SO MR. SCHUMANN IF YOU COULD FIRST TELL ME ABOUT THE MOOD IN FRANCE ABOUT THE TIME IN 1951 WHEN THE AMERICAN TROOPS FIRST STARTED ARRIVING AND EISENHOWER CAME TO TAKE OVER SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF NATO. WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN FRANCE AT THAT TIME AND WHO DID PEOPLE THINK WERE THE REAL ENEMY?

That's a very good question.

WELL WHAT'S THE ANSWER? IF YOU COULD JUST TELL ME WHAT THE MOOD WAS IN EUROPE AROUND 1951 WHEN...

That was two years or two years and a half after the famous Prague coup. Undoubtedly the majority of the French nation felt that the greatest danger came from the east. That's why the American troops were undoubtedly welcomed. But at the same time the past weighs very heavy on the nation's conscience, especially recent past, recent past and a very painful past, too. That's the reason why, on the 12th of September 1950 just before I came into office when in New York very heavy pressure was borne on the French government, to bring them to accept the revival of the German army, my namesake Robert Schuman felt that it was asking too much a German national army German headquarters German general staff all that of course reminded the French people of too much and of too recent recollections. That's why he suggested the famous European defense community which meant rearming Germany without giving Germany a national army. And the result was that three years were lost. And it was only after EDC failed in 1954 that the French government and the French parliament and the French people, were bound to accept a German national army.

NOW I'LL COME TO THAT IN A MINUTE, BUT RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THESE RATHER TORTUROUS NEGOTIATIONS THERE WAS, OF COURSE, THE LISBON NATO CONFERENCE WHICH YOU ATTENDED. CAN YOU TELL US A BIT ABOUT ANY RECOLLECTIONS YOU HAVE OF THAT CONFERENCE AND OF THE SO CALLED LISBON GOALS AND WHETHER YOU THOUGHT THEY WERE REALISTIC?

I remember very well that we found ourselves in a very difficult position. In the first place, we knew that we couldn't expect the American boys to cross the Atlantic, which we felt was essential and vital, if all the Europeans didn't take part in their own defense which entailed German rearmament. And on the other hand we knew that the French parliament and French public opinion were not ready to accept German national army. So we had to find some kind of compromise and the only compromise we found was EDC, although EDC proved not to be a practical purpose.

DO YOU THINK THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS THAT IT WAS DECIDED TO TRY TO FORM AT THAT LISBON CONFERENCE WAS REALISTIC AND IF NOT WHY DID PEOPLE THINK THAT IT WAS NECESSARY?

It was a symbol because we all felt, and we're right to feel, that if the Americans were actually in Europe, the Russians wouldn't go wouldn't beyond a certain point and wouldn't take an irretrievable risk.

BUT 90 DIVISIONS; HOW SOON WAS IT REALIZED AT ANY RATE IN FRANCE THAT WAS NOT A REALISTIC AMBITION?

Do you realize yourself that, important as this figure was it was not really essential because half of the matter was the Americans in Europe. A socialist prime minister who came into office a few years later, his name was Guy Mollet used to say that one single American in Berlin would probably be enough for all security not to be too dangerously threatened. Of course it was an overstatement, but actually I see what he meant.

WELL WHAT DID HE MEAN? PERHAPS YOU CAN SPELL IT OUT FOR US.

He just meant that the Russians would never run the risk of taking Western Europe if that could lead to direct challenge to the United States. That was true. After the Russians had the bomb it was even of course truer when the Russians didn't have the bomb.

BUT ULTIMATELY YOU WERE CONSCIOUS AS EARLY AS 1951 OR '52 THAT IT WAS THE BOMB THAT WAS THE REAL DETERRENT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

Exactly. Yes it was a real deterrent but the problem was were the Americans ready to use the bomb to protect us and not to later protect themselves. And it still is the essential problem. From the time there was the American army in Europe the problem could be considered to be settled. Maybe it was not entirely settled but it was nearer to settlement than before.

NOW IN 1954 THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FINALLY VOTED AGAINST THE EDC AND ALL THAT NEGOTIATION WAS IN VAIN AND COLLAPSED. WHAT WAS THE MOOD AT THAT POINT AS YOU RECALL?

The mood at that point was, a combination of Communist opposition and Nationalist opposition because the French people gradually came to realize I think it was probably worse to merge the French army into a European army on an equal foot with the German army than to accept a German national army.

SO THERE WAS THIS RATHER FRANTIC LAST MINUTE NEGOTIATIONS BY DULLES AND EDEN TO TRY AND GET GERMANY INTO NATO. HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE PROMISE BY ADENAUER NOT TO DEVELOP OFFENSIVE ARMS AND, PARTICULARLY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Absolutely essential. Absolutely essential. It was a crucial point and the heart of the matter. When Adenauer proved to be a European statesman, when he, when he proved to be worth his anti-Nazi past, don't forget that he was in seven concentration camps in the period, when he admitted that a divided country could not be given an offensive weapon. Of course he would never have used it to attack the East but he didn't know who his successor would be. The past has lasted long and the future lasts longer said a French poet. When its obvious that as a prominent statesman, he renounced offensive powers and especially, and essentially, the atomic bomb there was virtually the majority in French Parliament who accept Germany in NATO. I dare say had it not been for that concession the result would have been different.

SO FOR FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR, THAT CONCESSION WAS VITAL YOU THINK?

Vital.

IF YOU COULD JUST SAY THAT FOR ME. COULD YOU, JUST IN ONE SENTENCE, HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR FRANCE?

It was vital for France. And when Mendes-France came back from London with I was going to say with that gift, it was not a gift as you and I mean, with that major concession from the Germans he had practically won.

FINE. WHAT WAS THE REACTION, IF ANY, IN FRANCE TO THE SUCCESSFUL TEST OF THE BRITISH ATOM BOMB IN 1952 AND WAS THERE ANY EITHER SURPRISE OR REACTION TO THAT IN FRANCE THAT YOU RECALL?

The, the reaction was certainly favorable because it meant, on the one hand, that Western Europe was stronger and in the second place that American protection which was vital was not exclusive. The average Frenchman wants to be an American's faithful ally and at the same time doesn't want American pressure to be too heavy and American power to be too insistent and it was a step undoubtedly, a step forward in that direction.

YOU WERE A FAIRLY SENIOR POLITICAL POSITION DURING THESE YEARS. WERE YOU AT ALL CONSCIOUS OF THE STATE OF THE FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM AND WERE YOU ...

Yes.

WHAT WAS YOUR STATE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THAT TIME OF THE FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM AND DO YOU RECALL ANY DISCUSSIONS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT FRANCE WOULD DEVELOP AN ATOMIC BOMB?

Between '51 and '54 the issue was not permanently at stake. You probably know that the final decision was taken in 1954, in December 1954 when Mendes-France was in office. Not before. But, I want here to stress a very important point. My namesake, Robert Schumann, whose deputy I was in those days, was a firm and staunch opponent to those who, both in England and France, didn't want Europe to possess the atomic bomb. He was a staunch supporter of those who believe that there was no serious participation of a country like France in common defense without the atomic bomb. That is a very important point which has to be underlined because very few people know of it and know it and here I'm in a position to speak as a, as a witness.

NOW THE OTHER EVENT OF THOSE YEARS, OF COURSE, WAS THE GROWING CRISIS IN INDOCHINA WITH THE COLLAPSE OF DIEN BIEN PHU AS THE CLIMAX OF THAT. WHAT WAS THE FRENCH FEELING ABOUT THE COOPERATION, OR LACK OF IT, THAT IT GOT FROM THE UNITED STATES. DID IT FEEL ABANDONED BY THE UNITED STATES DURING THAT PERIOD OR, AT ANY RATE, NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED?

Yes. Unfortunately this was a stumbling block on the road both to a united Europe and to a better protection against the Eastern threat. The average French people felt that the Americans let us down. It was a mistake because they had expected too much. They felt that there was one single fight all over the world. That the Prague coup, the Korean War, the Indochinese War, all that had finally the same significance and that we had to be together. Everywhere or nowhere. Of course I knew and my namesake knew better than I did and although you had serious responsibilities in French politics, knew that this was not as simple as all that and that the Americans were both anti-communist and anti and against the colonialists and against the colonial powers and thought that in Indochina we were the colonial power. But, when we came to realize, on the one hand, that they let us down, not entirely, because they gave us weapons, but not, no direct assistance. On the one hand that they let us down. But on the other hand that they were prepared to relieve us. In Indochina there was undoubtedly a bitter resentment against them. All the more that we have taken part in the Korean War. I was the French representative, for awhile, in New York in the committee where all the nations who took part in the Korean War sat together, England, Turkey Belgium and all the rest of them. And our contention was that the aim ought to be a package deal. Peace in the Far East, both in Korea and in Indochina. We wanted to bring Indochina into the picture. I tried to achieve that result as much as I could and I must say that all my attempts proved to be vain.

OF COURSE YOU WERE AT ONE POINT OFFERED BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES, THE ATOMIC BOMB, TO HELP YOU OUT THERE, WEREN'T YOU?

No. No. No. This is both...

IF NOT BY DULLES THEN BY RADFORD, BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

It was both, this is both true and entirely false. I was there when Dulles said to Bidault, Georges Bidault whose deputy I was and who was Robert Schuman's successor, "What would you think if we offered you the atomic bomb?" And Bidault's reaction, of course, was not only negative but astounded. It was absolutely meaningless. You realize what an atomic bomb on the Northern Indochina would mean? Do you remember what it would have entailed? It meant absolutely nothing. The prop..., the proposition was never serious. It was just a way of evading the negotiation. The endless, and pointless negotiation of better support from the Americans. But please don't take this so called proposition at it's face value.

DO YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION AGAIN ABOUT THE...

At the time, when the situation in Korea was anything but bright. The administration, the American administration, rejecting the Mac... MacArthur's suggestion that an atomic bomb might be dropped on the Chinese and North Koreans. So who would believe that an American administration would do for France and Indochina what they refused to do for themselves? At the time again when they found themselves in the appalling situation, which-which was put right lately, later but which in this time was appalling. Besides don't remember that you don't give an atomic bomb like you offer a cigarette to a friend of yours. You have to drop it yourself. Its not a toy which you hand over like a child to another child. In other words, they would have to do it themselves. All that tends to prove that it was never a serious proposition. And I'm sure that if Admiral Radford ever raised the point in front of Eisenhower, the President's answer was "He must be crazy."

TO MOVE ON A COUPLE OF YEARS, WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN FRANCE TO THE SUEZ DEBACLE? YOU WERE A LITTLE BIT INVOLVED IN THAT YOURSELF, BUT WHAT WAS THE OVERALL REACTION IN FRANCE?

Terrible. I was personally in Suez. I was called up as most liaison officers who had taken part in the landing on the 6th of June 1944, we are supposed to know all about British tactical principles and habits, so we were called up and I was personally in Suez. But being a politician at the same time at several time, at several I was several times ordered to come back to France, and back again to Isles of Cyprus or Suez and the French public opinions reaction was terrific because at the time when the Russians, don't forget it happened at the same time, at the time when the Russians crushed the Hungarian revolt as they did. At the time when the Russian tanks entered Budapest. The fact that American took position against France and England in the Near East was felt as a terrible challenge, and the French people resented more bitterly than you can imagine.

WHAT DID THEY THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE DONE? AFTER ALL, FRANCE HAD NOT WARNED THE UNITED STATES ABOUT WHAT ITS INTENTIONS WERE.

Are you sure? There was nothing obvious in those days, I'm I don't know, but I'm sure there were contacts at least between London and Washington, if not between Paris and Washington, although I'm not quite sure there were no contacts between Paris and Washington, on that special point. At least, we expected that America could have been neutral but when we saw the American fleet, just off the Egyptian shore prepared to join the Russians in a common action, the United Nations against France and England we had that terrible feeling of being let down by your allies. And I'm glad to say that after a few months all that was forgotten. But I was afraid, in those days, that it might have longer effect than expected.

DO YOU THINK THAT FEELING OF BETRAYAL AND BITTERNESS WAS SOMETHING WHICH INSPIRED GUY MOLLET, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE TIME? DID IT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON HIS ATTITUDE TO THE ATOM BOMB?

That's an interesting approach. No. I'm perfectly sure that we should have raised to atomic rank whatever happened. Maybe, of course, that Suez had an influence on a very specific point. In 1966, much later, when de Gaulle asked me, I was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, asked me to go to Washington and explain to President Johnson the reasons why we are getting out of...

NATO.

Integrated Organization, while of course remaining faithful to the alliance he told me, "Please, don't forget to tell the President that of course we don't want to be entangled into a war without having decided ourselves to join, but tell him that it is even far more important that we should be in a position not to be let down in case of an eastern aggression, because this time we couldn't afford waiting until 1917 or until 1943 for the New World to come to the rescue of the Old, as Churchill quite flatly said in 1940." And it's, he didn't mention Suez, but I'm sure, that experience, that 1956 experience, was an argument which strengthened that the above mentioned position.

IT MIGHT HAVE SEEMED TO THE AMERICANS THAT WHAT YOU WERE SAYING WAS, "YOU MUST NOT ABANDON US, YOU MUST CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THAT YOU WON'T WAIT FOR TWO YEARS, OR WHATEVER PERIOD BUT WE'RE ABANDONING YOU. WE'RE GOING TO GET OUT OF NATO. WE'RE NOT GOING TO CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARILY TO THE ALLIANCE." BUT WE DEMAND THAT YOU CONTINUE YOUR GUARANTEE. ISN'T THAT A FAIR REACTION ON THE AMERICAN SIDE?

It was, for a very short time. Because, I remember very well, that the end of my conversation with Johnson was, "General de Gaulle is ready to start negotiating immediately an agreement on military cooperation, in case, just in case" use this to finish the sentence "and could you repeat that to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, which you are going to address tomorrow." "Certainly, Mr. President." I did, and a few months later, the famous agreements between the two generals, General [Ayare] on the French side, and General Lemnitzer on the American side, were negotiated and signed. And now, in 1950, '86, it's no longer an issue.

NEVERTHELESS, THE REACTION -

The cooperation has never been closer than it is now.

WHAT WAS THE AMERICAN REACTION AT THE TIME, THOUGH? WHAT WAS JOHNSON'S REACTION TO YOU, DO YOU REMEMBER?

The, the first reaction was negative. Offended. But I felt, during the conversation, that things could be put right on a short period. When I landed in New York, I remember telling our ambassador, "Mmm, I'm sure the crisis would, will probably last two or three years." And I remember when I left telling him, "The crisis will be over within a few weeks, because now the real issue at stake will be the negotiation of the, of the agreements, which will be substituted for integration." Don't remember, don't forget, rather, do remember, don't forget, what de Gaulle said in those days. "We're not asking you to trust us for the future. We're asking us to trust us for the past." Both in the Cuba crisis and in the Berlin crisis, we were the most faithful, we were entirely side by side with you. Which just tends to prove that the more independent the ally is, the more conscious he is that he's mainly responsible for his own security, the more reliable he is for leaning upon.

TO GO BACK AGAIN, WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO SPUTNIK IN FRANCE? DO YOU RECALL ANY, TO THE SPUTNIK SATELLITE? DO YOU RECALL WHAT THE REACTION WAS GENERALLY OR WHAT YOUR OWN REACTION WAS?

Yes, I remember it very well. The, the layman, the average Frenchman, doesn't make much difference between pacific conquests of the, of the sky, and military consequences of those of a... progress of improvement of that kind. And undoubtedly the people were scared, I would say scared stiff, but very scared. They felt that Russian, Russia was very powerful, and proved to be a lasting danger. And the impact on the alliance was positive, for that special reason.

DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN YOU WERE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AROUND THIS TIME? GENERAL GALLOIS WAS BRIEFING A GREAT MANY PEOPLE. WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS OF THAT ON YOU?

Well, I liked Gallois very much, but so far as I was concerned his demonstrations were not necessary. I was convinced before he started explaining all about it to the average MP.

BUT DO YOU THINK THAT THE KIND OF STRATEGIC REASONINGS THAT GALLOIS WAS USING, HE USED TO TALK ABOUT PROPORTIONAL DETERRENCE AND ALL THESE THINGS, WAS THAT PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE? OR WAS THE DECISION ULTIMATELY, AND I'M THINKING ESPECIALLY OF DE GAULLE, FOR THE PRESTIGE OF FRANCE?

Gallois' whole profession was perfectly adapted to the situation as it was, in those days. And his contribution was certainly positive. But he wouldn't go so far as saying that de Gaulle needed it to do what he did. Because if you cast a glance at the private letters which de Gaulle wrote in 1958, as far back as 1958, even before he was the president of his republic, and he was the last prime minister of the Fourth Republic, Coty was still chief of state, if you cast a glance at this, at these private letters, which have now been published by his son, Admiral de Gaulle, well, you'd see that he knew exactly, he knew exactly what he aimed at. And I remember him telling me, "I shall never accept the NATO situation as it is, a country like France must know and feel that we are primarily responsible for our own security. But, it's useless to raise the problem now, because we can't afford it. Three previous conditions must be fulfilled: we must get rid of the colonial, of the overseas wars; we must have a strong political system, and a strong political structure; and in the, and in the third place, we must restore trade, economic, and financial balances." When these three conditions have been fulfilled, then we'd raise the NATO problem. And when he called upon me in 1966 and asked me to go...

SORRY, LET ME STOP YOU THERE. WHAT DID THAT HAVE TO DO WITH AN ATOM BOMB? HE DIDN'T MENTION THAT AT ALL. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE SAID, "WE MUST HAVE THE BOMB."

No, because that he didn't even mention it, because that was admitted once and for all. That was unconditional.

LET ME ASK YOU AGAIN. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE PRIME REASON FOR DE GAULLE, WHY DID DE THINK THAT FRANCE NEEDED AN ATOM BOMB?

Well, never forget one can't be more Gaullist then, but don't believe that the decision was taken by de Gaulle.

LEAVING THAT ASIDE, HE HAD TO CONFIRM OR NOT. I MEAN, HE CERTAINLY WAS A GREAT PROPONENT OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE.

He played a prominent part because things went much quicker once he was there. And instead of doing it without speaking about it, without making it conspicuous, he as always said exactly what he was doing explained what his aims were. In other words, it was a gigantic step forward, but the decision was taken before.

I KNOW THAT. BUT WHY DO YOU THINK HE...

Otherwise the discussion wouldn't have taken at the time that it did.

SURE, BUT WHAT DO YOU THINK HIS REASONS WERE FOR WANTING FRANCE TO HAVE A SUFFICIENT FORCE DE FRAPPE?

His reason was that he was de Gaulle, and that as far back as 1940 when we were the most distressing situation of all, of all our history, he wanted France to be a full partner in the alliance. How can you be a full partner in the alliance in 1960 if you don't ha... if you, if you are not a strategic power? And how can you be a strategic power if you, if you don't have the bomb?

DID HE THINK THAT THE BOMB WOULD GIVE FRANCE ADDED SECURITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, OR DID HE THINK IT WOULD GIVE IT ADDED PRESTIGE VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES?

Not only prestige. Impact on the United States decision...

COULD YOU GIVE ME A SENTENCE?

De Gaulle knew that articles...

AFTER I STOP TALKING, IF YOU COULD JUST GIVE ME A SENTENCE...

De Gaulle used to mention Article Five of the Atlantic Treaty. Article Five says that every member of the alliance if another member of the alliance is being attacked, decides how and when he's going to help.

COULD YOU SUM UP FOR US THE SORTS OF REASONINGS THAT WERE IN DE GAULLE'S MIND AT THAT TIME?

The first place, De Gaulle's reaction in 1960 was the same as it was in 1940. Feeling of inferiority in the alliance was just unbearable to him. That's the first answer. The second answer is that he knew, he knew and every Frenchman doesn't know, that article five of the Atlantic Treaty says that if we are being attacked America as any other member of the alliance will undertake the action he judges necessary. In other words, there is no automatic commitment. This is essential. In other words, we must be in the position to have a specific impact on America in case of a major crisis.

IMPACT ON AMERICA. NOT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

Ah. On the Soviet Union, of course, but you're quite right to underline that to have an impact on the Soviet Union, you must be a strong coalition. There is no strong coalition without America. And to be sure that America would come to the rescue of Europe must be in a position to act by itself.

SO THIS IS THE IDEA OF TRIGGERING THE AMERICAN RESPONSE BY THE USE OF THE FRENCH BOMB? IS THAT...

Exactly.

COULD YOU JUST SPELL THAT IDEA OUT FOR US? COULD YOU JUST...

I remember De Gaulle telling me the French atomic bomb, as the English atomic bomb, may prove to be a necessary trigger.

WHAT DO YOU THINK HE MEANT BY THAT?

He meant that we might have to use the atomic bomb to protect Europe and to force the United States to accept all the consequences of... Let me start that all over again. So difficult to...

IF YOU COULD JUST PERHAPS SPELL THAT OUT. IT'S QUITE A SIMPLE IDEA, REALLY.

Doesn't it a... You don't think that the word trigger...

WELL I THINK IT SAYS...

Says everything. Yes.

PERHAPS IT DOES. LET'S LEAVE THAT.

He, he meant exactly this. That if the worst came to the worst, America would not be the only power to decide whether we had to react and when we had to react. That the decision would have to be taken by the free world at large. And not only by the American side of the free world.

I WANT TO JUST TO COME TO YOUR TRIP THAT YOU MADE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ONCE AGAIN. IF YOU COULD TELL US THAT STORY A LITTLE BIT MORE SHORTLY THAN YOU DID LAST TIME, IF THAT'S POSSIBLE. THE FACT THAT IT WAS YOU SENT BY DE GAULLE, AND WHAT, VERY BRIEFLY, YOU SAID TO JOHNSON AND WHAT THE INITIAL REACTION WAS. COULD YOU DO THAT FOR US?

When I saw President Johnson in the White House, he was of course astounded and terribly unhappy for various reasons. The end of the conversation was far more encouraging than the beginning. What had happened in the meantime. I was in a position to tell him, "General De Gaulle doesn't ask you, Mr. President, to trust us for the future but to trust us because of the past. We've been side by side with you in the Berlin crisis. We've been side by side with you in the Cuban crisis. And General De Gaulle believes that an ally is far more reliable when he feels that he's mainly responsible for his own security."

AND AS A RESULT OF THAT, THE AMERICAN REACTION WAS NOT AS FIERCE AS YOU'D EXPECTED.

It wasn't. Especially because I could add one very important point. We had already, we are ready now, we are ready in a position to suggest negotiation between American general staff and French general staff on cooperation between the two armies in case the necessity occurs. President Johnson answered, "Now, are you prepared to repeat that to the foreign affairs committee of the Senate and the foreign affairs committee in the House?" "Certainly, Mr. President." I did it the next day and as you, everybody knows, a few months later the agreement was signed between General [Ayare] on the French side and General Lemnitzer on the American side. And a few years later, I daresay a few months later, that problem was no longer an issue at stake. And the military cooperation was never smoother.

LET ME TAKE YOU TO THE LAST QUESTION. BACK TO 1950, '51. WHAT EFFECT ON THE MOOD IN EUROPE DID THE KOREAN WAR HAVE SPECIFICALLY. WAS THAT THE FINAL THING THAT MADE PEOPLE FRIGHTENED OF A GENUINE AGGRESSION FROM THE SOVIET UNION?

The Korean War was felt as a global challenge of the communist war, of the communist world to the Western world, to the free world. The French people in those days didn't feel more than General MacArthur did, that China and Russia were to be torn asunder. That there was no lasting alliance between the two communist powers. It was rescinded the first time as the equivalence to for example, Ethiopian War had been in 1935, a kind of rehearsal before the big show. And the reaction was, "We don't forget what happened fifteen or twenty years ago, and we think that the right time to stop them, is the first moment, the first minute." And that was the reason why solidarity, except of course, for the communist party, solidarity between the Americans, between the United Nations and France was accepted and enforced.

BUT IN TERMS OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE...

Exactly. The feeling was that the security of Europe was the issue at stake. And the durable security of the free world was a security... was the issue at stake. After that we felt as I told you before, we felt that it might be used a... as a path towards a package deal of all the overseas issues, in other words, that we might possibly settle the Indochinese crisis at the same time as the Korean crisis. And that of course, was unsuccessful. It was not brought to a successful conclusion. In other words, the impact of the Korean War was highly positive on Western co-operation in the first stage, and unfortunately, detrimental to it in the second stage.

DO YOU THINK PEOPLE IN FRANCE WERE GENUINELY SCARED OF AN ACTUAL SOVIET AGGRESSION IN EUROPE AROUND THAT TIME?

Not a, maybe not immediately. Not at that time. But as... but it was resented as a challenge, as a global challenge which would undoubtedly lead, as--

IF THEY DIDN'T FEAR A SOVIET INVASION AT THAT TIME, WHAT WAS ALL THIS BUSINESS ABOUT NATO BRINGING THE TROOPS OVER AND ARMING EVERYTHING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HAVING NINETY DIVISIONS.

Simply because if the reason, the reasoning mass, if aggression pays this time, there will be another aggression. And possibly or likely an aggression against us. It was all as simple as all that. So the problem is to make sure that the aggression will not be. And then decide by side with the Americans to prove that aggression won't be.

LASTLY, TO LOOK BACK ON THINGS, DO YOU THINK THAT ITS OWN BOMB REALLY HAS CONTRIBUTED AS PEOPLE ASSUMED AS IT WOULD, TO FRENCH INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE? AND IF SO, HOW?

It did. Undoubtedly.

COULD YOU MAKE THAT INTO A SENTENCE, PLEASE?

When I became Foreign Minister in 1969, I realized immediately, also De Gaulle had resigned, I realized immediately the difference with the situation between 1951 and 1954, when I was Deputy Foreign Secretary. France's rank and prestige had been restored. The atomic bomb is not the only reason for that. The, there were no longer overseas wars. The institutions were serious solid and the French governments lasted instead of being thrown out every other day. Our financial and economic situation was far better than it was years before, at the same time. The fact that we were an atomic power, played a very important part. Before being Foreign Minister, I had been responsible for scientific research and atomic questions. And I had played a part a, in the nuclear phase of the whole thing. At last a nuclear phase in the whole thing. And even in those days, I realized how important that was. The questions which our allies asked us, were very significant. I must say, that the development of the Atlantic Islands, including NATO, might have been entirely different if America had accepted to help us. And as you know, America did not accept to help us, so we had to do everything ourselves. Although, I dare say, probably the first time I say so, although I dare say that one of the very, one of the very few who know that we were to a certain extent, helped by our British friends. I can't say anymore, but I deliberately go that far. Because any contribution to better relations with England is always a good thing.

AND YOU WON'T SAY WHAT AREAS?

I can't say any more. I can't say anymore. But a, being a strong supporter... of Franco-British alliance and co-operation, I dare say that in those days, I realize that our British friends were true allies, even when they found themselves in a difficult position between the most powerful ally and the oldest one.

OK, LET'S JUST STOP THERE FOR A MINUTE, CAN WE? I'M JUST GOING BACK AGAIN TO THOSE EARLY FIFTIES. TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE FIFTIES ABOUT THE FRENCH BOMB PROGRAM, TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THEY SECRET? WAS THE CABINET CONSULTED, WAS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSULTED, OR WAS IT KEPT VERY SMALL CIRCLE OF PEOPLE?

They were a secret. The National Assembly was never consulting. And the Cabinet at large was not either. The decision was taken 1954 in Pierre Mendes-France's office. I'm sure that he was probably the only he was a prime minister. The only Cabinet Minister there, maybe there was one other ... maybe the foreign minister was there, but certainly not more than two or three. And that was a great difference between the force of the Fifth Republic, the decision was taken, but it was not made conspicuous because they were afraid of inside oppositions, probably. And on the other hand, some people thought it was going to be too expensive or dangerous. I don't know what. When De Gaulle came, he immediately made it both public and conspicuous.

IT'S IRONIC IN A WAY THAT BOTH BRITAIN AND FRANCE, IT WAS SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS OF THE LEFT, AT ANY RATE, THAT TOOK THE DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH BOMB IN GREAT SECRECY AND LATER, CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS ANNOUNCED IT.

And later Mendes-France took position against the bomb.

COULD YOU PERHAPS DRAW A PARALLEL WITH THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE THERE, BECAUSE IT'S...

I wouldn't like to interfere in British politics, but it reminds me of your own experience. It happened very often that socialist governments took secret decisions which were made public with conservative governments. The same applies to France. One more reason to feel that the Entente Cordialle relies upon solid formation.

OK.

Lays upon solid formation.