WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE – TAPE D05000 THEODORE SORENSEN [2]

Proposed Courses of Actions during Berlin Crisis

Interviewer:
THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WERE GIVEN TO KENNEDY CONCERNING THE BERLIN CRISIS. IF YOU COULD GIVE US A SENSE OF THE RANGE OF POSITIONS AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION ON THAT OR YOUR SUGGESTION?
Sorensen:
With a little advance warning I could have been prepared for that question.
Interviewer:
SORRY?
Sorensen:
With a little advance warning I could have...
Interviewer:
BUT WHAT IS YOUR RECOLLECTION?
Sorensen:
Uh... the President returned from his Vienna summit meeting with uh... Chairman Khrushchev determined to find uh...some method of preventing uh... the Russians from making good on their uh... their threat to close off access to West Berlin. He canvased his advisers and he canvassed his allies. And not surprisingly they came up with a wide range of recommendations all the way from uh...taking the matter to the uh...world court to uh... the use of nuclear weapons. In between were recommendations for declaring an actual emergency, calling up the guard and the reservists. Uh... considerably reinforcing the American uh.. military uh...contingent in West Berlin and West Germany. Uh... strengthening the allied fore along the uh..front in central Europe and uh... increasing uh... civil defense efforts in the United States in anticipation of a potential nuclear war.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT WHAT SOULD BE DONE?
Sorensen:
My own feeling uh... was that the United States had to use a combination of uh... carrots and sticks. That we had to make clear to Chairman Khrushchev that the United States would not uh... simply accept uh...the strangulation of uh...west Berlin and was prepared to resist by force if a force were needed. But at the same time, to uh... open channels of communication to ascertain whether a negotiated solution was possible.
Interviewer:
WAS KENNEDY SYMPATHETIC TO THAT?
Sorensen:
Ultimately that is where uh... Kennedy came out. There were other elements uh... in his speech including the element of a civil defense which had an unanticipated uh... result and which he later uh... regretted having placed in quite those terms. But on the whole, it was a speech which bought time. Which reassured our allies. And which persuaded uh...Chairman Khrushchev that uh... he ultimately should open a dialogue on the subject which in the secret correspondence that followed in September uh... the two superpower chiefs began to do.

First Strike Proposal

Interviewer:
THEY INTERVIEWED CARL KAYSEN YESTERDAY. HE TOLD THEM THAT KAYSEN AND HENRY ROWEN HAD WRITTEN A FIRST STRIKE PLAN OPTION PLAN. DO YOU RECALL THAT AND THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION?
Sorensen:
Uh...I recall their presenting such a plan to me and I reacted with uh... unusual emotion uh... and vigor in telling them that it uh...was an unthinkable plan and the President would never support it. I'm not sure it even reached the President's desk.
Interviewer:
(REPEATS QUESTION)
Sorensen:
No. I don't remember Rowen coming in with it but I do remember Carl Kaysen coming in with it.
Interviewer:
(REPEATS QUESTION)
Sorensen:
I recall Carl Kaysen coming into my office with plan for use of nuclear weapons by the United States in a sort of pre-emptive uh... move. While I did not pretend to be the worlds uh... foreign policy expert in the White House, and generally took all recommendations with uh... some calm and under consideration, I reacted immediately and violently to that proposal and told them that it would... it was an outrageous: uh... thought and that the President would never consider it.
Interviewer:
DID THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER IT? OR DID IT GET TO THE PRESIDENT?
Sorensen:
I'm not sure that proposal even reached President Kennedy's desk.
Interviewer:
WE SAW A BIT OF FOOTAGE THE OTHER DAY OF ROBERT KENNEDY TALKING ABOUT BERLIN AND SAYING LET IT BE CLEAR THAT MY BROTHER WILL USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF IT'S NECESSARY TO. DO YOU RECALL THAT SORT OF THREAT BEING MADE.
Sorensen:
Uh... it was American policy in the Kennedy administration, before and since, that America was prepared to use uh... nuclear weapons to prevent the conquest of western Europe. No one uh... believed it would come to that, but the only way that a superpower with nuclear weapons and overwhelming conventional strength could be deterred and the only way that our allies could be assured and thereby prevented from going off in six different directions on their own was they promised that we would be willing to stand up and risk our security for their security.
Interviewer:
BUT KAYSEN'S PROPOSAL WAS GOING BEYOND THAT IN SOME WAY OR...
Sorensen:
To tell you the truth, I have no recollection of the uh... Kaysen's proposal at all. The only reason I can tell you what I've just told you is because there was reference to it a year or so ago which refreshed my memory that such a proposal had been put before me and I had reacted violently to it.
[END OF TAPE D05000 AND TRANSCRIPT]