...THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IS SEEN AS SORT OF THE QUINTESSENTIAL OR THE BEST EXAMPLE OF DEALING WITH A CRISIS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE... YOU WERE SAYING EARLIER THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS CRISIS WHEN YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, THAT IT WAS ALSO, AND COULD BE CONSIDERED A VERY SERIOUS NUCLEAR CRISIS...COULD YOU TELL US BRIEFLY WHAT THAT...

That's true there was a crisis. It was uh, soon after Truman became president and uh, there had been uh, a treaty signed at the end of the war that the British and the United States and the Russians would move their forces out of Iran. Uh, the British and United States did so. The Russians refused and uh, Truman made uh, a very definite threat that if they didn't move back into their own territory, he'd drop a bomb on them. And I think he meant it. But they moved back, I think they thought he meant it too.

HOW SERIOUS DO YOU THINK THAT THREAT WAS FROM TRUMAN'S POINT OF VIEW?

I think it was very serious. I think it-very serious.

YOU THINK HE MEANT IT WHEN HE SAID THAT...

No question about the fact that the meant it in my opinion. And that is one of the three or four crisis of the nuclear age. Of course the Cuban Missile Crisis being perhaps the more serious one.

JUST ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT THAT—THE IRANIAN BUSINESS—UH, DO YOU THINK THAT'S A WISE THING TO DO, TO MAKE THAT SORT OF A NUCLEAR THREAT THAT...

I don't think it is now.

AT THE TIME.

Well at the time, well...we were the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. It wasn't long after Hiroshima and uh, it was a safe thing to do from the standpoint of being immune from my reciprocal action, by anybody else 'cause nobody else had a bomb but me.

TELL ME AGAIN WHAT TRUMAN DID, WHAT HE SAID AND HOW YOU FELT ABOUT IT.

Well I wasn't privy to talks with him at that time but, what was reported to me was that he threatened the Soviets with an atomic attack if they did not withdraw their forces from northern Iran in accordance with the treaty that uh that they had signed uh, with the British and the United States after the United States and the British honored the treaty and the Soviets refused to do so. In effect their plan was to take over Iran, on the, this we did not want, and uh, this was his means of persuading them uh, to change their course.

IT'S A VERY EFFECTIVE BIT OF PERSUASION...

I think so.

WHEN YOU FIRST BECAME DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, IN SEPTEMBER OF '61, WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE FEELING THEN IN THE WHITE HOUSE IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING CUBA AND CONCERNING CASTRO?

Well there was considerable concern uh, about Cuba and uh, Castro,...a feeling that the, for some reason the Eisenhower administration had been rather soft on Castro, soft on Communism and indeed uh, uh, soft in uh, Indonesia or South Vietnam.

AND WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN THE KENNEDY'S TIME AND WHAT WAS YOUR OWN SENSE OF— YOUR OWN FEELINGS ABOUT CUBA AND COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?

Well I had felt for uh, a couple of years that uh, uh, Castro was a—was a serious threat uh, to, to us and then his uh, uh, policies which were so uh, abhorred by John Foster Dulles uh, might possibly lead to a situation where uh, Castro would embrace the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union would have at their disposal real estate uh, in an area which they had no real estate. And this worried me. And uh, I spoke to John Foster Dulles about it uh, uh, at the time.

WHAT WAS IT ABOUT, I GUESS THIS WAS A NEW DEPARTURE—I MEAN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY SO--...I'M TALKING ABOUT NOW LATE '61 WHEN YOU BECAME DIRECTOR. IT WAS CLEAR I WOULD THINK BY THEN THAT CASTRO WAS A COMMUNIST THAT THIS WAS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY...

Well there was no question about...by late '61. He espoused communism and he'd uh, started to make arrangements with the Soviet Union on the—the threat of and the worry of uh, '58 and '59 and '60 had all come about.

WHAT DO THINK SHOULD HAVE BEEN—WHAT AT THE TIME, WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THIS?

I think that uh, diplomatic arrangements could have been made with, with Castro at that time. Uh, this is just my my judgment uh, I've no specific reason to believe it but this I think, because uh, he needed our help and uh, if we could have adjusted our uh, political thinking at the time we might have worked out an arrangement which at least would have protected Cuba from Soviet domination.

WHY WASN'T THAT POSSIBLE—I GET THE FEELING FROM THE READINGS AND PEOPLE I'VE SPOKEN TO THAT AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS, THE KENNEDY BROTHERS IN PARTICULAR AND I THINK PERHAPS OTHERS AROUND THERE WERE— FELT THAT THERE COULD BE NO COMBINATION WITH CASTRO, THEY...

Well, and what I've just said, I was talking about a period before the Bay of Pigs or before Kennedy took office. By the time Kennedy took office, and Eisenhower left office, uh, then uh, uh, it was too late. You see a year and a half gone by, by the time that uh, Kennedy uh, President Kennedy tackled the job, uh, there was no chance for compromise at that time whatsoever, that I know of. Nor were there any discussions that might lead to a compromise.

AND WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE CONCERNING CASTRO IN CUBA WHEN YOU BECAME THE DIRECTOR WHAT WERE YOUR UH... WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT WHAT HAD TO BE DONE WHEN YOU BECAME DIRECTOR OF THE CIA CONCERNING CASTRO IN CUBA?

Well, I thought at that time, that we had to uh, be on our look out and be prepared to counter the moves of the Soviets which were taking place at that time. But there was no specific course of action, that uh, was indicated or recommended. The Bay of Pigs had taken place and had failed for reasons which almost everybody understands now. And uh, there were very uh, there was really no uh, uh, program against Castro uh, at that particular time. Now, some program had developed later, uh but uh, at that particular time, there were no programs, that I know of.

THESE DEVELOPED IN THE SORT OF '62 PERIOD, DID THEY—IN THE SORT OF SPRING AND SUMMER OF '62..?

Yes, that's right...

CAN YOU JUST TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT SOME OF THOSE PROGRAMS THAT THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WITH?

Yes, they were involved in a number of uh, of entries into Cuba, a number of sabotage activities uh, designed to discredit the—the uh, Castro regime and uh, a variety of, of actions of that kind. None of them were very effective because uh, uh, apparently the Cuban community in—in Florida was pretty well seated with uh, Castro agents, so almost everything that was planned was uh, known to Castro before it took place. But some very effective things did take place.

WAS IT FRUSTRATING FOR YOU NOT BEING ABLE TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN DEALING WITH COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERES…

I didn't get the question.

WAS IT FRUSTRATING FOR YOU THAT YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO BE MORE SUCCESSFUL WHEN YOU HAD A COMMUNIST COUNTRY UH, IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?

Sure, it was a very, very frustrating. Just like all of those in Washington today are frustrated over the uh, impasse of Nicaragua. But uh, uh, we saw this developing and uh, were very worried about it.

...THE KENNEDYS AND ROBERT KENNEDY IN PARTICULAR WAS SPECIFICALLY KEEN ON TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CASTRO.

Very much so. Very much so. Robert Kennedy uh, uh was very much interested in what actions might be taken uh, to uh, upset Castro, dismantle his authority. They were very, they were very supportive of any ideas that might be developed.

WAS THERE ANY FEELING AS DIRECTOR OF THE CIA THAT THEY WERE INTERFERING WITH WHAT YOU WERE TRYING TO DO, I KNOW THEY SET UP A WHOLE THING CALLED THE SPECIAL GROUP WITH MAXWELL TAYLOR AND ROBERT KENNEDY...WAS THIS—DID YOU EVER FEEL THAT THIS WAS IN SOME WAY YOU KNOW GETTING AROUND YOUR OPERATION, YOUR CIA WORK.

No, I didn't feel that way. I think some of the professionals in the CIA felt that way. But, uh, I did not feel that way.

THERE WAS A WHOLE THING THAT IS NOW BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE, GENERAL LANSDALE OPERATION AND ALL THAT SORT OF THING, WAS THAT A CIA-RUN THING OR WAS THAT SOMETHING WAS KIND OF BEING RUN SEPARATELY BY ROBERT KENNEDY.

Well it was the CIA participated in in it. Well I attended countless meetings as did some of my deputies but uh, basically it was an inner agency activity that uh, reported up to Bobby Kennedy, rather than the—rather than the CIA.

YOU THINK IF THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE HEAD OF THE CIA AS YOURSELF WERE--WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT CUBA AND CASTRO, YOU'D THINK THAT THEY'D BE ABLE TO GET SOMETHING DONE. CAN YOU HELP ME UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS YOU WERE HAVING THERE.

Well they...They weren't able to get it done. On their various efforts were, were failures. Uh, I think that there was a mistake made and judgments at that time because uh, I think those who were planning those operations uh,...and others uh, felt that the, that the people in, in Cuba uh, and the and the military in Cuba uh, would embrace anything that would uh, be detrimental to Castro. That was not quite the case. I think the and the feeling among the people towards Castro grew after that. I don't think Castro had been there long enough uh, that the euphoria of a new leader and the hope for a new uh, economic condition uh, was still embraced by the Cubans.

SO THEY UNDERESTIMATED UH, PERHAPS THE POPULARITY OF CASTRO STILL.

There's no question about it. There's no question about it. We ran a post-mortem on the Bay of Pigs which was a disaster and a failure and we're not going to into those details this morning. But in the post-mortem, why the Cuban analysts that were in the CIA concluded that if all of the complement of equipment and everything you got...according to plan, which it didn't for reasons you understand uh, they, the war would have lasted for three or four weeks rather than 3 days. In other words, they did not think that the that the invading brigade of 15 hundred uh, Cuban... who were, who were very good and very brave and very dedicated would be embraced by the uh, by the people and by the military and this was the assumption that was made and those who planned the Bay of Pigs.

HOW DID THIS FEEL TO YOU, THIS, JUST NOTION IN YOUR MIND THAT THERE WAS THIS FLOURISH—FLOURISHING IN A WAY OR UH, COMMUNIST COUNTRY NOW, JUST 90 MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, WAS IT SOMETHING THAT KIND OF STUCK IN YOUR CRAW IN A WAY, WAS IT A...

Sure it did at that time and has ever since.

WHAT CAN YOU EXPRESS YOUR FEELINGS IN YOUR OWN WORDS.

Well, I think it was a disaster and I think it was, serious uh, diplomatic failure uh, and I think it should have never been permitted. There was a great deal of emotion grew up in the United States and in the in the State Department and in the White House, uh, against uh, Castro, from the very start. Uh, and a lot of prob, the Eisenhower administration and of course by the time the Kennedy administration came along why uh, it was, Castro was well entrenched. But in the latter part of the Eisenhower administration uh, it was very emotional uh, uh, not uh, constructive uh, in as much if it was not reaching in the direction of agreement. It was quite to the contrary.

NOW THIS WAS SOMETHING YOU IN A SENSE, FELL INTO, WHEN YOU BECAME DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, THIS CONCERN ABOUT CASTRO AND CUBA, WAS IT SOMETHING INSIDE YOURSELF AS WELL THAT...

Well, I think be the time I became director of CIA everybody was concerned about it.

BUT WHAT WERE YOUR OWN INTERNAL FEELINGS ABOUT IT...I MEAN...

Well, my feelings were, were one of serious concern. See I came in three or four months after the Bay of Pigs. And uh, in that interval uh, Castro had made his arrangements of, in Moscow and troops actually had been sent over.

... 50,000 on a static defense of certain facilities and uh, then in the spring of 1965, uh, Johnson ordered uh, offensive operations.

AND THAT'S ABOUT WHEN YOU LEFT.

Yes...Because I thought he was wrong, uh, that he should not engage in that kind of a war unless he was going to support it with adequate uh, air support which uh, he would not do and was advised against. And uh, I felt this was a mistake.

IF HE WAS GOING TO DO IT HE SHOULD GO ALL THE WAY.

That's right...You're going into a war you better go into to win it.

DO YOU THINK HE'D BE APPRECIATED IF HE IF THERE WAS A DOUGLAS MACARTHUR NOW TO DEAL WITH THE PHILIPPINES?

I don't know, I don't know that... situation is not parallel at all.

WHAT...HOW WAS YOUR OPINION RECEIVED BY, DID YOU SPEAK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT IT? HOW WAS YOUR ANALYSIS RECEIVED BY THOSE...

Well, we had a number of meetings in August uh, meetings of the principles and uh, uh, there was a sharp difference of, of the judgment factor and I must say that I was quite in the minority. I was nevertheless, that was my my judgment. After we had two full dress meetings and Secretary Rusk's office, and the, my views were not well received there weren't the, the judgment of the CIA analysts were contrary to my judgment, uh, which or... my inability to persuade them but that's what they thought and that of course was their privilege. And lacking any hard intelligence, uh there were, I became very restless because I was going to be married and uh, planned to go on a wedding trip so I went over to see the President. Uh, I went over on the advice of, of uh, Gerry Ford, who I had talked with and the, told him of my concern and he suggested I go over and see him. And I saw the President on a one-on-one basis and explained uh, my views. Uh, he listened very attentively and called a meeting of the National Security Council the next morning. And uh, asked me to express my judgments before the entire council which I did. Uh, that meeting ended after some discussion uh, the judgment of others was presented and he, the President said, turned to McGeorge Bundy, and he said, "Let's prepare a contingency plan, just in case John is right." And uh, I told the President I would gladly postpone my wedding trip, but I wouldn't postpone my wedding so, so he said, "No that wasn't necessary," he could send for me if it was necessary. And so I went on my way.

WHY DO YOU THINK THE—WAS IT MORE THAN JUST THE LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE DIFFICULTY IN KENNEDY ACCEPTING YOUR POINT OF VIEW, WAS THERE MORE TO IT THAN THAT? KENNEDY WAS A DEMOCRAT YOU WERE A REPUBLICAN WAS THERE ANY OF THAT IN IT, OR WAS THERE KENNEDY MAYBE HAD A DIFFERENT FEELING ABOUT COMMUNISTS THREAT THAN YOU DID, WAS THERE ANY OF THAT IN IT?

No, I think I did not hear President Kennedy express himself uh, one way or the other. Uh, He uh, listened to my judgments very attentively but he listened to the judgment of others. And since there was no hard intelligence his problem was the way uh, my judgment against the judgment of others. And uh, that's what he did, and uh, I think he went about as far as he could in ordering a contingency plan, which incidentally was the plan that we adopted when we didn't find out that there was a missile there.

AND YOU WENT OFF ON YOUR HONEYMOON, AND I UNDERSTAND DURING THAT PERIOD, YOU STARTED SENDING CABLES.

Yes, I had secure communications and uh, the longer I stayed the more this concern built up in my mind. I uh , was down in France, down in Cape Ferrat, I went up to Paris and uh, talked with my deputy General Carter on a secure telephone and uh, also I saw McGeorge Bundy who happened to be in Paris at the time and I expressed my concern to him. And I think that he returned uh, to uh, to Washington realizing uh, that I had this concern. I sent several telegrams which had become known as the "honeymoon telegrams," one in particular which I violently opposed the estimate of the, of mid September by the Board of National Estimates of the United States Intelligence Board in which they expressed the judgment opposed to mine and uh, but being uh, away of not having any uh, current intelligence available to me of my views uh, did not carry much weight of my deputy General Carter and others. We have to so when I returned I found much to my surprise that uh, we had not over-flown Cuba I think we over-flew it on the 4th or 5th of September and not again until October. Now, uh, I violently protested that because I thought we've helped to keep Cuba under surveillance but for one reason or another be did not do so, uh until the historic flight of October the 14th, in which we flew over the side of crystal ball and located the first missile that had been moved into Cuba.

AND WHEN YOU GOT THOSE—WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST FEELING WHEN YOU SAW THOSE PHOTOS, DID YOU FEEL AHA, FINALLY HERE'S MY EVIDENCE..? WHAT WAS THE FEELING FOR YOU?

Well, my feeling was that one of them saying well, you were right and everybody else was wrong. My feeling was one of the one of deep concern uh, it happened that my uh, step-son had been killed uh, flew out to California unexpectedly to his uh, funeral. We flew from Washington to Los Angeles, he was killed in automobile accident outside Los Angeles and we uh, took his body up to Seattle and arranged for his, for his funeral. I received a telephone call very early in the morning from uh, my executive officer, Mr. Elder and he said in a rather cryptic words that, "What you expected has happened." And I said, "They're there are they?" And he said, "Yes." Uh, and he said, "The President wants you to come back right away." And I said, well I think if President would understand if I stayed a day or two to, my step-son's funeral." He said, "No, the President wants you immediately and we'll send the plane for you." So it happened that there was an early morning plane to Chicago and I took that and...a military plane picked me up at Chicago and I came right into Washington and into the White House. And met with the President, he at that time had formed the Executive Committee.

AND WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST FEELING ABOUT WHAT HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THESE MISSILES? WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO, WHAT SORT OF ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN?

Well, I thought we had to be uh, very deliberate and very careful and uh, no action was demanded in a matter of hours because the missiles, the missile that we observed uh, was not in position to launch and sometime would be required before it was in position. So we kept it under constant surveillance until we reached the point where we uh, felt it was at the point of launch or close to it and then uh, uh, the, the Executive Committee as a whole uh, realized that action had to be taken. And we'd done a great many things before that as you know. And uh, uh, I think the course of action that was followed was prudent and correct.

THERE'S A LOT OF DEBATE OF COURSE, IN THOSE MEETINGS AND I UNDERSTAND THERE WERE VARIOUS CAMPS AND VARIOUS POINTS OF VIEW, WHAT WAS YOUR OWN INSTINCT ABOUT WHAT YOU FELT SHOULD BE DONE?

My own instinct was that we had to get rid of the missiles and our only probability we had to get rid of the militarily. But that we had to pursue a course of action that would uh, give Khrushchev a opportunity to turn around if he was so inclined. But if he did not do so, then we had to take the ultimate action of an air strike and, and an invasion. I realized that that was the most serious undertaking because it would uh, spill a lot of blood and uh, a lot of Russian blood and it would involve unpredictable actions by the Soviet Union elsewhere. But nevertheless that was what we would have to do if it became uh, necessary. Fortunately we had a few days in there to explore this possibility and uh, we had countless meetings of that Executive Meeting uh, and we've sought the opinion of a great many people uh, Adlai Stevenson came from the United Nations to confer with the, with the Committee, uh, Dean Acheson was called in. I went to Gettysburg to discuss a problem of uh, Eisenhower who could not come to Washington because of health, so I went down there and met with him twice uh, retired generals and admirals were brought in and uh, Jack McCloy came down from Washington and he was most helpful. I don't remember whether Robert came down or not but he apparently was not in very good health, and I don't think he came down for the Committee. But these meetings went on. We had almost daily flights and uh, I convened the United States Intelligence Board every morning at 8 o'clock, we'd go over the latest photography and then the executive committee would gather about 9:30, it was in secretary Rusk's office or the White House and uh, we would open the meeting by a report on the uh, findings of the Intelligence Board which I would report how that went on for 13 days. And I must say it was a great strain because the uh, we had to operate clandestinely. We did not want the press and the public to know that we—that we were meeting so we'd travel in unusual ways several in one car, or sneaking in the basement of the State Department a few things like that. But, uh,...well there were no leaks.

WHEN YOU UM, I UNDERSTAND DURING THE PROCESS OF THE COURSE OF THESE MEETINGS PEOPLE CHANGED THEIR MINDS. DID YOUR MIND CHANGE FROM THE...

Yes, I did,

AND WHY DID THEY CHANGE.

They changed their minds for a variety of reasons. Uh, Secretary Rusk changed his mind from uh, an attitude of uh, taking immediate military action to uh, one of a more passive uh, role uh, holding off to see whether other moves would work. Uh,...

HOW ABOUT YOUR SELF SIR, WHAT...DID YOUR MIND CHANGE DURING THIS PERIOD?

No my mind did not change. I uh, I felt uh, confident that uh Khrushchev would in the final analysis uh, back down rather than risk a confrontation. I was quite confident of that. And uh, that turned out to be the case. But I must say that uh, some of the arguments that were put forward by some of the men I mentioned were very persuasive, very persuasive.

DID YOUR MIND CHANGE THEN DURING THIS WHOLE PROCESS, THESE 13 DAYS OF CONSTANT MEETINGS?

I don't think so. I don't think so. Uh...I was convinced in my mind that uh...Khrushchev would back down. I was also convinced if he did not do so, we would have to take military action and should do so. But that we would hold, I thought we should off until the last minute, which we did.

NOW SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE BLOCKADE ITSELF WAS A MILITARY ACTION AND THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED A RATHER PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTION, BECAUSE THERE YOU WERE ON THE HIGH SEAS STOPPING SHIPS.

Well, it was a provocative military action. But a necessary one. Uh...we debated about a blockade. A blockade would have been an act of war. We did not do that, but we put a quarantine which was coi...a coined expression but it served it purpose. Uh...there was a great deal of uh...of anxiety among the committee uh...when the first Soviet ship was stopped and boarded. It turned out that that ship had no weapons on it. And there was a great relief uh... when 12 or 14 ships that were in the vicinity of the Azores, all of a sudden were stopped dead in the water and after 24 hours turned around and went home. They were the ones that had uh... most of the missiles on them in our opinion and probably the warheads as well.

IS THAT PERIOD FOR YOU THE MOST FRIGHTENING TIME OR THE MOST CRITICAL MOMENT?

Oh, I think probably the most critical moment was the boarder...boarding those first couple of Soviet ships. That was...that gave us all great concern.

WERE YOU ON THE PHONE TO THEM? WAS MCNAMARA ON THE PHONE TO THE AMERICAN SHIPS TO THE TIME? WERE YOU SORT OF ALL SITTING AROUND LISTENING TO THIS HAPPENING?

Well, we had pretty good contact. Pretty good intelligence on what was going on. Who was on the telephone with who, I really uh...if I knew I don't recall. It was some years ago, you know.

BUT FOR MANY PEOPLE WE'VE SPOKEN TO THIS PERIOD IS KIND OF ETCHED IN THEIR MEMORY. THEY FELT IT WAS SUCH A CRITICAL TIME, IN MANY WAYS THE CLOSEST TO A NUCLEAR WAR THAT WE'VE HAD. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

Well we were close to a war if... if Khrushchev had not taken the opportunity to reverse himself. Now, I've always greatly admired uh...President Kennedy's restraint in uh...holding back until the very last minute. Uh...until they couldn't... wait no longer without uh...placing the United States in danger. Uh...and then he was prepared to order the strike. But uh...his doctrine and his philosophy which I thought was correct was to give uh...the...give Khrushchev and the Soviets an opportunity to reverse themselves.

YOU WERE NOT ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE ANXIOUS FOR AN AIR STRIKE EARLY ON IN THE PROCESS AND QUICKLY, WITH WHAT THEY CALL A SURGICAL STRIKE, AND QUICKLY GET THESE THINGS OFF THE MAP BEFORE THEY BECAME OPERATIONAL?

No, I did not uh...advocate that uh...for a variety of reasons. I thought uh...history would not treat the largest and most powerful nation in the world uh...very well if we imposed a military might against a country of six million people. Uh...I would...I deplored that and uh...supported it only when necessary. When it became necessary the I supported it fully.

THE ARGUMENT IS THAT DEAN ACHESON AND OTHERS--AS I UNDERSTAND IT THE ARGUMENT WAS WE SHOULD TAKE THESE OUT QUICKLY BEFORE THEY GET OPERATIONAL BECAUSE WE ONLY HAVE SO MANY DAYS AND IF WE WAIT TOO LONG THEY'LL BE READY TO FIRE AND THEN IT WILL BE A MUCH MORE SERIOUS CRISIS.

Well we uh...uh...would realize that. And that's why the United States Intelligence Board uh...under my direction kept this under constant surveillance. So we knew uh...when those uh...missiles would be operational and uh...it was just a matter of 24 or 48 hours uh...before a strike was to take place. And I suppose you have the chronology of...of those hours well documented. But uh... if I remember uh...that was Friday night that we told the President that he had to act either Sunday morning or at the latest Monday morning, and he ordered the go ahead. And then uh...those telegrams came through which you are familiar with and uh...he took advantage of a...of a telegram that obviously was written by Khrushchev and not by the foreign office. And uh...acted upon it. And responded. And on the strength of that response...on Sunday morning, Khrushchev announced that he was going to remove the missiles. On a 2 o'clock Sunday afternoon we flew a U-2 plane over San Cristobal and they were actually digging up the foundations.

THAT QUICKLY?

Uh?

THAT QUICKLY..

That's right. That's right. I...I remember going to mass on uh...8 o'clock on Sunday morning. And we were to meet 9:30 or 10:30 or something like that. And there came the...it came over the news at 8 o'clock that Khrushchev would have a...statement to make within an hour. That's the longest mass I've ever sat through. When at 9 o'clock he announced that he was removing the missiles and by 2:00 that afternoon they were actually dismantling the...the San Cristobal...foundations. Very dramatic, you know?

HOW DO YOU FEEL? DO YOU REMEMBER COMING OUT OF CHURCH? IT WAS AFTER YOU CAME OUT OF CHURCH THAT YOU HEARD THE NEWS?

Well, we, of course, we felt very...very anxious. What he said and what he did we...we... would do, we didn't know. So we had to uh... we had to be on the alert. We had to be ready to move uh...we could not depend on a speech made over a radio. And that's why we flew those flights that I told you about.

WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF ROBERT KENNEDY DURING THESE MEETINGS? I UNDERSTAND THAT HE WAS A VERY PASSIONATE SPEAKER UH...DURING SOME OF THESE MEETINGS. WHAT DID YOU FEEL ABOUT HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE?

Well, I thought it was very great. Uh...he did not engage in the...in the debate very much. He left that to others to McNamara and to Rusk and to Bundy and....and others. But uh...he was serving as a...as an intimate liaison with the President uh...at all times. And I think he stayed in the...in the position where he could be helpful but not dominate the meetings which he and this is very wise of him to do that. Also he had two or three meetings with the Soviet ambassador who were very useful. And uh...he could convey to -the Soviet ambassador for transmission to uh...Khrushchev just what the temper in Washington was.

I UNDERSTAND THAT MR. ACHESON GOT QUITE UPSET WITH KENNEDY DURING SOME OF THESE MEETINGS. WERE YOU PRIVY TO ANY OF THAT?

Well, Acheson took some very strong positions for immediate and uh...definite and massive military action. And uh...I didn't know that he he got disturbed with Kennedy over that. I....I.. I hadn't heard that, but uh...I know he was so positive in his views. And knowing Dean as I knew him, he'd broke no opposition. So I...I imagine there was some...there was some rather rough talk although I had very few ...conversations with Dean myself, although I knew him very well of course. And he was violently opposed to...to uh...Stevenson's plan to refer the whole business to the United Nations which Stevenson advocated uh...but nobody agreed with that.

LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR OWN FEELINGS TOWARDS STEVENSON'S PLAN. ONE ASPECT OF HIS PLAN WAS TO REFER THE THING TO THE UNITED NATIONS. THAT OTHER-ASPECT, I UNDERSTAND, WAS THAT STEVENSON FELT THE THE US MISSILES, THE JUPITER MISSILES IN TURKEY SHOULD BE OFFERED AS AN EXCHANGE FOR THE SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA. WHAT WERE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT STEVENSON'S ARGUMENT?

Well uh...I never heard him made...make that argument of exchanging the Jupiters in Turkey... uh...for the missiles. Oh, I think that did occur to him; however the plan to put the missiles, the Jupiters in Turkey had uh...all but been abandoned long before this missile crisis came up, because there was great opposition to put them there. We'd put the Thors in England and taken them out. We'd put the Jupiters in...in uh...Italy and taken them out. And we hadn't put the...the missiles in...in Turkey and uh... uh...missile crisis or no missile crisis, I don't think we would have done it. That was uh...there was a growing opposition to it. And the...I've always been opposed to putting offensive missiles in the hands of other countries uh... At least I was at that time because uh...we did not have a very uh...strong force to protect them.

DID YOU FEEL THAT STEVENSON WAS A BIT NAIVE IN HIS APPROACH THAT THIS THING COULD BE HANDLED DIPLOMATICALLY BY A BODY LIKE THE UN?

Well, I don't know that I'd call it naive uh... I...I didn't think it was realistic. And uh... their failure to handle crises of those kind certainly indicated that uh...that concern about their ability or willingness to handle the situation of this kind was a...a real and valid concern. I uh...uh...I thought that uh... Stevenson was kind of carried away with the power and the influence of the United Nations. He hadn't been in there very long, you know, and uh...he had had a few crises on his...on his hands. So uh...l think he felt that with his own power of persuasion and his own uh...uh...power of conviction that uh...he could carry the...the program uh... to a satisfactory conclusion. I felt that Khrushchev's plan was to have uh...a few missiles put in Cuba surreptitiously and unknown and then he was to appear before the general assembly uh... some short time later, and he'd just announce that uh...we were looking down his gun barrel, you know. And uh...I think that was his ploy. And fortunately it didn't work.

DO YOU REMEMBER THE FIRST MESSAGE THAT YOU AND THE GROUP RECEIVED FROM KHRUSHCHEV, I UNDERSTAND IT WAS A VERY EMOTIONAL LETTER.

Yes, I remember it, but I don't remember the wording and it was a long time ago and I...

NO, NOT THE WORDING SO MUCH, BUT I'D BE INTERESTED IN WHAT THE REACTION WAS TO THE PEOPLE IN THE ROOM. DID YOU FEEL HERE WAS A MAN OUT OF CONTROL? WAS THIS A MAN WHO WAS...

Well, there were two messages came in, if you will recall. One message was very obviously written by the foreign office. Was very gruff and uh...presented us with no option. The second message, which we felt was a personal message written by Khrushchev, but sent out as an official message uh...gave us lots of latitude. And it was that message that...that Kennedy answered. Now I...cannot quote those telegrams. My files are not here and I haven't been able to review them. Some of them are still highly classified as you know.

WE'VE SEEN THE FIRST MESSAGE, THE MESSAGE THAT CAME PERSONALLY FROM KHRUSHCHEV. AND MANY PEOPLE FELT THAT HERE WAS A MAN THAT SEEMED LIKE HE WAS ON THE EDGE OF AN EMOTIONAL BREAKDOWN OR SOMETHING. HE WAS TALKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR AND IT WAS A KIND OF, HOW FEARFUL HE WAS OF NUCLEAR WAR. DO YOU RECALL THAT? DO YOU RECALL THE REACTION OF THE GROUP TO THAT?

Well, the reactions were varied. But the reaction of the President and Robert Kennedy was that uh...this gives us something to...to work on.

LET'S TALK IN TERMS OF YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT THE MISSILE CRISIS AND THE LESSONS THAT ONE SHOULD LEARN FROM IT. MANY OF THE PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELF WHO WERE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING AT THAT TIME FEEL THAT THERE ARE MANY LESSONS THAT WE SHOULD LEARN.

Well, I think that there are a great many lessons. One is that we must preserve our intelligence resources at all times and at all costs. One of the great mistakes that we all made was standing down the...the U-2 flights throughout the month of September and then till early October. That could have spelled tragedy to the United States. Fortunately we got them started at just the opportune time. Uh...but uh...that is one of the great lessons, in my opinion, that we learned. The other uh...lesson I think is to...is to exhaust every opportunity to settle a difference uh...before you resort to armed conflict and most particularly, nuclear conflict.

I UNDERSTAND ONE OF YOUR GREAT CONCERNS IS THE WHOLE ASPECT OF CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONTROL OF THEIR MILITARY USE. CAN YOU ADDRESS THAT?

Yes. I'm increasingly concerned about it. Here we have uh...missiles at sea, and we have missiles located in various places in Europe and uh...and of course in the United States. And uh...there are dangers inherent. There's dangers of an accident. And there's also dangers of...of a man or a group of men uh...taking independent action. Uh...now every safeguard has been... that's conceivable has been set up against that, but I still think that it's a very, very serious problem. Serious for us and serious for the Soviet Union.

DO YOU THINK THAT PERHAPS THIS IS THE GREATEST DANGER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE OF AN ACCIDENT RATHER THE PRESIDENT OF THE US OR THE SOVIET PREMIER, BUT SOMETHING GOING WRONG THAT'S BEYOND CONTROL?

That's what I'm afraid of. I'm not at all afraid that the...that the President of the United States or the leader of the Soviet Union will bring down a catastrophe on the world. I don't think that will happen. But I'm afraid of a...of a accidental firing by either side, causing a response and that would escalate. That worries me.

HOW DO YOU THINK IT'S CHANGED IN THE 25 ODD YEARS SINCE THE MISSILE CRISIS? DO YOU THINK THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR HAS BECOME MORE SEVERE OR LESS SEVERE?

Oh, I think it's become less severe. I think our controls have...have...have improved continuously. And uh...so I think it' less severe than it was 20 or 25 years ago.

BUT THERE'S SO MANY MORE MISSILES. AT THAT TIME I THINK THE SOVIETS HAD HAD SOMETHING LIKE 300 ICBMS AND THE AMERICANS HAD MAYBE 1,000 or 2,000. NOW THERE'S BILLIONS OF THINGS. DOES THAT NOT CONCERN YOU? DOES THAT NOT MAKE YOU FEEL THAT PERHAPS THERE'S A GREATER DANGER?

No, I don't think that numbers make all that much difference. Uh...the numbers haven't increased all that much. There have been the modernization and improvement. But uh...our inventory of missiles is not gone up to a point where it would impose a...a new and different threat. I think both sides have too many missiles, too many warheads. But uh...that's being debated right now in Geneva with questionable success, it seems to me.

AS THE MAN WHO WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE AEC AND THEN AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA AND HAD A DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ALL THIS PERIOD AND OF COURSE YOUR GREAT EXPERIENCE DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION I WONDER IF AT THIS POINT IN YOUR LIFE AND YOUR EXPERIENCE OFFER SOME LESSONS THAT WE MIGHT LEARN FROM ALL OF THAT IN TODAYS SORT OF NUCLEAR DILEMMA.

Well, I feel that uh...we must uh...realize the uh...frightening power that we have. That both sides have. And uh...therefore, I think both sides have to de...dedicate themselves to...to procedures and policies and conduct that will uh...to every extent possible, foreclose the use of this uh...frightening power. Uh...I already said that. I think it is necessary for the United States to maintain a military posture that will uh… have such a retaliatory capability that the Soviet Union or anyone else will tempt it...into into action. And uh...that I think we must insist upon. We don't have to have more. We don't have to have bigger. We don't have to have any of that. But we have to have enough so that the Soviet Union would know that the destruction of our counter force or retaliatory force would be unacceptable from their standpoint.

ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AREN'T ENOUGH AWARE OF THAT?

Oh, I think they are. I think they're...they're uh...they're perfectly aware. Uh...and I applaud what the President is trying to do in his strategic defense initiative because uh...he looks upon that as an alternative to uh...mutually assured destruction. But until that comes into being uh...then he has to depend upon a retaliatory force strong enough to...to assure destruction on the other side if we are attacked and face destruction ourselves.

YOU'VE ALWAYS BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMUNIST THREAT, IF YOU LIKE. DO YOU THINK TODAY THE THREAT IS ANY GREATER OR LESSER THEN...

Oh, I think it's lesser. I think it's lesser. I think the uh...uh...Communist grip on their people is lessening. I think their people are becoming more informed. And uh... as they become informed they'll be less inclined to...to actions which ultimately would seriously damage them.

SO IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS ARE YOU AN OPTIMIST OR A PESSIMIST ABOUT WHERE WE'RE GOING AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD IN THE NUCLEAR AGE?

I'm optimistic. I'm optimistic. I do not think the world is going to be destroyed by the...by the nuclear forces available to both sides. I think that now that the process of discussions have started, I think that they will prove fruitful and they will continue and continue successfully. Now it's going to take years to do it, but I think it will be done.