DAVID, WHAT WAS THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS THAT LED TO THE PROPOSAL FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS WITH SECRETARY VANCE?

Well, I think it started out during the campaign, with the Democratic reaction to the Vladivostok agreement. The basic reaction was that the Ford Administration and the Soviets had taken their defense plans and stapled them together and said "Here, we have an agreement," and that it did not really in fact represent any substantial effort to use arms control to improve the strategic balance, to make it more stable and to make both sides more secure. With that as a background, when we came into office we looked at a very wide range of possible proposals. And outcomes to the negotiation. And we tried to focus on outcomes, rather than on initial negotiating positions, so that we could, if we could... start again. So that if we could... focus... You want me to start the whole thing over again?

(MISC.)

Okay. When the Carter Administration came into office, we tried to focus on outcomes to the negotiation, not initial negotiating positions, because we were trying to improve the strategic balance, trying to make it more stable. The result was that we realized that for SALT II to really accomplish something, not simply be a, an agreement for an agreement's sake, it would have to result in substantial changes in both our force posture and that of the Soviet Union. In particular, that it would lead to overall reductions, and reductions in heavy Soviet ballistic missiles. So in formulating our approach to Moscow we in effect set forth what we thought would be a very positive... strategic relationship, for both sides. And that really was the genesis of the Moscow proposals that Vance took there. I would say that we used the normal National Security Council machinery. We had the study groups, they developed options they put those options forward to higher levels, sort of... what we called the mini-special coordinating committee, which was what I chaired, and then ultimately to the special coordinating committee itself, which was a cabinet-level body that was composed of Dr. Brzezinski, Harold Brown, Cy Vance, Stan Turner, sometimes the Vice President chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those meetings, I think it's fair to say that Harold and I both with our background in SALT I felt quite strongly that we should make every attempt to really do something about the heavy Soviet ballistic missiles, which we believed posed a threat to our fixed land-based ICBMs. We weren't certain or confident that we could get the Soviets to reduce them but our analysis showed that if you could have done so, if you could have brought them down to a hundred and fifty missiles, for example, even if they were MIRVed, they would not really represent a new first-strike threat to our fixed land-based missiles. And with that basic analytical point, we both pushed very hard for this kind of a proposal.

SO YOU AND DR. BRZEZINSKI AND HAROLD BROWN WERE ALL IN ACCORD ON THIS?

I think ultimately Zbig was in accord with it as well, but it was basically Harold and myself.

WAS THERE ANY TENSION IN THESE CABINET-LEVEL MEETINGS?

Well...

DID THEY FIGHT IT?

I... never got the sense that they fought hard against these proposals. Perhaps they had their own private reservations about it but... they... did not seem to take the position that this was an improper effort. They... I think, subsequent or at Vladivostok -- I mean, sorry, at Moscow -- once these proposals were rejected, quite frankly the Secretary of State did not react as though he thought that they were... nonsense all along; in fact, he reacted in a very disappointed manner, held a press conference, and announced that there had been a great failure, which I think was not, was a mistake to do that, but it didn't reveal I think on his part that he was prepared to simply go back to Washington and say, "Well, you see, I told you so."

WERE YOU AT THE MEETING ON MARCH 12, WHICH DR. BRZEZINSKI CHAIRED?

I'm sure I was there, yes.

WHEN CARTER ACTUALLY ACCEPTED YOUR PLAN?

Yes, that's correct.

CAN YOU TELL US IN THE FIRST PERSON WHAT HAPPENED?

Well Dr. you know, Secretary Brown said that the greatest strategic problem, dilemma we faced, was what to do about the increasing vulnerability of our fixed land-based missiles, and our intelligence analysis demonstrated to us that at the level of technology that the Soviets were at then, if we could have constrained the number of heavy ICBMs, and then precluded any new MIRV developments, we could have avoided the situation which we have today, where we're increasingly worried that the Soviets could carry out a first strike against our land-based missiles and destroy them all. This seemed, to Harold and to me and ultimately to the President, to be a worthy objective for a strategic arms agreement; it would bring about greater stability. And so the President listened to him; he listened to Cy and to Paul Warnke; I think the two of them were more concerned about what their going-in position was going to be, whereas Harold was really talking about what is our long-range objective. The president made the decision that this would be a good going-in position and, if we could get it, a very good outcome as well.

AND SO WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT SAY WHEN IT WAS...

To tell you the truth, I don't remember his exact words. All I can tell you is the President decided that what he wanted to do -- I think the critical decision at the meeting was not so much on what the shape of the proposal was going to be; the critical decision was how was it going to be presented to the Soviets, and there was some discussion of shouldn't we call in Ambassador Dobrynin and give him a preview? Shouldn't we give him a letter that outlined our proposals, so that when Secretary Vance arrived in Moscow, they would have had some time to digest them and they could have some useful give-and-take? Cy didn't like that idea, and neither did the President, for that matter, and they decided that Cy would go to Moscow and lay it on the, out on the table there, and then see what reaction he could get. I think my own experience in previous administrations had been that this was not a good way to go; I think that there were others in the room that may have had some skepticism, but, he was the Secretary of State and Mr. Carter was the President, so....

YOU SAY EVENTUALLY BRZEZINSKI CAME ALONG. WAS HE SKEPTICAL?

No, Zbig didn't have any particular view of it. He was very cautious in the early years, on the subject of strategic arms and arms control. He didn't consider himself an expert in the field; I think it's fair to say he relied a lot on me and... so, if Harold thought it was a good idea, and if I thought it was a good idea he, generally speaking, went along.

THERE WAS A REMARKABLE SORT OF CONFLUENCE OF CARTER'S INSTINCTS FOR REDUCTIONS, AND SENATOR JACKSON. IS THAT, WERE THEY IN AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME?

That's not my recollection, no. Senator Jackson had come forward with the proposal that I believe had been prepared by Paul Nitze to have the Senator Jackson had sent the President a proposal, in a letter, which said, "What you should strive for is a thousand single-warhead ICBMs on both sides. This would be most stabilizing." In other words, repeal the multiple independent rear, reentry vehicle, the MIRV. Get rid of them, and let both sides just have some good warheads. Well, I certainly didn't object to that kind of a strategic relationship, and nor would Harold Brown, but both sides had invested so heavily in MIRVs, that we didn't think that was a realistic proposal, so, at this, at that point we decided not to go forward with that kind of a proposal.

BOTH SCOOP JACKSON AND THE PRESIDENT WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HEAVYS.

Everybody was concerned about trying to do something to, use SALT to redress the increasing vulnerability of our ICBMs. We had, you know, two problems: one was how do we get the Soviets to stop developments that would make them vulnerable; and secondly, what could we do on our own? And of course, that ultimately led to the MX decision.

YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE, AT THE TIME, GETTING THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEIR OWN HEAVY MISSILES, THAN OUR BUILDING THE MX.

Well, the other way to meet them, the way to meet the problem of the Soviet heavy missiles, and big MIRV missiles is to decrease the vulnerability of our systems. Now the MX, of course, has two aspects to it: one is, it's a great big missile somewhat like the Soviet heavy missiles and the other is that it was to be based in a way that would make it less vulnerable. Those are two very separate things, and when the President decided on a mobile shelter arrangement out in the western deserts that was rejected by the following administration, and of course, today we have no system for making them less vulnerable.

CARTER SAID THE THOUGHT OF THE MX WAS NAUSEATING. DID HE HAVE A REAL ANTIPATHY IN EARLY '77 TO THE THOUGHT OF A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM?

Well, my... I think the president's position on strategic weapons was very well summed up by him, before he was sworn into office. He met at the Blair House with the chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he said to them, "Imagine that you could design the strategic forces for both sides. Not only just for us, but also for the Soviets. What would be the most stable, secure, strategic posture for both sides, at the lowest possible level? What would it be?" And then he tossed out a number. He said, "For example, would it be 200 submarines on both sides?" He was thinking that they're very invulnerable; that's a low number, and so forth. Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were shocked by this discussion, and it didn't take more than 48 hours for the story to get in to Evans/Novak, and to become a cause celebre. But the President, as this president, President Reagan was deeply interested in trying to do something substantial about the strategic arms race, not just do something at the margins. Not just something incremental. And... that's what he looked to do in SALT. He, I don't think he was anxious to deploy new, or better, or different kinds of strategic arms, if in fact he could achieve the same result, in terms of security by actually having reductions.

BUT HE DIDNT, THE EFFORTS TO GET THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF HEAVY MISSILES FAILED, AND THE HIGHER CEILINGS WERE ACCEPTED, SO HE HAD TO GO WITH THE MX DECISION. SOME HAVE WRITTEN THAT BRZEZINSKI RAMMED IT DOWN HIS THROAT. WERE YOU AT THE NSC MEETING IN JUNE 4TH OF 1979?

Well, what happened, ultimately, was that the Soviets were not prepared to limit their heavy missiles so dramatically. You have to remember that the heavy missile had always been seen by the Soviets, in SALT, as compensation for the fact that we had all these aircraft and other, strategic non-strategic, but nonetheless powerful nuclear system deployed on the periphery of the Soviet Union, in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere. And, what happened in SALT I, part of the sort of unstated deal, was that the Soviets got to keep their heavy missiles, and we got to keep what we called our "forward-based systems." Now nothing had changed in that respect as we got into SALT II, but the Soviets did ultimately accept a sublimit on their heavy missiles. It was probably very close to what they planned to do to begin with, but it at least accepted the form of our concern, if not the full substance of it. And of course... the present administration, the Reagan Administration, is trying to lower that sublimit, to a hundred and fifty -- in effect, that they've gone right back to the proposal we made in March of 1977. Now, once that kind of an agreement emerged, and it was clear the Soviets were going to have a substantial number of heavy ICBMs, we had two problems: how to reduce the vulnerability of our ICBMs, and there were also those who were worried, don't we have to respond in kind somehow? Don't we also have to have a heavy ICBM? Well, that was a very debatable proposition from a strategic standpoint. From a political standpoint, looking at where the President stood with the Senate, his popularity in the country, and all the rest, it was quite clear we didn't want to be demagogued on the issue. We didn't want to have to somehow explain that we don't have to have one just like they have. So, the decision was ultimately made to deploy the heaviest ICBM that we could build, and still put in a Minuteman silo. That turned out to be the current MX. I think the President was not happy, having to make that decision, but I think he had to bow to the political realities of trying to get the SALT agreements ratified.

BUT THERE WAS A REAL CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR -- -

There was a very genuine concern about the vulnerability of our ICBMs, and even though there have been subsequent studies, and there even, debate of the time, as to whether the vulnerability was real, whether the vulnerability meant anything, given the fact that we have all these bombers and all these submarine missiles -- a lot of people said, what difference did it make? Well, there are some of us who are fairly conservative on this question, and did not like the idea that any major component of our strategic forces remain vulnerable, if there was something we could do about it. And I believe there was something we could do about it; in fact, there's something we could do about it today. But, of course, nothing has been done about it.

WHAT WAS THE PRIMARY MOTIVATION FOR THE PRESIDENT AGREEING TO THE MX?

I think the President's primary motivation for agreeing to the MX was that something had to be done about the vulnerability of our ICBMs. We also had the political issue that the Soviets were deploying these big heavy missiles which had been turned into this great bogeyman from a political standpoint. So he wanted his SALT agreement, and for his SALT agreement, he had to accept the big MX. Bear in mind, we looked at a lot of different MXs. Some of them would have been very small and mobile like the current Midgetman. Others would have been very large like the current MX.

WAS THIS BIG TO SATISFY THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, OR WAS IT BIG TO THWART THE SOVIETS SENSE THAT THEY COULD USE THEIR BIGNESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE?

Well, the desire to have a big missile, that would match the Soviets' was motivated on two fronts. One it was... motivated domestically, because there were people who felt, for parity, for perceived parity, to look like equals in the world, we had to have a big missile too. And then of course there were those who genuinely believed that argument. And so the President, I think, felt that strategically he didn't need a great big missile to somehow show his manhood but he did recognize the politi-, the fact that several peo-, that a lot of very important people believed that.

ONCE THE MX DECISION WAS MADE, JUST BEFORE THE VIENNA SUMMIT, WHAT DID THAT SAY ABOUT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF HOW THE US DEALS WITH THE SOVIETS? DOES IT SUGGEST ASSURANCE AND RESTRAINT, OR STRENGTH...AND INTIMIDATION?

I think there was no doubt that Dr. Brzezinski felt that it was important to make the decision on the size of the missile, if not the basing mode, before we met in Vienna. He also had felt previously that it was important to go forward with the normalization of relations with China, before reaching another SALT agreement. So, I... from... so, I think there was no question but what he felt it was important to show strength not only to the Soviets, but to our domestic critics who had now, by that time in the history of the administration, decided that the theme of weakness was the most powerful they could use against the President.

WHAT DID THE SALT TREATY MEAN? WHAT WAS GOOD ABOUT IT?

Well, I think it was important for several reasons. I think that, okay.... I think the SALT agreement was important for several reasons. First of all it did... carry the process forward to a new level of sophistication, and a new level of constraint. You know, the arms race that we've faced over the last 20 years has been both qualitative as well as quantitative; it has represented an explosion of technology as well as an explosion of numbers, of actual weapons. And in fact the two have gone hand in hand. This was the first agreement that really began to put real limitations, not only on the numbers and to bring about some reductions, which it did, but also to... very importantly, to control technology. Up until that agreement, it was sort of judged that technology was something you couldn't control how can you control technology? We didn't have that philosophy. Our philosophy was that man makes choices, and people can make deals. And you can make a deal, and make a choice that says, we will not pursue this kind of technological avenue beyond a certain limit. So I've always felt that the real importance of SALT II is that it demonstrated that you could, in fact, in your own interest, and in your mutual security interest, control technology. There were a lot of spin-offs of that. It gave us a baseline on which to direct our intelligence, our monitoring capabilities, against Soviet technology. It wrote a lot of rules and regulations about the extent to which the Soviets could encrypt their telemetry. It did a number of very important technical, but strategically vital, things like that, and it committed both sides to doing it. And I think in that sense it was a, really a breakthrough agreement, and I would hate to see it trashed.

IT WAS TRASHED YESTERDAY, WASNT IT? I WANT TO TALK ABOUT AFRICA. I THINK ONE OF THE KEY QUESTIONS IS WHETHER DR. BRZEZINSKI REALLY CARED ABOUT THE WHOLE SALT PROCESS. YOU WENT TO ETHIOPIA IN EARLY '78 TO SEE PRESIDENT MENGISTU. WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, I went to Ethiopia in 1978 because there had been a war raging between Somalia and Ethiopia for some time. Mr. Mengistu came to power during the Ford Administration and at first there was some hope that his revolution against Haile Selassie and the people who had ruled that country for so many thousands of years, might well be a reasonably moderate one. It didn't turn out that way, and very quickly the Cubans moved in and pretty soon we had Cubans fighting Somalis in the Ogaden Desert and we had in fact an interesting situation in which the Soviets switched sides. Prior to the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Soviet Union had been an ally of Somalia. They had been in the base at Berbera, on the Indian Ocean. I was sent to Ethiopia in 1978, in order to warn Mr. Mengistu not to invade Somalia, because by that time we had changed sides. We were passively supporting Somalia not in the war, but in terms of its own security. Let me start that answer over again. Can I just, okay. I went to Ethiopia in 1978, because we were deeply concerned that, the result of the war that had been dragging on between Somalia and Ethiopia would be that Ethiopia would invade Somalia, and that the Soviet Union, which by that time was now supporting Ethiopia with... not only military assistance but the support of Cuban troops, that the Soviet Union would also capture recapture the strategic port I've forgotten Berbera, Jesus Christ, let me start again one more time?

YEAH, FINE, OKAY.

I was, I...okay. I was sent to Ethiopia in 1978 because we were concerned about the consequences of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia. It had been raging for some time, following a revolution in Ethiopia in which Mr. Mengistu, Colonel Mengistu, replaced Haile Selassie. Part of that time, of course, Ethiopia had been a very close friend of the United States. Somalia, on the other hand, had been a very close friend of the Soviet Union; in fact the Soviets some people said, had a base in Berbera. But when the Somalis invaded Ethiopia the... Soviets suddenly changed sides. They were supporting Mengistu; they encouraged the Cubans to come in, to support Mengistu and they were kicked out of Berbera. Suddenly we saw the prospect of the worst of both worlds. Not only were the Soviets getting into Ethiopia, but they actually might through the Ethiopian army, conquer Somalia, and get back the base at Berbera. So I was sent out there to warn Mr. Mengistu against invading Somalia. And that essentially was my message. It was not an easy message to deliver, because like Haile Selassie, Mr. Mengistu kept lions on the grounds of his palace, and in fact he kept the lions right under his office and as we sat there discussing the subject, and every time I was trying to make a very strong point, I would suddenly hear this roaring underneath my feet, and I couldn't help but look down and wonder whether I wasn't about to be lunch. But as it turned out he gave me assurances that they were not going to invade Somalia. And I think that really was not because of my role, but I think that was an important accomplishment in securing our position in that very troubled area.

DID THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SEE SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA AS PART OF A GRAND DESIGN?

I think that we saw when we saw the Cubans go from Angola, where they moved in during the late Nixon, early Ford Administration, and then into Ethiopia where they moved in the early part of our administration and their activities in Grenada, cause we were even concerned about that we saw that as a deliberate, challenge to American interests in Africa, and elsewhere. We had discussions at various points with the Soviets and with the Cubans about it, and they took a very cavalier attitude; they said that was of no interest to us and refused to recognize our concerns. I think they were legitimate concerns; and...

THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF LOOKING AT IT: ONE IS NITZE'S VIEW OF THE GRAND DESIGN, THE IDEOLOGICAL EXPANSIONISTS; THE OTHER, WHICH I THINK THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHARED, THAT THEY ARE STRATEGIC OPPORTUNISTS THEY'LL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A POWER VACUUM. IT'S HARDER TO PLACE BRZEZINSKI IN THIS. DO YOU THINK HE TENDED MORE TOWARD THE GRAND DESIGN OF THE SOVIETS ON THE MOVE?

Well, you know, in the two great theories of how you interpret Soviet behavior the theory, on the one hand, that they have a grand design that's slowly unfolding and the other theory that, they're simply opportunists who seize the strategic advantage when they can I think that Dr. Brzezinski probably leaned more to the latter, but, you know, if you seize every strategic opportunity you can, it doesn't really make much difference whether you have a grand design or not. The only difference really is if somehow you had some clear timetable, or you had, you're willing to up the stakes because your timetable couldn't be met and so forth. I don't think it's fair to put the Soviets in the same frame of mind as Adolf Hitler, who did have a timetable and did have a grand design for German conquest. The Soviets really are in a different category, it seems to me. They believe their system will triumph. They ... they derive legitimacy at home, through that philosophy. They have to demonstrate that the system is triumphing, from time to time. That makes them very dangerous; it makes them quite aggressive from time to time. But I don't think it means that we're not in a position to respond to it; and when we do respond effectively to reach an accommodation.

BRZEZINSKI WANTED TO TREAT IT MILITARILY, CARRY A TASK FORCE INTO SOMALIA IN CASE THE ETHIOPIANS CAME ACROSS THE BORDER. BUT AGAIN ALL THIS CAME TO A HEAD, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VANCE AND BRZEZINSKI, IN AN NSC MEETING IN OCTOBER IN '78.

Do you remember what the issue was?

I THINK THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD A REEVALUATION OF POLICY AND DECIDED THAT THE GRAND DESIGN WAS LOCAL CONFLICT AND THEN BRZEZINSKI WANTED TO COME IN WITH THE TASK FORCE.

Oh, I see you mean, this was involved with Ethiopia... I see. No, my as the time, as our concerns about the horn of Africa deepened it was quite clear -- Zbig wanted to do something that was dramatic, to prevent that whole important strategic area from falling into the hands of the Soviets And so we developed this plan, which was to bring a naval task force into Berbera, and dispatch me as an emissary to Mengistu, both the show of force and, hopefully, a show of persuasion. I might add, at that time, I also went there with some humanitarian aid, for Ethiopia, which had been held up ... because of the turmoil in that country, as a gesture of... our good will, as well. Unfortunately the Navy did not want to move a carrier task force into Berbera, and when we had a discussion of why, they said, well, it would be too vulnerable there. And we said, well, vulnerable, but you have F-14s to deal with this. And they said, Well... and, you know, I said, when we said vulnerable they said well, yes, the Soviets are there with MIG-15s, and we said, Well, but you have F-14s, I mean, two generations more advanced. And they said, Well, they might just get lucky. So... this show of force was a show of force that was not supported by the Pentagon nor the Chiefs they thought it was too risky, and that's the reason it didn't happen. Secretary Vance may also have opposed it, but I don't recall that.

THE READING THAT IVE DONE SUGGESTED THAT VANCE SAW THIS AS A LOCAL PROBLEM, AND NOT IN TERMS OF A BIG GESTURE. AND THAT BRZEZINSKI WANTED NOT TO DEAL WITH IT MILITARILY.

Well, I think that Zbig's strategy, and his view was, in terms... I think that Zbig's approach to how you build congressional support for a SALT agreement, was to show that it was the result of tough policies of dealing firmly with the Soviet Union and responding strongly to efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to either expand their power or undermine friendly regimes or improve their geo-strategic position. I think Cy's view was that you can't get a SALT agreement through the Congress unless you have a positive political atmosphere, that you don't have a, you must have a constructive sense of engagement with the Soviet Union. Well, the facts were that we were having a number of very nettlesome regional problems with the Soviets, as they made an effort to expand their power and influence. And you could choose whichever school of thought you wanted, but unless the Soviets showed some restraint we weren't going to be able to get to that positive atmosphere, which I think Cy correctly considered to be an essential element of getting Senate approval. And unfortunately confrontation would only produce that positive atmosphere, if it worked. And so it was very important to try to select the proper ground for doing that. My only regret about the Ethiopian mission and the conflict in the Ogaden, is that we didn't make more of the success that we had, because in fact, Mengistu was perfectly right in being able to reclaim the territory that had been lost to the Somali invasion. We didn't make enough of the fact that we got concessions out of him, or assurances out of him... that he was not going to go further and go into Somalia. If we had made more of that, I think it would have looked as it was, as a very positive development for stability. Unfortunately the result was that it didn't add much to the situation. If we'd had a big confrontation, I'm not sure we would have gotten that assurance. He didn't have to give it.

WAS DR. BRZEZINSKI CONCERNED THAT BY TAKING FORCEFUL ACTION WE MIGHT JEOPARDIZE SALT?

I think he was less concerned that would happen. I think his view was that if we didn't take forceful action in some of the situations like Afghanistan and so forth SALT would be jeopardized anyway. So that there was no way to accommodate to increased Soviet pressure and expansionism. I think that judgment was a good... was a fair judgment. I happened to agree with it. The issue always was, in my, in my mind, where do you draw the line? It's very important to draw the line in the place where you win. If you draw... a line in a place where you can't win, or where even if you win it isn't very clear or it's ambivalent, then you end up with a kind of a mishmash that could be politically damaging.

DAVID, WOULD YOU SENSE THAT BRZEZINSKI WHAT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO HIM, HAVING A SALT AGREEMENT OR CONFRONTING THE SOVIETS IF IT WERE NECESSARY ON THE GEOPOLITICAL CHESSBOARD?

Well I think his biggest priorities were always the security of the United States. And that meant in his judgment... I'll start over. I think his biggest priorities were to advance the security of the United States. I think he started in office as someone who believed in arms control and...believed in the SALT process. I think he was also deeply concerned about growing evidence of Soviet assertiveness. I think he believed that detente was fine, but it had to be reciprocal and it had to involve restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. And as events unfolded in the course of the administration I think we all saw that Soviet assertiveness in a number of areas was running contrary to their desire for a detente and that was expressed exclusively in terms of arms control. And when we got to that point, is when you had the great falling out of the administration. You had Cy Vance and Paul Warnke on one side saying that arms control should be insulated from these other political developments: the horn of Africa Afghanistan, what-have-you. And then you had Zbig saying, "No. This is all of one part. You can't have a differentiated policy towards the Soviet Union. You have to have a unified policy." And I think that, at that juncture, certainly after Afghanistan, Zbig felt that you could not go forward with the SALT ratification.

NOT BECAUSE IT WOULD AFFECT -- BECAUSE AFGHANISTAN WOULD AFFECT THE PROSPECTS OF RATIFICATION, BUT BECAUSE YOU SIMPLY CAN'T DO BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS?

I think you know, you'll have to Zbig'll have to...I mean, you're going to interview him at all? Ok.

IN CASE HE GIVES US ONLY TEN MINUTES.

Yeah. I see. Uh.

THE LINE ALL ALONG WAS, "HEY, WE'RE NOT LINKING." BUT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS WILL MAKE IT, THE SENATE WILL MAKE IT.

I think Dr. Brzezinski was very reluctant to link Soviet behavior in a place like Afghanistan with a strategic arms agreement. I mean he understood the overriding importance of avoiding nuclear war. And I think he believed that the SALT agreement contributed to reducing the risk of nuclear war. But as he frequently put it, Soviet behavior does affect the political atmosphere within which we can do anything. Whether it be strategic arms negotiations, or trade or a cultural arrangements or sports. And the Afghan invasion was such a blatant disregard for the entire international community -- it was such a wanton act of aggression that I believed he felt it would have been a mistake to go forward with the SALT ratification even if the Congress would have been willing to do so. Of course, it was not willing to do so.

WHAT ARE THE REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET ASSERTIVENESS? ONE OF OUR REACTIONS IT APPEARS WAS TO HASTEN NORMALIZATION WITH CHINA. WHAT DID THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OR ZBIG SEE IN THE NORMALIZATION? DID HE SEE THIS AS PART OF THE TILTING TOWARDS THE SOVIETS, AND IF SO, HOW DID HE DIFFER FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW?

Well I think Dr. Brzezinski viewed the normalization of the relationship with China as a fundamental strategic interest of the United States. It was his judgment that despite the tragedy of the post-war history of relationship, China and the United States had a long history, of cooperation and of mutual respect. Unlike the relationship between many European powers in China. The result was that he felt we should go forward as fast and as far as possible in establishing a normal relationship. both for its own sake, in terms of the stability of Asia and for the, what he felt to be constructive affect it would have on the Soviets in coming to terms with us on strategic arms and other kinds of problems. Zbig felt, and I think correctly, that you will never have peace in Asia without the cooperation of China. And that many of the tragedies, Korea, Vietnam might have ben avoid if indeed we could have preserved a relationship with China. In any event, it was quite clear that we had an historic opportunity to solidify the opening made by Dr. Kissinger and the Nixon administration and he was determined to solidify it.

BUT WASN'T HIS INTEREST REALLY MORE IN TERMS OF THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP? HE WAS IN FAVOR OF DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY. HE WAS IN FAVOR OF ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO SELL WEAPONS.

I think Zbig was also deeply concerned about Soviet pressure on China. And I think he judged that the internal situation in China might well change depending in the degree to which the Soviets put... were able to put pressure on them. And it was quite clear that the Sov...that the --It was quite clear that the Chinese needed a form of security relationship with the West -- not exclusively the United States that would strengthen their hand in dealing with the Soviets. And for that reason, Zbig supported dual use technology, sales to the Chinese. He encouraged our European allies to have a military supply relationship with China and we did a number of other very important things that would the Chinese confidence, not only of their relationship with us, but also confidence in standing up for themselves in their relationship with the Soviets.

WAS HE INVOLVED IN THE TIMING OF DENG'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES?

Yes. But I don't know...

I MEAN, DID HE WORRY THAT THE VISIT WAS AT THE TIME OR VERY NEAR THE TIME WHEN BREZHNEV WAS GOING TO COME TO THE U.S.?

That would have been later. That would have been later.

WHAT WAS BREZHNEV GOING TO DO IN JANUARY WITHIN A MONTH? DENG XIAOPING CAME IN DECEMBER. WAS THE HOPE THAT THE SALT AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED?

Yes. There was...the there was hope that the SALT agreement could be concluded in late December, early January. And Zbig looked on the Deng Xiaoping visit as extremely important in solidifying the relationship. For two reasons. One, it would have been important agreements were to be ratified in effect by the visit. But even more important, this was the first visit here by a Chinese. And he was very sensitive to the fact that every American visitor, high ranking visitor, had always gone to China instead of any Chinese coming here. And this was a repetition if you will of the of the Chinese imperial relationship with the outside world. He felt it was time to reverse that and it was the time to tell the Chinese if you wanted a reciprocal relationship, then you are going to have to visit us as well. Can we cut this right now for a moment?

YEAH.

While I talk to my...

WAS BRZEZINSKI WORRIED THAT DENG XIAOPING'S COMING TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALIENATE BREZHNEV SO CLOSE TO THE TIME WHEN THEY HAD OPENED TO SIGN THE SALT AGREEMENT? THAT IT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SALT AGREEMENT? OR DID HE THINK IT WOULD ENHANCE IT?

I never heard any arguments that improving our relationship with China, whether that be the normalization agreements themselves or the visit of Deng Xiaoping, would somehow derail the SALT agreement. It was our judgment that the Soviets had an important strategic interest in the SALT agreement and that- that would transcend a relationship being normalized with China. We recognize that they were neuralgic about it, But I don't believe anybody thought that this was somehow stop SALT. In fact, to the contrary, I think we thought it might in...well encourage the Soviets in trying...in being more accommodating in SALT.

HOW DID THE NSC PERCEIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN?

Well it was unclear to us exactly how much Soviet influence existed during the time of the Iranian revolution. The Tudeh Party existed. It was underground it's exact scope was not clear. The Soviets did have assets there and as we thrown out, we became increasingly concerned because we had no source of influence whatsoever in the country. And so there was a deep concern that in all the turmoil and revolution the Tudeh Party Soviets agents of influence might rise to the surface there. I think in the end it turned out to be a misplaced concern.

WERE THERE INFLAMMATORY BROADCASTS? ANTI-AMERICAN BROADCASTS...SOVIET INSPIRED?

The Soviet Union during the revolution did try to whip up as much anti-Americanism as possible. It was only after our hostages had been taken at the Embassy that we really leaned on the Soviets and said, "Listen, this is a deeply unfriendly act. And you ought to shut it off." That they moderated that to some extent.

HOW DID BRZEZINSKI SEE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? DID HE SEE IT AS A FRAMEWORK OF A GRAND DESIGN OR SIMPLY THE SOVIETS TRYING TO MAINTAIN A PRO-SOVIET REGIME AGAINST THE ISLAMIC CHALLENGE?

Well I think Dr. Brzezinski's view of the invasion was that it might have been precipitated by instability in the country. By the fact that increasingly the Afghans wanted to be assertive of their own independence and ultimately then the Soviet backed a communist party -- elements in the country acting against that. I think it started out that way. I think he saw it that way. But it...was pregnant with strategic implications because it did move the Soviet Union much closer to the Gulf. It was a flanking movement on both Pakistan and Iran. And we were deeply concerned that it might only be the first of more steps particularly given the fact that Iran was in such a state of disorganization and turmoil

COULD WE HAVE DEFENDED THE PERSIAN GULF IF WE HAD TO?

We looked at the question of whether the United States alone could defend the Persian Gulf. And the answer to that is, not in the sense that we can defend West Germany or the United States itself. It's a very long ways away. The Soviet Union is very close. The geography however does permit the possibility of if you will, drawing a line in the sand saying "If you cross over this you will meet determined American resistance." And that American resistance would have had to be I think, most people think nuclear to be effective.

DID YOU EVER DISCUSS THIS WITH CARTER? HE WRITES THAT OUR REACTION MIGHT BE MILITARY AND NOT NECESSARILY IN A PLACE OF THE SOVIET'S CHOOSING WHICH IS VERY REMINISCENT OF JOHN DULLES ANNOUNCING MASSIVE RETALIATION.

The President, I believe, fully understood that the Carter doctrine carried an implicit threat for the use of nuclear weapons. That is why the language broadly speaks of all means, or something of that sort. And the phraseology was not because we were being coy. It was because we were being clear. And I think that the President understood the importance of what he was saying.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA. HOW IS THIS DISCOVERED? DOES THIS REPRESENT A BIG INTELLIGENCE FAILURE? IF SO, WHO'S TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THAT?

Well the Soviet Brigade in Cuba flap was precisely that. A flap. The kind of basically, substantively meaningless issue that takes on very great political importance. Substantively, the intelligence community had simply lost track of the fact that there were some combat elements in Cuba that like many Soviet combat elements, it had a little skeleton headquarters that called itself a brigade and that it trained once or twice a year. It was indifferent...in somewhat different form. It was left over from the Cuban missile crisis, but it had remained in Cuba in different forms since that time. And with the deployment of intelligence assets to strategic questions, to Vietnam, to any number of other issues, they basically had lost track of it. And...in 1978 we began to get some indications that there was some strange activity there... that we hadn't noticed or the intelligence community had not noticed before. It was the White House that kept asking, "What is this? What is this? Find out more about it." Unfortunately, the answer came over a Labor Day weekend when almost no one was in town, and the decision was made to immediately inform the chairman of the foreign relations committee who for his own political reasons went out and announced it as though suddenly the Soviets had made a massive troop deployment to Cuba. And then of course the fat was in the fire. We were already in the process of beginning to skirmish over SALT. The campaign of 1980 was already under way, with charges that the Democrats were weak and this was ceased upon in that context.

WHAT KILLED SALT?

I think SALT was killed by the invasion of Afghanistan. I don't think there's any question that despite all of the problems, despite the Cuban brigade, despite the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran, and everything else, when we did our nose counts, it was clear that we had -- we were within two or three votes ratification and we had a half a dozen senators who said, "Listen, if you need my vote in the last you know -- if I can be the last vote, I'll be the last vote." In a situation like that, you can have not the highest confidence, but you can have pretty good confidence that you're going to prevail. And Bob Bird had planned to have the debate begin in January as soon as the Congress got back. In fact, we were going to try to have the vote before Christmas. And because the press of other business it was postponed. I often wonder what would have happened to the Senate of the Democratic Party and to the President if in fact we'd had a ratification vote, if all these senators had walked the plank for SALT, and then the Soviets went ahead and invaded Afghanistan as they clearly were planning to do. When the President said, "I've learned more about the Soviets in the last two weeks than I did, you know, in my entire previous career, " that's really what he was talking about. They had either no comprehension or no regard whatsoever for the relationship that they supposedly trying to establish with the United States. There could not have been a more destructive thing than to ratify SALT and then invade Afghanistan. That would have been the end of arms control. Not just for two administrations or two terms of a president as we've seen now, but I think it would have been thirty years before we had another arms control agreement.

THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO FEEL THE SOVIETS HAD GOTTEN SO FRUSTRATED BY WHAT HAD GONE ON IN THE FALL AND THE CUBAN BRIGADE FLAP AND SO ON THAT THEY HAD GIVEN UP ON SALT AND WENT AHEAD AND DID WHAT THEY WANTED TO DO ANYWAY. HAD THE TREATY BEEN RATIFIED, THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND A TIDIER WAY TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL.

I think the Soviets were in a bind. They felt, for whatever reasons, they had to move in Afghanistan...and were determined to do so. They were hoping against hope that maybe they could get the SALT agreement ratified first, and they could have their cake and eat it too. They were washed out and told everybody immediately, "Oh, we've -- we didn't kill SALT, the Americans did. And we just went ahead with this because it was already dead." You know. They went around say...told everybody -- Soviets went around and told everybody, "SALT is already...was already dead before we went into Afghanistan." That just wasn't true. That's just nonsense.

The President even before he was sworn in met with the... Um. Before the President even came into office, he met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the members of the Joint Chiefs in order to discuss fundamental military strategic questions. And I think his basic attitude was made clear in that meeting in which he asked the military chiefs, "If you had an opportunity to design the strategic forces of both sides; not just ours, but the Soviet's as well, what would you want? How would you design it? What would be the lowest level of strategic forces that you would have on both sides and still have a stable and secure America?" And he at that point went forward with a -- and at that point he said, "For example, what if we only had two hundred sub-launched strategic missiles on both sides on the grounds that those are the most secure most survivable?" That of course caused great consternation among the Joint Chiefs. And it wasn't more than 48 hours before the idea that Carter wanted to unilaterally go down to 200 submarine launched missiles was in the newspapers via Evans-Novak. But the fact of the matter is he proposed, "What would we do if we wanted both to go down?" And I think that it showed that he came to Washington determined to make some changes just as the current President has been interested in the most sweeping forms of arms control. So was Jimmy Carter. And that really was his fundamental orientation. He was concerned about the survivability of our land based forces. He was concerned about all these strategic questions, but I think he fundamentally felt that you had to try to get beyond those questions and try to get nuclear weapons back to a minimal part of the American security posture if you could do the same with the Soviets.

WHY WAS BRZEZINSKI -- WHAT DID HE PUSH FOR? WHAT CAME TO BE KNOWN AS PD-59? A COUNTER-FORCE DOCTRINE. GADDIS SMITH HAS WRITTEN THAT IT WAS A CAPSTONE OF A POLICY HE HAD BEEN SEEKING TO SHAPE FOR FOUR YEARS. WHAT WAS HIS POLICY AND HOW DID PD-59 FIT IT?

Well I always viewed PD-59 as a kind of maverick. No let me start over again. I never felt that PD-59 was central to either the President's policy or for that matter Dr. Brzezinski's. Each administration had come to the point of having its own strategic doctrine. And from that standpoint, I think Zbig was anxious that the Carter administration make its imprint on nuclear strategy. He had no preconceived ideas that I was aware of...uh, about what that strategy ought to be. And as a result what we did was go back and look at the so called Schlesinger Doctrine. Now in fact PD-59 doesn't go very far beyond the Schlesinger Doctrine. And the Schlesinger Doctrine was designed to say, "What would we do if a nuclear war actually happened? Would we push the button and let everything go? Or would we have some more limited response?" PD-59 tried to answer that question. And it said, "Yes. There should be a limited response and we should have the command and control that it would make it possible to have such limited response." In other words, the whole philosophy behind it was to try to...keep Armageddon or catastrophe from happening even if nuclear deterrence failed. Now a lot of people have misinterpreted that as saying what the PD-59 called for was a war fighting doctrine. That the only way you could have deterrence was an ability to conduct small strikes and a protracted nuclear war. That was not the basic philosophy. That's the philosophy now. PD-59 has been taken and used for that purpose. But in my judgment, the real origin was in the event the worst happens how do you keep the total end of the world from happening? How do you do something more limited? Now, it's been overtaken by people who say, "The only way you keep the worst from happening is to be able to have a limited response, fight a nuclear war, et cetera, et cetera." So I think it was very much in line with the idea of trying to reduce the consequences of the fact that we live in a nuclear world.

YOU REPRESENTED PRESIDENT CARTER ON TRIPS TO EUROPE IN EARLY '78 WHEN THERE WAS POLITICAL PRESSURE BUILDING UP AGAINST THE NEUTRON BOMB. WHAT HAPPENED OVER THERE? WHO'D YOU SEE, WHAT WAS THE CONCERN?

Well I was sent to Europe after the neutron bomb fiasco. In order to deal with a rising concern, particularly in the part of Chancellor Schmidt about the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. Those are the long range, intermediate range nuclear weapons that were targeted to Europe and for which we had no effective counterpart. Our reaction was initially that this is nothing new. The Soviets had SS-3s and -4s and -5s, all of which were intermediate range nuclear weapons and this was a modernization. The right response to it, we felt, was American central strategic forces and the submarines, the Polaris submarines, Poseidon submarines that we had assigned to SACEUR. Well Chancellor Schmidt's response to that was to give a speech in London in which he said, "You've got to respond to the SS-20s." Now in the light of the problem of the neutron bomb where nobody in the alliance covered themselves with any glory we felt it was very important to respond to this fear on the part of the Europeans. And it was very deep. I think the fear I'm going to have to cut -- but let me just...let me just finish this. Um. The Europeans had seen us go through Vietnam, they'd seen us go through Watergate. They were deeply concerned that strategic arms agreements would either lead to a condominium or a lessening of the American commitment in Europe. And so when the SS-20 started to be deployed by the Soviets, they really wanted an American response. And the problem was in trying to get them all together because while they wanted an American response, they didn't want to take very much responsibility for themselves. And my job in going to Europe was, first of all, to tell Chancellor Schmidt and the President of Italy and the President of France and Margaret Thatcher and so forth that, "Yes, we were really going to respond." And then to go back and tell Jimmy Carter, "Yes, Chancellor Schmidt is really going to accept it." Because you have to realize that the neutron bomb fiasco was not indecisiveness on Jimmy Carter's part...uh, from Jimmy Carter's point of view. It was the fact that at the last moment the Germans said, "We can't be the only ones to deploy the neutron bomb in Europe." And Jimmy Carter's reaction was, "Well I'm not going to push it down your throat." And that really was the basis of it. And then when Carter talked with Schmidt, he said, "Listen. I'll take all the responsibility, but I'm not going to you know put you in a position where we're forcing you to accept nuclear weapons." Now, when we came around to the problem of dealing with the long range, intermediate range missiles it was very important to keep everybody working from the same sheet of music so that we didn't have the same neutron bomb fiasco all over again. And that was my job. To try to keep them all marching together.

IF THERE HADN'T BEEN A NEUTRON BOMB FLAP, WOULD THERE HAVE BEEN LESS NECESSITY TO MODERNIZE THE OTHER TACTICAL WEAPONS?

I think from a political -- from a political standpoint, if there had not been a neutron bomb fiasco, there would have been less requirement to respond to the SS-20s with these deployments. From a military and strategic standpoint, those arguments and pressures would still exist. But it became an overriding political concern that the alliance be able to take a nuclear decision and not be intimidated by Soviet propaganda or by demonstrations or anything else. And that was I think a prime underpinning of the decision that was announced in December of '79.