DR. SEABORG, IN THE EARLY DAYS, IN THE '40s WHEN YOU WERE WORKING ON SEPARATING PLUTONIUM, HOW DID YOU SEE IT BEING USED?

Well, eh... we were about to end er a war and the impression was that we were in a race with the Nazis for the production of an atomic bomb. And plutonium was an approach to the atomic bomb. The other being of course the separation of the rare isotope of uranium... uranium-235. Both of those isotopes, as we call them, U-235 and plutonium, which is plutonium-239, are fissionable and therefore were eligible materials to be the explosive ingredient for an atomic bomb.

WHAT POINT DID IT BECOME EVIDENT THAT IT WOULD ALSO HAVE CIVILIAN USES?

I would say when the chain reaction was first demonstrated by Enrico Fermi and co-workers in the west stands of the football stadium of the University of Chicago on December 2, 1942.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THE REALIZATION WAS IN TERMS OF ITS CIVILIAN UTILITY?

Well, the idea that developed fairly soon although the focus at that time was on the nuclear weapon, we were at war and frightened. And thought we were in a race with Hitler. So there wasn't a... a great deal of focus on the civilian use. But as the war... wore on and towards the end we began to talk about the possibilities of the heat of the fission reaction being transformed to electrical power for civilian use.

AND WERE PEOPLE INTERESTED TO HEAR THAT?

Well we were only talking to ourselves. You see, this was all under the cloak of secrecy, until the atomic bomb was bombs were dropped on Japan in August of 1945. So our discussions were all in within the closed doors of our laboratory. In this case, the so-called metallurgical laboratory of the University of Chicago in in the south side of the city of Chicago.

AT WHAT POINT WAS THE GENERAL AWARENESS OF THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION?

Oh, I would say by... 1944, and particularly the spring of 1945 when it became clear that the atomic bomb could be built. The scientists at the metallurgical laboratory where I was situated began to talk about the consequences and the one of which would be that other nations would have the capability to develop the atomic bomb and it would proliferate of course. At that time the main fear was the Soviet Union would have that capability. But there was also the recognition that a number of countries would eventually have the capability because the main secret of the atomic bomb was that it worked. Once it was known that it worked and that of course, was announced to the world when they were used. Then the secret was out and the principles of fission and so forth had been published and it was clear that to the scientists. Perhaps more so than to the politicians that it was only a matter of time before the countries would have the atomic bomb.

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION... WHAT DID THE ATOMS OF PEACE SET OUT TO DO? AND WHAT DO YOU THINK IT ACHIEVED?

Well, the Atoms for Peace had as its aim, the providing of the benefits of nuclear energy—the production of electricity the production of radioactive isotopes for medicine and so forth to be spread to other countries. And its other aim was to have a little bit of a hand on the possibilities of proliferation. A finger in the pie, so to speak, so that the United States would be involved with other countries in the inevitable next step which would be that they would want nuclear power for civilian purposes. And since this has the possibility of diverting plutonium to weapons through the Atoms for Peace, we and a... nuclear weapons countries would have a hand in it and perhaps have the possibility of controlling it better than if the other countries went off on their own... without our involvement.

LET ME JUST ASK YOU TO REPEAT THAT AGAIN. IF YOU CAN KEEP YOUR EYES FAIRLY AS NEAR TO ME AS POSSIBLE. WAS THE ATOMS FOR PEACE--I'LL ASK YOU TO JUST REPEAT SOME OF THAT. WAS ATOMS OF PEACE A PROLIFERATION MEASURE? WAS IT A PROLIFERATION MEASURE ON EISENHOWER'S BEHALF?

Uh... the Atoms for... for Peace, was well had two aspects. One was to make the benefits of nuclear energy. Nuclear power, radio isotopes and so forth... available to other countries. And the other benefit to the United States and the nuclear powers, presumably, was that we would have a hand in their entry into the nuclear age, making it possible for us perhaps to control and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

THIS IDEA OF CONTROL—HOW DO YOU MEAN CONTROL? WHAT WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS US -- HOW WOULD THAT WORK OUT IN PRACTICE?

We would have the entree to these countries as they built their nuclear power reactors. And perhaps furnish some of the materials and in return have the right to monitor the operation, apply safeguards to ensure that the one of the products, for example, plutonium, would not be diverted to nuclear weapons, but would be kept as a nuclear fuel for the production of electricity.

FOR THE LAYMAN, HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE IN THE TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN WHAT IS USED TO PRODUCE CIVILIAN POWER AND WHAT IS USED TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Well, civilian power...is the result of the fissionable material—

OH. LET ME JUST INTERRUPT. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE FOR THE LAYMAN BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY USED?

Uh, well... for civilian uses of nuclear energy, the energy is released slowly and in a controlled fashion over a period of days, months, years. Whereas for the atomic weapon release of atomic energy, all of the energy is released in a small fraction of a second in an explosive manner. It's the same energy, but in the civilian, it's put in a controlled situation where the heat energy is released slowly over whatever period of time you want it to be released. Whereas in the explosion, all of the energy is released in a...a small fraction of a second in an explosive manner. It's the same energy.

NOW, IS IT THE SAME EQUIPMENT?

No. It's not the same equipment at all. For a... for a nuclear weapon, you just have the fissionable material itself, and whatever you need in order to cause it to explode, which is other explosives... chemical explosives, to compress it and so for the. Whereas in the civilian use of nuclear energy, the material is much more dilute and put into a huge structure. Many feet tens of feet across, and... and weighing with the auxiliary material, hundreds of tons. And as I say, this enables you to slow down the nuclear reaction, so that you can get the benefit of the energy release over whatever period of time you wish.

SO WHEN PEOPLE TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AS BEING POTENTIAL BOMB FACTORIES, IS THIS CRAZY OR WHAT?

Oh... a... a... what they have in mind is when a nuclear power plant operates, it produces plutonium—this fissionable material which can also be used in an atomic bomb. That plutonium can be used as a fuel for the continued operation of that nuclear power plant or it could be diverted—taken out and chemically separated and diverted and put into use as a... a... an explosive ingredient for a... the nuclear weapon. It's not a very good explosive. Because it is contaminated with another form of plutonium which leads to pre-detonation and not a very efficient weapon.

IS THIS ONE OF THE REASONS THAT YOU GOT INTERESTED IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERN?

Yes. Yes. Because of this possibility of the diversion of the plutonium product of nuclear power to weapons, that's one of the reasons I got interested in... in proliferation, but another approach to nuclear weapons, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the enrichment of the U-235... which other countries might do. There are a number of methods that you can do this. And we also wanted to exer... exercise some control over that.

I GET THE IMPRESSION THAT IN THE '50s AND '60s THERE WAS A LOT OF SHARING OF INFORMATION. WAS THIS A RISK? WAS THIS A DANGER?

Uh...

DID YOU ASSESS IT AS A PROBLEM AT THE TIME?

No. The sharing of the information gave us a hand in the game. The information is more or less available anyway. I... it's in the... it was in the published literature. It might take a little longer, but the price we would pay then, if we waited for the other countries to go ahead with their own nuclear power program, would be that they would be completely independent and in a position to produce nuclear weapons. Whereas with our aid, we were in a position to exercise some control. For example, when we furnished nuclear materials to other countries, the United States—we did it with the imposition of safeguards which means that we had the right to go in and monitor the operation, and assure ourself that the material was not—the plutonium, for example or... the... ah...U-235 was not being diverted from peaceful uses in nuclear... in... in... electricity production to nuclear weapons.

DID AMERICA ACTUALLY HAVE THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD AT THAT TIME?

They certainly did. Ah... at... well, at the very beginning they... they were the only country that had the... the atomic bomb. But as we scientists predicted, in the spring of 1945 the Soviet Union within four years had exploded an atomic bomb.

NOW, THE GENEVA CONFERENCES TO WHICH YOU WERE A DELEGATE IN THE NATO PERIOD IN THE '60s WHEN YOU WERE AT THE AEC AS CHAIRMAN, WHAT DID THEY ACHIEVE? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE LIKE AT GENEVA?

Well it was a matter of exchanging information and actually meeting our Russian competitors for the first time. I attended the first Geneva Conference in 1955. Up until that time, anybody Russian... a Russian scientist... or anybody was considered to be sort of an ogre... a mysterious and perhaps sinister person. And we met our counterparts at the first Geneva Conference and found that they were pretty much ordinary human beings like we were. I think perhaps that was one of the main accomplishments of the Conference was to just get acquainted. And that happened for the first time in 1955. It's very important to emphasize that. Up until then, there was very little contact... between the Russian people and the American people on any level, including scientists having contact with scientists of the other country.

CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT THE PEOPLE— THE SCIENTISTS FROM THE THIRD WORLD, WHO YOU PRESUMABLY RUBBED SHOULDERS WITH IN THOSE EARLY DAYS? THIS IS WELL BEFORE THE PROGRAMS WERE UNDER WAY.

Yes, well they learned a lot of good science. It's nuclear science is not only atomic bombs. It's concerned with the nucleus of the atom. The study of the fundamental properties of the nucleus. The study of radioactive isotopes... which have many applications in industry... in agriculture... in medicine for the diagnosis and treatment of... of disease. There are many aspects to nuclear science that were focused upon in those Geneva conferences. And of course, in exchange of information which increased in... the extent to which it became available... in the open literature on the nuclear power itself. The Soviets had a little different approach to nuclear power than the Americans, for example... and the British and the French were also getting into the field. And it was very useful to exchange information so that we could advance the... the art of nuclear power on both sides.

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE INDIANS? HOMI BHABHA? CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME COLOR ABOUT THE PEOPLE THERE AND WHAT THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS?

Well I... know Homi Bhaba, I was the head of the American US delegation to the intern... to the annual general conference of the international Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA... every year. Between '61 and '71, and I would meet Homi Bhaba, the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission there every year until his unfortunate death. I um...visited India in January of 1967, when their atomic energy establishment was dedicated to Homi Bhaba... became the Bhaba Atomic Center. And at that time I met the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi and talked with her. At that time I also visited the Indian Central Atomic Energy Laboratory, which became the Bhaba Laboratory... and saw the work that was going on there. Um the nuclear research that was going on there, including their work on plutonium. I saw that they had plutonium, and that they were going to have the capability to make a nuclear explosive. They produced the plutonium in a reactor furnished by Canada, which didn't have the safeguards. The CIRUS reactor. The United States, through the General Electric Company, had also furnished nuclear power reactors. The CIRUS reactor was a research reactor...at a place called Tarapur. But this was done under safeguards so that it was not possible for the Indians to divert any of the plutonium produced there to to nuclear weapons. However, the CIRUS reactor was not under safeguard so they could take the plutonium that was produced in that reactor and chemically separate it and actually produce plutonium metal and so forth, which they showed me at that time in January of 1967.

I'D LIKE TO KNOW A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THE PERSONALITIES. DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH HOMI BHABA ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY?

Um, Yes. Ah, he was from the very beginning, at the very first Geneva Conference in 1955, extremely optimistic about the possibilities of nuclear fusion as a source of energy. And he made a speech at that time that was carried all around the world announcing, you know, the, the potential of nuclear fusion. He oversold it, ah. He was a very what's the word, positive I wouldn't quite say flamboyant but close to egotistical very capable scientist, He had a rather semi–regal bearing about him. Ummm, you know came into a room with his shoulders back, and arms moving and come up to a group to talk, and uhm, as if he were in charge. He was a very positive personality. I had a fight with him at the very first meeting. When I say fight, I don't mean literally physical but a battle of words, at the very first meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna that I attended because I supported Sigvard Eklund to be the Director General. And the Soviets and the Indians opposed him. And this was a rather pitched battle. Bhaba told me that if I persisted in my support of Eklund, in the face of the Soviet opposition, this would lead to the break up, the demise, of the IAEA. So I had that decision to make. I decided that he was bluffing and that I would go ahead and support Eklund who I thought was the best qualified person, and did. And the Soviet delegate walked out after the vote when Eklund was elected with the implication that the Soviet Union was walking out of the IAEA and would never come back, but they were back the next year they were back, and forgotten about it entirely. But... that was an interesting confrontation that I had with Bhaba. In general, I had good relations with him. I met him in many places. I remember once having breakfast with him in, in England. He was trying to convince me of some, some action that was pending in the IAEA that he was supporting. I don't happen to remember which one it was, and I saw a good deal of him. He visited me in Washington. I, of course have known him ever since that 1955 first Geneva Conference when he played such a such a role in it.

WHEN YOU MET MRS. GANDHI, DID YOU GET ANY SENSE OF THE WAY NUCLEAR POLICY WAS GOING IN INDIA?

Ohhh, she was a kind of a bit of a hard-boiled kind of a cold personality. Ah, I wouldn't have called her very friendly. She was not a great supporter of the United States at that time, 1967. She was civil, and you know, it, there was no we didn't have any disputes or anything, but it was a very formal relationship. That sort of reflected her attitude towards the United States at that time which was not one of close friendly relationship.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION AT THE EXPLOSION OF THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE?

Oh I think see when was that, 1974?

YES.

I'd, I'd think I wasn't surprised. I was more or less convinced in 1967 that they were not going to have an build an atomic bomb. And I think they were probably of that mind at that time. But in the intervening years, there was... they were ambiguous about it. They've never admitted that it was an atomic bomb that they exploded underground, but that it was a nuclear explosive, ehhh, for the purpose of peaceful uses of explosive nuclear energy. But, of course, there's no real difference between an atomic bomb and, and such a peaceful, explosive device. On the other hand, now we've gone 12 years, and there's no indication that they're going on to build atomic weapons. So it's situation where I think they've not been sure themselves and probably some leaders have been in favor of it, of them going towards nuclear weapons, and some who seem to more or less prevail, have been against their going into the production of nuclear weapons.

LET ME JUST ASK THAT SAME QUESTION AGAIN IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WAY. WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THE NEWS OF THE EXPLOSION, AND WERE YOU SKEPTICAL OF THE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS FOR PEACEFUL USES?

Yes, I was, well I was, I say somewhat surprised because, I had the experience of 1967 to know that they had the capability if they wanted to do it. Ah, as I said in news conferences at that time that I thought they had the capability if they wanted to do it but I was convinced that they didn't want to do it. Yes, I was skeptical in 1974 that the actual explosion was only for peaceful purposes I thought that they were probably testing a nuclear weapon.

THERE'S NO DIFFERENCE...--

Because, but there's no difference... I mean, they could use it for either purpose,... either as a nuclear weapon or as to a, use the tremendous energy in the nucleus of the atom to uhm, as an explosive for earth moving experiments or, or whatever.

...THE NPT, THE TREATY. WHY WAS THERE A NEED FOR A TREATY AT THAT POINT,...THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED UP IN THE EARLY '60S WHEN YOU HAD TAKEN OVER AS CHAIRMAN...WHY WAS THERE A NEED FOR AN NPT"?

Oh because this could have a tremendous influence in slowing the proliferation of weapons. Countries, the average country that signed the NPT would, therefore, forego producing nuclear weapons. Whereas if there were no NPT, and one country did it and another country did it, and so forth, it'd just be a plethora of countries that were building nuclear weapons. So it, it had a tremendous effect on slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now there are obviously a few countries that haven't signed the NPT and are still problems. But it's much better to have it focused down to a few countries than to have dozens of countries going the direction of nuclear weapons. No, the NPT is a wonderful treaty, and I hope that it will remain in effect. But the fact that we're not going,... the nuclear powers are not making progress in arms reduction, and in particularly a comprehensive test ban, has put a big strain on the NPT. And the, the non-nuclear weapons countries that are in adherence to the NPT have given some indications that they, might abrogate their adherence to the NPT if there isn't some progress made in, in arms limitation by the, by the super powers. ...And they focus on a comprehensive test ban in, in, that connection.

WHEN YOU TOOK OVER --

And, and the NPT and the limited test ban treaty both had provisions in them... inducements for to make it, to get countries to, to, to sign them saying that the super powers would make attempts at arms limitation and towards the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban so that the non-nuclear weapons powers thinks, think that the super powers, the nuclear powers have not kept their part of the bargain.

WHEN YOU STARTED WORKING ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN BACK IN 1961, WAS THIS CONSIDERED A PROLIFERATION MOTIVE? WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL ROLE IN THAT TREATY?

Well I that's a little hard to describe I was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and participated in all of the negotiations that led to the determination of the American position... And when Averell Harriman went to Geneva to negotiate the treaty, he was instructed to try to get a comprehensive test ban treaty That is a treaty that would a, a, no he went to Moscow, I'm sorry, to negotiate the treaty... sometimes called the Moscow treaty, as it turned out the limited test ban treaty. When he went to Moscow to negotiate the treaty, he was to try to get a comprehensive test ban which would prohibit the testing underground as well as in the atmosphere. He had to settle for the atmospheric test ban which is called the limited test ban treaty which I think is a oh one of the major tragedies of the present time. If he had succeeded in negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty, we would be in a much better position than we are today... both our countries: the Soviet Union and the United States and the rest of the world cause we would have frozen the level of sophistication of nuclear at the relatively low level that they were in 1963. There's been an increased rate of testing, underground to be sure, since 1963 that has led to an increased, ever-increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons in making them more and more terrible.

IN 1961 WHEN YOU TOOK OVER AS CHAIRMAN OF AEC AND KENNEDY ASKED YOU TO REPORT ON MOSTLY THE CIVILIAN USES OF NUCLEAR POWER ...A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE PLUTONIUM ECONOMY AND SO ON. WHAT WERE YOUR FEELINGS AT THAT TIME ABOUT THE USE OF PLUTONIUM AND ALL THAT DISCUSSION ABOUT...AND ALL THAT OTHER SIDE OF THE STORY?

Oh, I think our view was that we had no control over it. Other countries are going into nuclear power whether we wanted them to or not, and that is the case I mean Japan, and France, Soviet Union, Germany, Sweden, and so forth And so it wasn't a choice from that standpoint of, of the world not going to nuclear power or going toward it. Ah we felt that this was a source of energy that the world would turn toward, as it has. Our report, was sort of a blueprint of the United States, for the United States program in nuclear power, and which we gave to the President in 1962, President Kennedy in 1962.

WHAT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STAND ON NUCLEAR POWER,...?

Oh, President Kennedy was favorably disposed toward nuclear power but extremely dedicated to arms limitation.

[REPEATS QUESTION] BUT ALSO THE PROLIFERATION?

Well, President Kennedy was favorably disposed toward nuclear power, civilian nuclear power, but tremendously dedicated, towards the achievement of a, of a, test ban and arms limitation. It's, it's almost impossible to describe how dedicated he was. He was, almost every meeting we had, he was driving towards that objective... And it is well known that he regards the limited test ban treaty that was achieved during his administration as the capstone of his administration... And that, that his biggest disappointment was the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY?

Oh I, I just participated in all the meetings of what they call the principles. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and 'Mac' Bundy, and Bill Foster and so forth, the head of ACDA in which we were trying to hammer out and determine the US position on a non-proliferation treaty and we met with the President often. I was the one that convinced the President, President Johnson in this case, to announce at the time of the 25th anniversary of the first chain reaction, which would have been December 2, 1967... that the United States, should there be a non-proliferation treaty, would be willing to place its peaceful, nuclear reactors facilities under IAEA safeguards. I'm, I'm the one that convinced President Johnson to make that statement. You see, one of the arguments used by the non-nuclear weapons countries was that they would be at a disadvantage in their peaceful nuclear program if safeguards were applied to them and not to the nuclear powers in the civilian nuclear power program And we countered that argument by announcing that we would be willing, in the United States, to place our civilian nuclear power program under IAEA safeguards.

NOW YOU ALSO HAD AN INSTRUMENTAL ROLE WHILE OVER IN THE SOVIET UNION?

I was in this, I had a, I had an, I believe I had a role to play in the attainment of the limited test ban treatment, yes. I was in the Soviet Union visiting in May of 1963... And this sort of broke the ice. I visited many of the Soviet nuclear, peaceful nuclear, installations... I didn't see any of their weapons work... And I had an unprecedented meeting with Chairman Leonid Brezhnev. In fact, I was the first American, well non-communist American... Gus Hall had met with him, to meet with Brezhnev and I met with him for more than an hour And at the end of the meeting he asked me to bring back to President Kennedy a message saying that when he spoke of peaceful coexistence, he really meant it. And he wanted me to assure President Kennedy personally of this, which I did. When I returned, I had an appointment with President, and passed on this message. And at the same time, the traffic, in the wire traffic between Kennedy and Khrushchev was beginning to speed up in which led to the negotiation, the agreement that, that there would be a meeting in Moscow to try to negotiate a test ban treaty. So I think I had some role to play there.

IN 1966, YOU HAD A VISIT, IN YOUR CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AEC, TO ISRAEL. CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT WHAT LEVEL THEIR PROGRAM WAS AT? WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM AT THAT POINT?

Well I didn't see any of their nuclear work. I visited the Weizmann Institute... gave a talk there. Talked to Prime Minister Eshkol at that time... Created a minor sensation when I went, through the Mandelbaum Gate to visit Jordan. Was just inundated with reported wanting to know whether I had given the atomic bomb to Jordan and why I was there… And of course, I was just, I just wanted to see the Dead Sea and some of the historical, biblical places. Uh, I was just a sightseer. I did not visit the Dimona where the Israeli reactor was located. We were cognizant of the existence of that reactor. We knew that it had been furnished by France to Israel and that it was not under safeguards. And we regarded it as a potential source of plutonium, therefore, it was a research reactor but it could, it would produce plutonium... And we were curious about that. But but I wasn't I didn't visit it at that time. They weren't allowing visits at that time.

DID YOU GET A SENSE OF HOW FAR ALONG THEY WERE IN THE PROGRAM?

No only that the scientists that I talked to were very competent, you know. They're in a class by themselves. We didn't talk about weapons production, but when we talked about nuclear science in general, they knew as much about it as we did. So there was every indication that if they got some plutonium, they would be able to fabricate it into a nuclear weapon.

[ASKS HIM TO REPEAT STORY OF GOING THROUGH THE GATE TO JORDAN.]

Since I was in Israel and Jerusalem, I decided that I would like to, as a sightseer, go through, I think it's the Mandelbaum or Mandelbaum Gate. And I went through there with my assistant... under the eyes of machine guns directed at us as we went through. And we were given an Arabic guide, and who drove us down, into, into, Jordan by the, you know, the Dead Sea, and other historic spots in Jordan. It was totally for the purpose of sightseeing, but I created a minor sensation in, in Israel because all the press figured that the only reason that the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission would be visiting Jordan would be to exchange information about atomic bombs and maybe giving them a couple, and so forth. So when I came back, I was met at the gate by a horde of Israeli reporters. And I had difficulty convincing them... I'm not sure that I succeeded, that I had just been visiting Jordan as a sightseer and that I haven't given Jordan any atomic bombs or any atomic information or talked to any scientists, for that matter. I didn't talk to anybody. We just, we were just tourists. Uh I mean I didn't talk to anybody who I recognized or by design.

THE CHINESE BOMB EXPLOSION, WHEN THAT CAME IN 1964, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT AT THE TIME?

Oh, I like everybody else announced confidently that, that it was a plutonium bomb. I just figured that they could made plutonium easier, and everybody, the CIA, everybody came out with that diagnosis And then in a few days, of course, the analysis of the debris confirmed that it was a U-235 bomb, which meant that they were, in a sense, further along and had attained a higher degree of sophistication in the production of fissionable material than we had deemed possible. It's easier, in a sense, to build a reactor to produce plutonium than it is to go to build and operate one of the complicated isotope separation methods that is necessary for the production of U-235.

WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT AHEAD WITH A HYDROGEN BOMB SO FAST... WAS THAT A CONCERN?

Yes, that was a concern. But, I don't I, I, think that by that time we would have expected them to be moving along pretty fast on a hydrogen bomb... But they have made, they have made good progress.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS YOU HAD WITH ANY OF THE POLITICIANS AT THE TIME ABOUT THE CHINESE EXPLOSION, WHAT IT MEANT TO US SECURITY?

Well, I sure. Oh yes, we had a cabinet meeting. In fact, I think that picture of me meeting with the cabinet there with President Johnson is on that occasion... it happened to be that day. I, there was a lot of concern expressed, and I remember some of those present indicated that this was nothing to worry about because they wouldn't be able to deliver it, and their methods were crude, and their scientists were, you know, not that competent. And I remember admonishing the group, not to underrate them. That their scientists might be more competent than they think and they might be able to build delivery systems faster than we were estimating. I can remember that very well.

WHEN WAS THAT, WHEN WOULD THAT BE? STRAIGHT AFTER?

Well yes. It was just about the day after... in October of 1964.

HOW EFFECTIVE DO YOU THINK NPT WAS?

Oh, very effective. As I say, we I think we'd have many more countries thinking and producing, thinking about and producing nuclear weapons. Many of the countries assigned just then, with that act... decided we're not going to do it. Whereas if, they'd all been going on their own way there would have been many more countries going in that direction. Very often because the rival country was at least deemed to possibly be building the weapon; therefore we better play safe and build it. Many countries just force war building nuclear weapons. Now there are some, as I've said, that didn't sign the NPT and that are still problems. But it's a smaller number than it would have been had there been no NPT.

IS IT SURPRISING TO YOU THAT THERE'S ONLY BEEN ONE EXPLOSION, THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, SINCE?

Yes, yes. I think anybody would've predicted that there'd be more explosions by other countries, nonnuclear weapons countries, developing countries, than there have been.

AND THE '70S, UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION... THEY WENT TO QUITE A BIT OF EFFORT TO TRY TO STOP THE US EXPORT OF SOME TECHNOLOGY? REPROCESSING AND SO FORTH. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT AT THE TIME?

Oh, oh, I'd, I didn't particularly agree with it. I thought that we would do better in controlling proliferation to continue to be involved in the furnishing of materials with our safeguards, and so forth, than to withdraw and not be part of the act... not have a card in the game... not have a hand in the card game.

YOU THINK THEY WERE TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH BEING CONCERNED ABOUT THE CLANDESTINE BOMBS IN THE BASEMENT AND THAT IDEA?

Ummm, yes probably. I've never... I've had a tremendous respect for he complexity of building an atomic bomb and have never been too concerned that it could be built clandestinely in a basement by the type of people who would be involved in that kind of an operation. It is a complicated proposition, and even some of the countries now that are considered to be proliferation threats... it is questionable that their scientists have the capability to build a bomb at least within the next few years. But as I've already indicated, Israel is an exception. They have the scientists with that capability.

HOW DO YOU BUILD A BOMB? [REPEATS THE QUESTION]

Oh, I couldn't tell you that! The bomb is exploded by compressing the fissionable material with conventional explosives. It's just em, in an oversimplified view you have the fissionable material, the plutonium, or the U-235 in the center, and it is below a critical mass... It is not enough to cause a chain reaction, an explosion. But when you squeeze it with, nuclear, with chemical explosives, you squeeze it so that all of the nuclei and atoms are closer together. Under those conditions the same weight of fissionable material becomes super critical, and a chain reaction can start. And that's the principle of the atomic bomb.

WHY IS IT DIFFICULT?

Uh, that's takes very fine calculations in extremely competent explosive capability, with explosives and so forth. I've obviously oversimplified the thing... And just to get the materials themselves... just the purification methods for the plutonium, put it in the form that is suitable to make it into an explosive and so forth. That can't be done with a kitchen sink or in a basement. That, that requires very sophisticated chemical apparatus with remote control because it's radioactive and, therefore, hazardous to handle. And it requires quite a capability in chemistry, and metallurgy, and physics; a capability with explosives and so forth.

AND IT'S NOT ENOUGH THAT THE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE IN THE ( ).

No. The information that I've given you is, is, not enough. You have to have the know how.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD OR ANYTHING THAT WE'VE MISSED?

I'm not so worried that they would build a bomb... that they might capture a bomb, is another matter...You know, whether there whether they transport them from one site to another... that they might capture it.

I WOULD JUST BE INTERESTED TO KNOW BECAUSE THAT SEEMS TO BE WHERE THE DIRECTION --

-- Well the terrorists, you know, they have to get the material And if they're going to get the raw material before it's separated, they can't do it... I mean, they have to have an organization with hundreds of engineers and scientists. Where're they going to get them? What scientist or engineer is going to be involved in that?

PEOPLE WORRY A LOT ABOUT A TERRORIST BOMB. ARE THEIR WORRIES OR FEARS JUSTIFIED?

Well, I, I'm not much worried that a terrorist organization can put together all the competence and sophistication that's necessary to build an atomic bomb purifying the material and putting together the intricate mechanisms for explosion and so forth. I'm much more worried about the possibility of them capturing an atomic bomb somewhere. Uh the whole weapon, and then learning how to detonate it. Of course there are a lot of safety devices built into it but, still they'd be much closer to having an workable atomic bomb that way than, than trying to build it from scratch.

WHEN WE TALKED A LOT ABOUT SAFEGUARDS, WHAT DO YOU SAY TO PEOPLE WHO CRITICIZE THE IAEA. FOR AN EXAMPLE, IN THE IRAQI CASE... HOW DO WE KNOW THERE ARE NOT A LOT MORE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AROUND?

Well they would have to be in countries that have no safeguards... Adherents to the NPT have their

-IRAQ WAS A MEMBER THEN...

...Iraq was a member of the NPT? Well, there is some question in the minds of some that the Iraqis actually were building an atomic bomb. There are those who believe that they were not, and that the attack was not justified. It's, it's not a foolproof system but it has worked pretty well so far And they have a competent group of inspectors, and it I think it accounts for the fact that there has really been no proliferation of nuclear weapons, no nuclear explosion by another country other than India in all these years.

THE OTHER CONTROVERSY THAT COMES UP IN ALL OF THIS IS THE FRENCH IN ALL THIS. THEY DIDN'T SIGN NPT. THEY DID STEP IN, RATHER, WHEN THE US WAS...

-- Well the French claim, I have good friends... Bertrand Goldschmidt, one of the leading French scientists worked in my laboratory in 1942 in Chicago for three months, and we've been friends ever since... My French friends assure me that they are, as dedicated to non-proliferation as we are even though they didn't sign the treaty.

IN THAT PERIOD DID YOU HAVE INDIANS WORKING WITH YOU AND PAKISTANIS? DID YOU HAVE A LOT OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD IN THE LATE '50s REALLY?

In the '50s I, I was head of the nuclear chemistry division here at the radiation laboratory as it was called then. It is now called the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and yes, I had scientists from all over the world Indian, European scientists, Course not in that time any Soviet scientists or Chinese scientists And I don't remember any Pakistani scientists, although I think that was mainly because there weren't any who were particularly qualified to come and work in my laboratory at that time.

WHAT WAS YOUR MEMORY OF THE INDIAN SCIENTISTS?

They were yes very good. Some of them obtained their PhD with me... They did their graduate work with me.

THIS WAS AN ATOMS OF PEACE, WASN'T IT, WHEN FOREIGN SCIENTISTS CAME OVER.

No that wasn't, When the foreign scientists came to work in my laboratory here, the nuclear chemistry laboratory and the radiation lab, no that wasn't part of Atoms for Peace. That was just part of the academic environment. They wrote to me and asked whether they could come and work in my laboratory. I got permission from the Atomic Energy Commission. We were not doing secret work... And we were carrying on basic research on the nucleus of, of the atom... And I had a number of PhD students, including some from India, for example. I've had about 65 scientists obtain their PhD working under my direction.