BUT DO YOU THINK THAT
THE KIND OF STRATEGIC REASONINGS THAT GALLOIS WAS USING, HE USED TO TALK ABOUT PROPORTIONAL
DETERRENCE AND ALL THESE THINGS, WAS THAT PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE? OR WAS THE DECISION
ULTIMATELY, AND I'M THINKING ESPECIALLY OF DE GAULLE, FOR THE PRESTIGE OF FRANCE?
profession was perfectly adapted to the situation as it was, in those days. And his contribution
was certainly positive. But he wouldn't go so far as saying that de Gaulle needed it to do what
he did. Because if you cast a glance at the private letters which de Gaulle wrote in 1958, as
far back as 1958, even before he was the president of his republic, and he was the last prime
minister of the Fourth Republic, Coty was still chief of state, if you cast a glance at this, at
these private letters, which have now been published by his son, Admiral de Gaulle, well, you'd
see that he knew exactly, he knew exactly what he aimed at. And I remember him telling me, "I
shall never accept the NATO situation as it is, a country like France must know and feel that we
are primarily responsible for our own security. But, it's useless to raise the problem now,
because we can't afford it. Three previous conditions must be fulfilled: we must get rid of the
colonial, of the overseas wars; we must have a strong political system, and a strong political
structure; and in the, and in the third place, we must restore trade, economic, and financial
balances." When these three conditions have been fulfilled, then we'd raise the NATO problem.
And when he called upon me in 1966 and asked me to go...