THE FIRST QUESTION I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ATTENDED THE CEREMONIAL OPENING AT TROMBAY. CAN YOU REMEMBER THAT INCIDENT?

Well, in I think it was in January, 1961; the Indian government opened their nuclear energy establishment at Trombay, which is just south of Bombay. The Canadian government had made a present to the Indian government of a research reactor and this was the, so to speak, the opening of the, of the station and of the reactor. And the Indian government, th, made quite a an event out of this and they invited scientists from all over the world and the prime minister Nehru was the host, so to speak, at this gathering. The British representation consisted of Sir John Cockcroft and myself I then being the chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority. So we went out to Bombay the Indian program, had... really been developed under the influence of a of an Indian scientist called Homi Bhabha who I think is one of the most remarkable people I've met, and who certainly was the inspiration and architect of the American nuclear, the, of the Indian nuclear-energy program. He was a, he was a, he was a very distinguished physicist in his own right; he was a fellow of the Royal Society; he was a good artist a good musician and a man of singular charm. And and he was as it were, the moving spirit. And so we had this meeting and the establishment at Trombay was also, urn used as a sort of: nucleus of the Indian electronics industry; they had they were doing a lot of electronics work there... as well as the obviously in relation to the nuclear establishment, but still... on a broader field. And so we spent I suppose... two or, two or three days, there; urn... there were, there was French and Russians and... Chinese professor, and there was a lot of entertainment and Nehru was the host, and a very attractive host too, and good opportunity to get to know him a little bit. And Sir John Cockcroft and I did a... gave a... press conference and a conference for young scientists, and the as we were rather contrasting personalities, it was it must have been a rather hilarious event for those who were there but the atmosphere was a, was a very good one; and of course the Indian... scientists... were very able people.

YOU MUST HAVE BEEN QUITE INTERESTED IN THE CHINESE PROGRAM AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. DID YOU TRY AND ELICIT ANY INFORMATION FROM THE CHINESE?

Yeah, we did indeed. Sir John Cockcroft and I cornered the Chinese professor, and we had a... conversation with him, I suppose it might have been at least half an hour — of course he spoke... ex-, excellent English. He, he spoke a great many words, and didn't tell us one single important piece of information.

WHAT WAS YOUR VIEW, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THE ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM THAT EISENHOWER PROPOSED?

Well, I think we were very much in favor of it. It was a, it was a new, well, we were in, obviously in favor of atoms for peace, civil program, and it was a, it was a new departure in that the, instead of the Americans trying to keep everything under wraps, they were prepared to give a great deal of their experience to the world, in the civil field, and in the, in the non-weapons aspects of atomic energy, so, I think they, it was a, it was a, it was a, it was a departure which the British government welcomed.

TALKING ABOUT THE CHINESE, WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REACTION IN '64, WHEN THE CHINESE FIRST EXPLODED THEIR NUCLEAR DEVICE?

I don't recall that particularly, I, the... we all along realized that the, these, that the nuclear... information, nuclear technology could not be kept to a single country. The the... in... the scientists in Russia, in France, in the United Kingdom, in the United States had all the information necessary to develop, the nuclear facilities. And it was, we that was where we differed from the Americans in the in the '40s because they... believed, or many of them believed, that they would be able to keep it as a monopoly, and that if they... kept tight security that the Russians and others would not be able to develop it, and they were not, many of them, at all enthusiastic about the British program. But we were, knew perfectly well that the Russians had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons; the only... the only slight, I suppose, miscalculation was, I think that we thought it would take them two or three years longer than it actually did, but then two or three years is a marginal period. So, I think we were not surprised when they, the Russian bomb was uncovered. Only mildly surprised that they managed to do it in three years instead of five.

TO GET BACK TO THE INDIAN PROGRAM, DID THE UK. GIVE ANY ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIANS IN THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM?

Well, I know of very close relations between Bhabha and the, and Howell and, Ian Sands; I, it's specific, I don't know specifically what... for it, but I mean, the relations were very close. And therefore a great deal of information must have flowed.

COULD YOU TELL US ALSO, FROM YOUR RECOLLECTIONS, WHAT THE BRITISH POSITION WAS TO THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY?

Well, obviously, we are, I don't re-call the details of it, because I wasn't myself concerned with it. But obviously, we were strongly in favor, and supporting all efforts to limit nuclear proliferation; I mean an... obvious thing, you know, the... there are many difficulties about it, but I'm sure that we were... actively... positively working for the negotiation and the widest possible exception of that treaty.

WHAT WAS THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE INDIAN EXPLOSION OF THE BOMB, IN '74?

Well, there again it, was it was something which was more or less inevitable. The Indian science is very good, and... their technology is quite good; they had the information it wasn't at all surprising that they were able to develop a weapon.

AND FINALLY, I DON'T KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVES WITH THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INVESTIGATION.

President Carter... I wasn't involved at all.

OKAY.

I don't remember... I don't remember it very clearly, I, even... I mean it was by that time, I was mainly concerned with other things.