(INAUDIBLE QUESTION)

I would say that the development of the Federal Republic of Germany's position went through several stages. Without going far back into history, taking 1987, the year of decisive negotiation then, after Reykjavik, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter FRG), according to general and my own opinion took an unconstructive stance. But, in the government of the FRG, there were a number who expressed disapproval of the American level of preparedness to work with the USSR towards a solution of this problem—in whole and in part, what is this connected with? Well, it's always difficult to provide explanations, though naturally, there is an opinion about this in Moscow. Evidently, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the inertia of old ways of thinking let itself be known. Thinking which espoused a gradual buildup in NATO forces, which, as at least some public figures in that alliance suppose, could have forced the Soviet Union and other communist countries to accept an unbalanced compromise and go back on its principles. Naturally, in the past and present, this attitude did not have a future, and as events show, it turned out to be unsound. The beliefs formed in the FRG, US, and other countries are incorrect: that the USSR placed in the last stage of negotiations the question of American warheads in the Bundeswahr, the American-bred Pershing A. This question arose, I want to make this very clear at that stage when, on on the American side, during Schultz's visit here, when, on the American side, the question was posed about the need to come to an understanding about the Pershing and Cruise missiles, and the corresponding SS-20 and SS-4, and also, agreement on smaller distance missiles, on strategic missiles. Then, in the context of that question, of course, one should ask the question about American offensive warheads which do not belong to but are controlled by the United States, since they are jointly controlled. At first, the government of the FRG took a very negative attitude. It stated that this issue wasn't under discussion, and couldn't be discussed, and that this is an unbalanced, new requirement, introduced by the Soviets to disrupt the agreements and the very process of negotiations. In general, everything was said that could be said to deflect its own unconstructive position in the direction of someone else. But this did not change the issue. We were absolutely indifferent to whether the American warheads were on American missiles, or on some other carrier, controlled jointly, by the Americans and the Germans. We are interested in the warhead, not the missile carrying it. I want to say that in the final analysis, the government of the FRG showed prudence, took a line in consonance with the mutual agreements, and in modifying its stance in the last stages of serious entanglements, there was, without doubt, on the FRG's part, a willingness to contribute to the final outcome in a positive way. Since they helped, we won't be stingy in our thanks to a government which possibly even definitely, in the past took a position which we couldn't help but see as complicating the negotiations.

(INAUDIBLE QUESTION)

The decisive change occurred in the fall, September-October. I think the principal motive that made its was an algorism. The government was defending a point of view which it was impossible to defend without breaking the elementary rules of logic. Public figures could not reach an agreement, and we were talking about a powerful capacity on the German side, if one took the American arsenal into account. Here, in the final analysis, one had to show one's flag sooner or later—what was the government of the FRG standing for? For steps to liberate Europe, the world, including the FRG itself, from the burdens connected with the arms race? Or did it act against that process? Naturally, the FRG had to lend an ear to its own public opinion, to powerful domestic groups, demanding that the FRG's official position be put in line with the need for easing of tension that concrete measures be taken in nuclear disarmament. Although one must say that here, up to this point, there are several nuances in the FRG's position which we couldn't help but be alarmed at. Among those who called for the FRG to bring its position in line with logic, life's demands, common sense, one cannot neglect to mention the Social Democrats, the Greens, various pacifist movements, and private social movements, such as intellectuals, trade unions, demonstrations, one has to say, of the leading parties, among the democrats there were such demonstrations, the XDC. We don't, I personally am far from saying that the FRG should testify to its error. In the final analysis it is much more significant that common sense prevailed. Common sense, not the Soviet side, the American side, or some other side, common sense. Mutual interests. The common denominator which lies at the base of our mutual interests, in our understanding, is this: that, today, there is not and cannot be a country which is not dependent on progress in arms control, whose interests can be separated from the fact that either there will be a lasting world, or a very un-lasting world. Today, this common sense is exemplified in concrete acts, and this can only be greeted with open arms.

(INAUDIBLE QUESTION)

I think that this is a normal, attendant factor which expressed various opinions and interests in different countries. When people have reluctance or even doubt about the usefulness of an agreement, then, naturally, various arguments come to mind against the other side, or even one's own side, regardless of whether these arguments are founded. We understand very well, and I am sure that the US also understands, that neither one of us will succeed in convincing the other side of something it doesn't want. The only kind of feasible agreement is a voluntary one. The time, especially between two great powers, when one could consider an unequal agreement is over. Today, it is practically impossible to think of unequal agreements between great powers and small countries. In any case, the days of unequal agreements are ending. Manipulations are of no use. Because a forced agreement will be so interpreted as to lose its meaning, or a loophole will be found to keep it from being implemented. We in the Soviet Union strive to create agreements today that have a good perspective and will serve the world.

(INAUDIBLE QUESTION)

In connection with your question, I want to say that even Reagan's strong personality should not be attributed to weak presidents. In the carrying out of their function, they also undergo development. If a man has real inner strength, when he comes up against the facts of life, he can't help but draw conclusions and incorporate them into his everyday policies. Independently of what he thinks of the Soviet Union, or of the socialist system, a political figure, leader of the United States, must admit that the US and USSR depend on one another. Our futures depend on the kind of relationship we have. If one doesn't want to be an enemy to oneself, then one must think about how to put these relations in order. It is counter productive to deny responsibility for one's share of work. Evidently, no President of the United States can allow himself the luxury of ignoring the facts. No President is strong enough to change these facts. And the main fact of our lives consists of the following: we can live in the world, or we can die in conflict. There is no other choice. From this, we have to draw the corresponding conclusions.

(NEW QUESTION)

I think that he was a very visible, and one can say, in the historiography of the FRG, he was a notable leader. He undoubtedly belongs in the ranks of those who commanded in the FRG and other western European countries, and this was very important—commanded economic resources. He was professionally interested in military strategy issues, and in the development of ideas. In my experience, he had the ability to listen to others, and was ready to take others' opinions into account. But he was, in many cases, it was his character, it was to some degree his fate, he was an impulsive figure. If something didn't come out well in his opinion, he could turn down the best option if a lesser one was more in keeping withe given situation. In this connection, perhaps his ideas were interpreted incorrectly, although, and I have emphasized this more that once—he played a definite part in nuclear arms in Europe, in their taking on such a critical character. This character was complicated in the last half of the 1970s, or precisely, the latter years of the 1970s...

REPEAT A LITTLE BETTER, SAY, YOU KNOW, SAY, I'VE MET HELMUT SCHMIDT, AND I KNOW HIM TO BE…THIS AND THIS AND THAT, AND THEN THE CONCLUDING LINE. OK? SO THAT IT COMES AS A PERSONAL.

In my capacity of Soviet Ambassador to the Federal Republic of West Germany, I had very many meeting with Mister Schmidt. I had known him even before my arrival in Bonn. I have met him when he visited Moscow. I would like to say, that we've had very interesting discussions with him, very frank, as a rule we were talking tete-a-tete. On the basis of those extensive contacts I can tell you, that I have always seen in Schmidt a very competent, and in many respects a very remarkable politician and statesman. But also on the basis of my experience I would like to say, that a certain personality trait has imprinted the political line, decisions of Schmidt as a Chancellor. He was emotional and even impulsive. If he was not getting something optimal, from his point of view, but this thing was feasible within a definite time frame, he could favor such a not entirely optimal for this particular moment decision. It would make sense in his view, even if it promised some difficulties in future. And despite the fact, that he has now many times rejected the interpretation which was given and is still given to his well-known London statement in the Institute for Strategic Studies, nevertheless, as a Chancellor, he has played a certain negative role, which has contributed to the step-up of nuclear arms race in Europe and to the general worsening of situation in Europe at the end of the '70s and beginning of the '80s. Despite all the positive things that I've said about him, it is impossible to deny. Although it is possible, that many ideas, expressed by Schmidt, were not met with sufficient attention in the Eastern block, and in the Soviet Union in particular.

I WANT TO SWITCH TO REYKJAVIK. ON THE WAY TO REYKJAVIK BEFORE GETTING THERE WHAT KIND OF HOPES, AND DO NOT EXTEND IT BEYOND, BECAUSE I WANT TO ASK YOU, ON THE WAY TO REYKJAVIK OR PREPARING IN MOSCOW FOR REYKJAVIK, WHAT WAS THE SOVIET UNION HOPING TO ACHIEVE? WHAT WERE…?

The Soviet side had, of course, its doubts and our experience proved them quite valid, about our approach to the problems of nuclear disarmament, total disarmament, under strict international supervision over the period of ten years and the acceptability of our approach. But, I think that everything that has happened after Reykjavik and what has just happened in Washington, we'll be justifies to draw a conclusion, that our attempt has justifies itself. The attempt to clarify the fundamental approaches of the opponents. Whether the opposing sides recognize the possibility of nuclear disarmament or not? If they do, then with what limitations? If those limitations are are caused by disagreements about timeframes t that is one thing, if they are caused by disagreements in principle - that's quite different. It seems to me that Reykjavik represented a unique possibility to conduct intensive, very intensive negotiations between the General Secretary and The President and, on their instructions, negotiations between members of delegations and advisers. We succeeded to clarify many questions. In this sense Reykjavik was a watershed, we have passed from the world, condemned to live without any respite in the darkness of nuclear arms race to the world, where nuclear disarmament, though limited at present, begins to be a reality. This will determine the place of Reykjavik not only in the history of the 20th century, not only the place in the contemporary events, that we are witnesses of, but probably the place in the history of civilization. It is already apparent today.

CAN YOU TELL ME IN SOME DETAIL, SOME TEXTUAL DETAIL IN TERMS OF PEOPLE, PERSONALITIES AND IDEAS, THE NIGHT MEETING, THE PREPARATORY MEETING, WHAT WAS...WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, WHAT WAS ACHIEVED, WHAT WAS NOT ACHIEVED?

The night meeting was the meeting between the Soviet and American experts. The Soviet side was represented by Marshal Akhromeyev who was a member of the delegation, academician Velikhov, Arbatov, Karpov, was negotiating with the United States in Geneva and me. The American side was represented by Ambassador Nitze, adviser to the President on matters of disarmament, Rowney, Edelman, Kampelman and three more representatives of the National Security Council and from the American delegation in Geneva. The task set before us was as follows: the Soviet side, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev forwarded to President Reagan some concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament to be carried out in two stages. We were instructed to try and work out, to the extent that it was possible, the agreed text of the treaty, which was to be presented the following morning to the leaders of two powers. I must say that....

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

I must say, that in the beginning the American side the American representatives were unprepared.... In the beginning the American representatives were unprepared to give concrete answers to our question: or to voice definite opinions, which were later expressed....

CAN YOU SAY IT ONCE AGAIN?

At first the American representatives were unprepared to voice concrete opinions, considerations in connection with the Soviet written proposals, which I have already mentioned. It took them several breaks to come to an agreement among themselves as to what they could propose as an answer. But that answer was finally made available to us, but its careful review which we did then and there, has shown us, that the was nothing new in this document, but absolutely nothing, by comparison to what the Americans had already proposed in Geneva and to what the Soviet side had also given its response back in Geneva. To the appropriate question of Marshal Akhromeyev, Paul Nitze has answered that there really was nothing new in that document. Then the following procedure was proposed: let us put aside all the general documents and let's review concrete fundamental points. For instance, in the first stage, which will last for five years, we will reduce by 50 percent strategic delivery vehicles and the appropriate number of nuclear charges - are we agreed about that or not? It turned out, that in principle, yes. Here the American side quoted 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 nuclear charges, the Soviet side agreed to take this as a starting point. But unfortunately we could not progress beyond that. So we broke up. Then we reported to our leadership. It was very late at night, about 2 a.m. The American, I presume, reported to their leadership. After that we have reconvened and worked on till morning. During this second session we have managed to come very close to each other on the 50 percent reduction in the first five years, on the elimination of intermediate range missiles, where certain portions, not completely worked out were left in parenthesis. We have not been able to make any progress on the observation of the anti-missile defense treaty on the renunciation of nuclear arms tests. In those areas the American representatives didn't have any new ideas. And despite all our invitations to a more concrete, businesslike discussion, the American delegation did not, unfortunately, change its stance. In general, I can say that in a number of key areas there was a perceptible convergence of positions; I will repeat, it was on the intermediate range missiles and on the fifty percent reduction in the first five years. But unfortunately, there was no progress in discussions on anti-missile defense and nuclear tests. On those problems, we have agreed to fully inform our respective leadership. With that we have parted. Let me add one other thing. Richard Perle was also present from the American side, let's not forget him. I would like to mention Richard Perle in the following connection: he was one of those, who voiced an opinion, that the Soviet proposals for verification were too far-reaching and went much further than Americans could agree to, especially in the area of verification of sea-based cruise missiles. He was promoting the idea, that it is not possible to verify those missiles, that the on-site inspection was inapplicable in this instance, that we'll have to trust each other's word in this matter. We rejected this position. Marshal Akhromeyev said, that we would insist on strict verification, we were ready to let American inspectors on our military sites, provided of course, there was reciprocity.

WAS THIS THE FIRST TIME IN REYKJAVIK THAT THE NEGOTIATION BROKE INTO THESE THREE SEPARATED PROGRAMS -SDI, INF AND STRATEGIC? AND WHOSE IDEA WAS IT TO SEPARATE?

Well, no. They were technically separated in three parts. We were considering them all together, as a whole, but technically the negotiations are so arranged, that they proceed from one point to another, from one article to the next. The treaty itself must have included some agreements on the intermediate missiles, on strategic missiles. One of the elements, one of the parts of the agreement on strategic missiles in our opinion, is the adherence to the existing permanent treaty on anti-missile defense. It must have surfaced in the context of our discussions, and it did. It couldn't have been otherwise. The same is true about nuclear tests. If we are trying to address the problem of liquidation of nuclear arms, the concomitant question is why do we need further nuclear tests if it is not for the development of more advanced prototypes? It is logical to say, that these questions are elements of the whole. This logic led the Soviet side to believe, that it is impossible to separate these problems, provided of course, we are genuinely trying to reach an agreement.

WHERE WERE YOU DURING THE MEETING OF THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT? THE LAST MEETING... AND WHAT WERE YOUR, I WOULD SAY, EMOTIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND HOW DID YOU FEEL THE RESULTS?

Well, I can tell you the following. At the last meeting of the General Secretary with the President all members of our delegation were present - the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze, Dobrynin, who is a Secretary of the Central Committee, other officials From the American side Shultz and other members of the delegation... As concerns expectations, I would say that the General Secretary was going to this meeting being 9/10 sure, that unfortunately the President was not ready to agree to the Soviet proposals. Well, maybe 9/10 is too high an estimate, but in any case, probably we were 4/5 sure, that the President was not ready for the treaty. Though the Soviet side also proposed not to finalize this lack of agreement, not to put the final full stop on the lack of agreement. In principle, we could have broken up for a short recess. We could have agreed for each side to take a timeout, in order to conduct consultations with the Senate, the Congress in case of Americans, and with the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee in case of the General Secretary. After that we could have reconvened and produced a final agreement. The President decided against this "golden bridge", he preferred another option. In the same vein, we were ready to carry on discussions in a more concrete fashion, what did the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty mean, what was in contradiction with that treaty, what was not, where our positions were not mutually exclusive... Once again, the American side didn't show the interest or willingness to proceed in this direction. To cut the long story short, my personal impression, maybe it is not entirely correct, is that at the beginning, somewhere at night, or early morning, the President still had some sign some rudiments of the desire to look for a compromise, but towards afternoon, maybe towards the end of the meeting, the President preferred to take a more tough position, which excluded at that time the possibility of reaching an agreement. I do not want to interpret the reasons for that.

Well, this is... The discussion was about the ABM treaty and not about the SDI. About the ABM treaty. On compliance with the ABM, on adhering to its guidelines. We have adopted a term - strengthening of the regimen, imposed by the ABM treaty. Also, the undertaking by both sides of an obligation not to surpass the limitations of this treaty for at least ten years. Note, we were projecting the nuclear disarmament to last for ten years, so the ten years of compliance with the treaty and ten years of disarmament are interrelated. If in ten years' time we will not have nuclear arms, then there will be no need for SDI. Do you understand that?

YES, I UNDERSTOOD. YOU KNOW, I SAW THE LITTLE EXCHANGE BY THE CAR, WHEN THEY SEPARATED AND I FOUND IT VERY EMOTIONAL AND...I DO NOT KNOW, IF YOU WERE RIGHT THERE OR IF YOU SAW IT. CLEARLY SOMETHING HAS TRANSPIRED BETWEEN THESE TWO PEOPLE AND…CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THAT AND MAYBE ABOUT THIS LAST EXCHANGE?

I don't understand the last...

[TRANSLATOR REPEATS THE QUESTION IN RUSSIAN]

Well, in the car... Well, at that moment, your President was probably not thinking of utilizing the last moment, as you might call it, but rather thinking of what he will tell the American audiences, first at the military base in Reykjavik, and then back home. You know as well as we do, how this last exchange was interpreted. Reagan was asking to remove a single word from the draft of the agreement, and the agreement will become possible. Well, this single word represented alternatives, whether there will be nuclear race in space or not. That was its real value. In Geneva we have agreed with the President, that our common goal was to prevent the arms race in space. We were on the same positions in Reykjavik, so naturally, we could not give up this word. And so Mr. Gorbachev just confirmed, what he should have confirmed, i.e. that the Soviet position remained the same as it had been jointly discussed in Geneva and that we did not see any grounds or reasons to question our position.

IN THE AMERICAN PRESS, THERE WAS QUITE A WIDE DISCUSSION, WHETHER REYKJAVIK WAS A SUCCESS OR A FAILURE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT DECIDE, AND FOR A WHILE THE PRESS COULD NOT DECIDE. IN RETROSPECT IT APPEARS TO BE A SUCCESS, WHEN DO YOU THINK...?

Well, let me say, in general, that the process of negotiations cannot be broken arbitrarily into successful and unsuccessful phases. This is a process, something integral. So if today we are able to say, that there would not have been a meeting in Washington without a meeting in Reykjavik, and I trust that all present share that view, so in that sense, Reykjavik was undoubtedly a success. Of course, we could have accomplished more, than we actually have. If we had started nuclear disarmament a year earlier, we would have achieved more results by now. Of course, if we had chosen the model... arrived at the model of the agreement, proposed there, concerning the intermediate missiles and strategic missiles, strategic arms, we would not have stretched out this process, and if we had adopted the principle of the five-year reduction.... the five-year period which was proposed for the elimination of all the intermediate missiles and the fifty percent reduction in the strategic arms would have permitted us to live in a better world in three - three and a half years. Today it is still ahead of us and we must work to reach it. But as they say, the best is the enemy of good and we must be content with the progress made at Reykjavik. Reykjavik was just a stage in the progress to the breakthrough, or at least to the major landmark, which are marked by the Washington agreements. And this is not something little, this is of major importance.

WHAT IS THE AMERICAN-SOVIET CONFLICT ABOUT?

Conflict? What do you mean, conflict.... Political…

TOTALITY.

Totality... I think that the major reason for the lack of mutual understanding at present, lack of coordination in approaches is based on our two different philosophies. Our position is the position of common sense, our policies stand for reason, whereas the United States, officially, at any rate, continue to insist on the expediency and usefulness of policy from the position of strength. If both sides graduated to the position of common sense, in the military sphere, to the position of sufficiency, I would take it upon myself to say, that all the major difficulties in our relations would become a matter of the past. As long as the United States pursues the policy from the position of strength, it is only natural, that this policy will be met with the policy of counterforce. There are no other options. If our policy towards the United States was formulated from the position of strength, the United States would have had to respond by the policy of counterforce. The fundamental principle of our policy has been formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress: the security of the Soviet Union and of the United States can only be a mutual security. For the whole world it will mean universal security. We would have shot ourselves in the foot, if we tried to find a way to arrange a lesser security for the United States, than for our selves. But the same criterion should apply to the American approach. If we will be able to achieve unity in this approach, when we will understand, that we cannot pursue self-interest to the detriment of the other side, then we could cooperate like equal partners. We could probably even cultivate a real friendship, because strictly speaking, our national interests do not clash anywhere with those of the United States. That is if we take our countries per se, if we renounce the misconceptions of the past, which have impelled the United States in the past to seek the world hegemony. This is an unattainable goal, which in the final account leads to squandering of national resources of any country. The world is different today. It has become integrated, interrelated. Each member of the world community has its interests. Even if it is a small country, its interests must be respected by everybody else. The world community will be unstable as long as there exists division in countries with more rights and countries with less rights. Such a community will go through one crisis after another. Neither us, nor the Americans can be interested in such a development.

I THINK WE ARE DONE, UNLESS THERE IS SOMETHING THAT YOU THINK, EITHER IN THE CONTEXT OF REYKJAVIK OR IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY, YOU THINK THAT IT IS WORTHWHILE TO ADD IN THE END.

Well, I would like to add, that you must check the dates, when it was that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany gave up its extreme position on Pershing, 1A. Was it in August or September? You have translated, in October-November. As far as I remember, it happened in September, but it may have happened in September-October.

...WHAT YEARS DID YOU SERVE IN GERMANY?

From 1971 to 1978.

OK. AND IT WAS IN 1978 or 1979 THAT YOU CAME TO…

In 1978 I returned to Moscow and worked in the Central Committee till 1983, then I was a chief commentator in "Izvestia" till March 1986. And since that time I am here at the Agency Press Novosti.

BUT YOU SERVED IN GERMANY BEFORE THAT, RIGHT? BEFORE YOU WERE AMBASSADOR?

No, I was only one year, 1950-1951 in Berlin. And then I worked in Foreign Ministry with one interruption, I worked in the Central Committee. And my function in the Foreign Ministry was our affairs with Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and then I was chief of the Third European Department -this is our relations with Federal Republic, Austria and German Democratic Republic.