...THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION AFTER THE WAR...

The German problem, or, as it's called sometimes, the German question... ughm... went through several stages of development after the (Second World) War. To be precise... three nations: the USSR, USA, and England had during the war one and the same vision of this issue: undertaking all the steps required to to permanently prevent the possibility of a new war to be started in German territory. And any step aimed toward achieving this goal, be it based on the individual, or collective initiative, was considered automatically justified. As one can see, this principle was reflected in the Teheran agreements, as well as in Yalta, and, at last, in Potsdam. By the way, our views... the ones of the West and the East... had differed only in one respect: the Soviet Union had never excluded the option, and in fact even encouraged it, to solve the problem within framework of a unified (German) State; while the core of the English and American opinion was that of the justification of...for the goal of...in this... sense... to divide Germany into several states, there were different options, into three to five states... This question about the German future was to be discussed at the Potsdam summit. And, as different documents state, Admiral Leahy's diaries included er... President Truman brought to Potsdam a plan of the division of Germany into several states; this plan was in the Admiral Leahy's briefcase and was never put on the table, because the Soviet Union proposed to create... to preserve the unity of German state, providing... a complete demilitarization of this country democratization of its politico-economic structure. One should note that the American point of view during the war, it was first expressed by President Roosevelt, and, later, by his successors was characterized by yet another aspect: er... the ...the United States did not think that it was urgent to conclude a peace treaty with a unified German state or its future successors... during... the first meetings of the Foreign Ministers, after the war, as you remember, the Foreign Ministers' Council was established, this issue brought by the Soviet initiative had been repeatedly discussed, but... er... though the most negative position was then taken formally by France, one should acknowledge that the position of the USA was also far from being positive. The American side had expressed such opinions, for example, as: first, rejection of including Germany in working out the conditions of the peace treaty, because Germans, supposedly, cannot be trusted; second, in general, there was no necessity... er... to have centralized government, or any German government at all for the purpose of the preparation of such a treaty and its conclusion. The treaty should be imposed upon... Germans by force, etc., and... we... the Society side, had formed the impression that...many of those loopholes and preconditions were were purposefully designed to make any practical solution of this problem impossible. There is... yet another point to consider ^regarding this issue: the US decision to start moving toward the factual split of Germany was finally formulated in Washington in the mid... by the fall of the year 1945. We can read in the documents dated at the end of 1945, the beginning of 1946, the following: it was agreed as being practical to move toward rejection of fulfilling German demilitarization decisions, and to recreate German armed forces as a part of the military program which the US was then starting.

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL REACTION... TO THE NOTION OF REARMAMENT OF GERMANY. WHAT DOES IT...THE IDEA... NEVER MIND THE SPECIFICS... WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO THEM... TO THE RUSSIANS... TO THE SOVIETS...?

You know, to us it was an undoubtedly important turn, from the psychological point of view, because the country that suffered such a terrifying invasion, suddenly faced the prospect of rebuilding the (German) armed forces with the participation of individuals that in the past held considerably high positions in the Nazi Reich... the Nazi Reich military apparatus included... and who, quite definitely and unequivocally, saw the Soviet Union as their first and foremost enemy... though called a "potential" one. That was, quite obviously, a political decision of the part of the US that broke with all the heritage of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, with the goals set by this coalition, that was a switch from the US position of cooperation with us to open and direct confrontation. That was, at last... er... a challenge... a purely military one... because... American bases were being built within immediate proximity to us, with hostile purposes to our country, and on the territory of the future German Federal Republic, then called Western Occupational Zones, for the purpose of military operations against the Soviet Union. The structure of the world strategy was changing, the military-strategic situation of the Soviet Union was changing; to some extent, the results of the victory over Hitler's Germany achieved with the participation of the Soviet Union were nullified... because we fought this war not just in order to achieve a military success, but mainly to secure our country, to secure the future safety of our nation. Naturally enough, it created for us a whole new series of... qualitatively new problems; it set quite new tasks for the whole Soviet military and international policies, the European ones included, for both a definite... and even indefinite period of time.

TO...TO WHAT KIND OF POLICY...WHAT KIND OF POLICY THE SOVIET UNION WAS FORCED TO TAKE IN THE LIGHT OF THAT? HOW DID THE SOVIET POLICY CHANGE? AS THE RESULT OF THE EVENTS?

Our main goal as we understood it… as it followed the Allies' decisions, the three nations, and, later, the four-nations' decisions, was in creating the neutral, the friendly to us Germany, the Germany without any considerable armed forces, and, therefore, by the fact of its very existence, this Germany would separate the rival forces, in case of their confrontation of West and East. That situation gave us hope that, apart form Germany, a group of other neutral countries would exist, the countries, either traditionally neutral, don't forget, there were ten neutral countries in Europe before WWII, or, there was also a possibility of becoming neutral for those countries that did not have such a status before... In any case, the Soviet Union... the Soviet Union plans did not include creation of some prototype of the future Warsaw Pact; we did not... ...toy, as we say, with such plans... er... The creation of the Warsaw Pact is a belated — five, even six years after the creation of NATO — response to the creation of this treaty (in original-"country"), and inclusion in it of the German Federal Republic. Er... naturally... we hoped to have friendly relations with all states that bordered us, that would be the situation most desirable for us...We were never interested then, as we aren't today, though, today it's a fact, in having any of our neighbors being a participant in any coalition openly directed against us as a country, as a system, as a union of nations. Alas, er... we weren't free to choose... we had to consider political facts, created by the policy of the other country, that time very, very mighty in terms of its politics, military strength, and other aspects as well. The country which had managed to change by force, and, thus, adjust to its own goals the positions, the policies, the strategies of the majority of European countries, and to cause eight out of the ten formerly neutral states to give up their neutral status.

CAN YOU TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT HOW THE MARSHALL PLAN WAS SEEN BY THE SOVIETS?

Marshall... The Marshall Plan... as we understood its general direction... The Marshall Plan had obviously two faces: the facade and the real one. It was quite obvious — because the Marshall Plan cannot be separated (from all the other political events of that period) that it was just a part of the cold war, the cold war that started, in fact, with Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart... on the 3d of June, 1946, when this Secretary of State declared the separatist line of US politics on German issues, as well as the US international postwar policy in general. Er... we understood that this plan was devised in order to force the majority of the European countries to yield to the requirements of the new political line of the US, the line that had so little in common, nothing in common, to be accurate, with that formed during the joint war which we fought together with the US against Germany, and, later, against Japan...

WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION, BOTH THE EMOTIONAL ONE, AND THE POLITICAL TO THE FORMATION OF NATO AND THE PARTICIPATION OF GERMANY IN THIS (TREATY)?

You know, that was a complex reaction, due to the fact that we did not want to fight, but, on the other hand, could not merely be indifferent to the events that happened... er... our decision, therefore, was... the decisions then were very complex, naturally. Speaking of the politico-psychological aspects of our response, the Soviet leadership stated... er...warned Western countries, West Germany included, with persistence again and again, that that move (the creation of NATO) could not take place without causing far-reaching consequences. It was stated, in particular, that the act of Germany's joining NATO, as well as the rearmament of West Germany would deem impossible the unification of this country. It would cause insuperable obstacles to the solution of problems which, we understood, were of prime interest to Germans, Western and Eastern alike. Simultaneously, England and France had been warned...

WAIT A SECOND...CAN YOU TELL ME HOW THE WARSAW PACT... ENTERED THE PICTURE? HOW THE WARSAW PACT DIFFERED FROM NATO... AND IF YOU WANT TO COMPARE…JUST TELL ME ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT.

Er... regarding this question, I want to make a point that the Warsaw Pact was concluded six years after the conclusion and ratification of NATO. Not just after the FRG had joined NATO, not just after the conclusion of all the necessary agreements, but only after the 5th of May 1955, when the FRG became an official member of the North-Atlantic Treaty... Only after that the defense Pact was formed, which included the East European Socialist countries and the Soviet Union. What makes the difference? From a legalistic, formal point of view, there are no pacts today that are called other than defensive. The international lawyers all know that the most aggressive coalitions are always calling themselves defensive. But the main principle of NATO, as it was formed and formulated, was a doctrine designed for the ousting of the Soviet Union. That doctrine meant pushing the Soviet Union back from the positions it reached as a result of the Second World War, as the result of events that happened after the War. M-mm... the military-strategic base of NATO was the plan. Ww... It... w... er... was developed in a form that practically never changed ever since it was formed, and it was formed as early as the end of 1949. It formulated the basic principle of all the military buildup in NATO. This plan required a military preparedness of all members of NATO in order to start an offensive against the Soviet Union and its allies by January 1st, 1957. And, as the said, er... by that very date of January 1st, 1957 the US should have nuclear armament superiority ten times that of the Soviet Union as was written down in the text of the Plan "for the purpose of convenient planning" and, as for the conventional weapons, enough to secure their then existing superiority. It was commonly believed that by the year 1957 all West European members of NATO would gain the required socio-economic stability needed to take control of the number of necessary functions required to begin the aforementioned military actions. Er... To look closely at the Warsaw Pact... Its goals were never of an offensive nature, of an aggressive nature. It can be easily proved by pointing out the very meaning of it, the ratio of forces involved, by recalling the circumstances of its creation: the Warsaw Pact definitely had a defensive nature. Even if, at that period, we would have liked to begin some sort of military actions in Europe, we simply couldn't do it: the ratio of forces was unfavorable to us. And this fact proves objectively that my conclusions are well substantiated.

AMERICAN STRATEGISTS ARE OFTEN MENTIONING THAT RIGHT AFTER THE WAR RUSSIA HAD SOMETHING LIKE HUNDREDS... FIFTY SEVEN OR SEVENTY FIVE DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, AND... WHAT THE NATO COULD FIELD WAS SOMETHING LIKE TWELVE. WAS IT THE JUSTIFICATION OF...

Well, its the usual game of numbers... that, unfortunately, doesn't really clarify the issue. If we operate with correct figures we can trace the truth pretty fast. Er... right after the war the US and the USSR started a demobilization of their armed forces. We ended the war having something like 12 million armed forces personnel. In 1946 we reduced the number of our armed forces by four times. Apart from it, when they talk about divisions, about the number of them, they never distinguish, I mean, the West never distinguishes, and for a good reason, the combat-ready from those not fully prepared; divisions of full effectiveness versus those of partial effectiveness. And, at last, the fact was that the majority of our divisions by the end of war were reduced to one battalion per regiment; they were enervated by the combats: as opposed to our American counterparts, we bore the main losses of the war until the very last day of it. But... divisions not only consist of men, they also consist of equipment. Let' s have a look and compare the resources of military equipment which the US ended the war with, and what were those of the USSR. Therefore, I wouldn't...I would abstain from this game of figures, because they can tell nothing. But there is a much more interesting question to recall, and that is of the US-developed plan to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union as early, as September 1945, two weeks after the end of the war with--

The first plans of using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union started to develop in the US, practically, as early as September 1945, two weeks after Japan had signed the unconditional Act of Capitulation. By October or November of 1945 these plans were already turned into a (military) concept. At the end of 1945 the Pincher Plan appeared, the experimental one... of destruction (with the help of nuclear weapon) of twenty big cities in the Soviet Union. Please, note, that even before the creation of NATO, in 1948-49, the Americans... Washington was already discussing the nuclear option as on of the ways to solve the Berlin crisis. And, within the political context of these discussions, the first American nuclear units arrived in the British Islands. Our efforts that time were, naturally, directed toward preventing a nuclear war. And we understood that to prevent a nuclear conflict meant to prevent the European war, too. In parallel with that, the Soviet side concentrated its efforts on ending the American nuclear monopoly, a task which was successfully concluded in August 1949. A year earlier, Molotov, than a Foreign Minister (of the USSR), stated that the atomic bomb secrets were no secrets any more, that the Soviet Union had obtained all the required technology. Therefore, the history of the nuclearization of NATO is rather a lengthy one, a long story. And this issue, as with many political issues of the United States, underwent several stages of development before the Americans shaped its final version. Speaking of the NATO nuclearization plans, the plans to create the nuclearized military alliance, I want to call your attention to the following fact: the United States gave up this idea only in 1964. Till then, there were different plans of Atlantic nuclear forces, multi-sided nuclear forces, the forces of bi-lateral command, etc.... all of which were under the process of development, starting right after West Germany joined NATO, and went on till... circa 1963-64. And...It was a fatal blow for these plans, when France decided not to support them, but create its own nuclear weapons. If you remember, France started its nuclear development as early as 1959, the French tests were concluded in 1960 — the whole series of tests — and, quite naturally, the US had to consider the French position. This issue is very difficult, it is actually a part of a (bigger) problem, that of a general nuclear arms ban. With a ban on nuclear tests, in particular. The United States, supported by England was trying to avoid a practical solution of this problem, and did so rather awkwardly. Well... for example... Americans kept saying it was impossible to control nuclear explosions, though scientists had proved the opposite. The Soviet Union then accepted without any objections the control recommended by scientists, while both the US and England rejected it. Generally speaking, I'd like you to note, there were scientists who played an important role in that issue; they brought to the attention of the governments the problem of nuclear tests, especially in the atmosphere, and...And, thanks to the activity of scientists, understanding of this problem became widespread^ eventually, this problem evolved into concrete recommendations, and, though discussions on the matter were lengthy and faltering, the the tests were banned in 1964 in all three substances (on land, sea, and in the atmosphere).Though it's a nuance, it is rather an important one, because today we witness a tendency toward the ousting of scientists from participation in discussions on the subject of nuclear ban, thereby preventing them from explaining the real scale of nuclear threat to masses. However, scientists, today as in the past, were the first qualified to express opinions on this issue.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT WAS THE SOVIET RATIONALE OF THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES?

Well, our position regarding the British (nuclear) forces was primarily the same, as the one regarding the creation of the American nuclear potential. We were convinced that the existence of nuclear arms was an evil in general, because the consequences of nuclear conflict, if it starts... well... the consequences will be an extraordinary threat to all nations. Therefore, we considered as a negative event every new move toward nuclear arms expansion, every new member of the "nuclear club" that appeared, no matter what the name of the new nuclear state that joined this club. Also consider the fact that to us... at least... that the way we saw it... that the British side... the territory of which served as the site of American (nuclear) arms from 1948... that British side created its nuclear potential for purely imperialistic purposes, and not as a response to the threat, supposedly created by us to British interests in Europe, or elsewhere. The same could be said about the French development of a nuclear arsenal. We understood that the French created their nuclear potential not in order to withstand the Soviet threat, but, merely, as the reflection of De Gaulle's and other French leaders' ideas regarding the general role of France in the world... regarding French relations with different countries, and, before all, with its neighbors. Er... m-m... in...er... In this respect... Er... the French nuclear potential served merely as a prerequisite to its superpower status. This is the main function of the French nuclear arms also at present. But... I'd like to note, that the series of nuclear explosions undertaken by France in 1960-61 served as one of the reasons why the Soviet side was forced to interrupt the agreement on nuclear tests moratorium, though doing it after several warnings, and well after Americans did the same.

VERY GOOD... THERE WAS... WHAT IS CONSIDERED SO FAR IN THE WEST AS THE NUCLEAR THREAT BY...BULGANIN... AGAINST BRITAIN AND FRANCE... DURING THE SUEZ INVASION. CAN YOU STATE WHAT WAS THE SOVIET POLICY DURING THAT PERIOD?

Our policy then regarding the Suez crisis was mainly based on the following: er... at one... particular moment of that political period the English stated that, when it came to their interests in the Middle East and its oil, they were prepared to fight. Hence, as the demonstration of a policy of power, the tri-sided aggression of Israel, England, and France against Egypt was undertaken. This aggression had far-reaching consequences... it caused considerable losses of human lives, especially on the Egyptian side. The Soviet leadership then stated that the United...er, that England and France should be aware of the fact of their own vulnerability, they also could be hurt as badly, as the victims of their aggressive offensive... That, considering the then-existing correlation of forces, England and France could find themselves, their dangerous policies continued, in a similar situation (to their victims). That was by no means a military blackmail, but, rather, a political warning inviting a new political thought, i.e. recognition of the fact that the new situation, the one of the nuclear age, today requires a change of the outmoded imperial politics, traditionally kept by different countries through epochs and even ages of the past. The time of such arbitrariness was simply over. Such was the political content of the notes and warnings of the Soviet Union mentioned above.

CUT... WHY IT WAS MENTIONED, IT WAS MENTIONED SOMETHING LIKE... THE ROCKETS WILL FLY...?

Yes, it was mentioned... that the Soviet Union ... had an adequate missile potential which just proved the fact that the entire ratio of forces, the distribution of world power became totally different.

ER... ER... PRIOR TO THE BERLIN MEETING THERE WAS A STATEMENT BY KHRUSHCHEV... TO SOLVE A GERMAN PROBLEM BY SLICING IT... AT LEAST THAT WAS THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION...

Er... the Berlin problem, as it existed in that period, had passed through several stages in its development — I have to repeat it again. Er... You mean, perhaps, the statement by Khrushchev of 1958 about turning West Berlin into and independent city. That was as early was the period of the Eisenhower presidency; the statement was interpreted as Khrushchev's ultimatum, as... er... a statement calling for actions which, in turn, could lead to serious political complications. I have to admit that we also had no unified opinion. The Khrushchev hypothesis was that Berlin's independent city status could serve as the key to the problem; this hope was questioned by some of us, and was even argued. Mainly, because this option could hardly be accepted by England and France for reasons of prestige, among others. But, during the negotiations in Geneva in 1959, and later, our Soviet-American discussions on that matter, a principal model was developed that gave some hope of a fairly interesting solution to this status. But, next, as you remember, the United States sent (Francis Gary) Powers, it was in 1960, the 1st of May, deep into Soviet territory on a reconnaissance mission, and the planned Paris summit practically did not come about, because Eisenhower refused to extend apologies to the Soviet side, and, thus, to repudiate the US actions that were conflicting with, as everybody understands it today, the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. Ughm... After Eisenhower left the presidential office, the US-Soviet contacts resumed, and the June 1961 summit of Khrushchev and Kennedy took place in Vienna. Its prime purpose was to examine the compatibility of Soviet and American interests.

In Vienna, in fact, rapprochement was not achieved, Khrushchev insisted that West Berlin cease being an occupation zone, because all legal justification for it became irrelevant after... the recreation of the sovereignty of both German states and some other changes that happened to the world... So, Khrushchev warned Kennedy that the conclusion of the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and GDR was considered, with possible consequences affecting communications between Western Germany and West Berlin. Kennedy responded with his known phrase: "Well, the cold winter is ahead of us..." Then, if you recall, on the eve of that cold winter, and after the GDR undertook certain steps on the borders of West Berlin and Federal Republic of Germany, the United States decided to try a power play, a challenge of wills. I would say that in October 1961 the world was closer to the third world war than ever. Our tanks were then positioned in Berlin, combat ready, two hundred meters from American tanks. And, as an immediate participant of these events, let me assure you that if Americans would follow the orders... given to them, and the orders to the US troops, as they said, were to destroy the Berlin Wall, our tanks would then open fire. But, as it happened, common sense prevailed after all. We delicately let Washington understand that they'd better stop playing with fire; and Kennedy, in turn, hinted that if we part without damages to each others' prestige, he would evince certain flexibility in this issue. This flexibility worked as follows: we moved our tanks back two hundred meters, the American side retreated its combat vehicles two hundred meters, then we moved our tanks farther back, the Americans did the same; in a word, these fatal two hundred meters turned into the normal distance of disengagement characteristic to this city, thus providing the conditions necessary to start a productive, purely political exchange of opinions. I'd like to say that in 1961-62, before the Cuban crisis, the exchange of opinions between the US and the Soviet Union regarding the Berlin issue as well as the German problem, in general, was very... interesting and condensed. There were options discussed which, if realized, could, for sure, reduce the tension in Europe as early as that time. Alas, as one can find, they... these projects were doomed to fail, there came... the other events overshadowed these plans, and the direction of political events happened as they did. Nevertheless, I'd like to note that considerable progress was made toward the rapprochement of the US-Soviet points of view.

... CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE MOTIVATION OF KHRUSHCHEV IN MOVING MISSILES TO CUBA? WHAT WAS THE SET-UP THAT MOTIVATED HIM...IN THIS DIRECTION?

I would say... er... in analyzing his personal explanation, because in many aspects it was an individual decision of this particularly concrete leader, his assumption was the following: ...I, as a first hand witness, can certify it... his assumption was the following: The threat to Cuba was very real. Hence, if we move our means of retaliation to the American borders as near as they did theirs' to the Soviet Union, the United States would better understand the problems of others. Since all previous actions of the United States were based on their belief in the United States' invulnerability, they blatantly disregarded others' interests. That was, so, from a general point of view, an attempt to show (the US) that the world had changed in that respect also.

WHAT WERE YOU DOING DURING KHRUSHCHEV'S ADMINISTRATION? WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL POSITION?

At that time I was a deputy head of the Third European Department (of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This position required frequent involvement in the writing of certain classified documents and and in the development of certain political doctrines. That also included documents regarding US-Soviet contacts on all European issues.

COME BACK TO DULLES' DECLARATION OF MASSIVE RETALIATION STRATEGY. HOW WAS IT UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DID IT MEAN, THE UNITED STATES — ...?

Well, in general, I would only say that the Dulles' Declaration had just been verbally formulated the specificities...

START AGAIN...

I would say that the Dulles' Declaration simply spelled out the specificities of the use of nuclear weapons. Especially during that period when the accuracy of missiles were low, guiding systems were primitive, et cetera…. The only possible way of military use of nuclear weapons was to strike the wide areas, strike the cities, strike the... for the purpose of the annihilation of everything that happened to be within the range of destruction of these weapons. And... Er... it also served as the embodiment of American superiority in the field of nuclear systems, a fact proved by various documents. I can refer, in particular, to data to data used by Robert McNamara in his book. If you will allow me, I'll quote only on figure. Er... in 1955 the US had 4,750 nuclear warheads... versus... 20 from the Soviet Union. Which meant it was not just superiority; it was an overwhelming superiority... er... in terms of nuclear armament. Based on this data, right or wrong, the Americans planned their operations, and...we could compensate for this gap only by increasing efforts in the development of conventional armament at that time... But...

HOW...HOW HAD THE MASSIVE RETALIATION STRATEGY AFFECTED THE SOVIET UNION...EITHER, OR BOTH POLITICALY AND MILITARILY?

I would not say that it had much of an effect... on the development of our strategy, nor, by the way, did it create a big difference on the new American strategy after all. It was clear, at least to military experts from both sides, that it was a temporary situation. That sooner or later, with the advancement of war technology, the US would have to resort to more balanced concepts... because to employ such a concept as way to control others meant to... er... invite, if you wish, the same approach upon themselves. It was only a question of time until the other side would have the necessary technology. So, with the launching of its satellite, the Soviet Union demonstrated that it did possess such technology, hence, the whole American doctrine had to be revised.

AND THAT STRATEGY CHANGED, I MEAN, BECAME A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY, HOW WAS THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NOTION UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIETS? HOW DID IT CHANGE ITS POLICY OR MILITARY THOUGHT?

You know, the flexible response, a system adopted by NATO in 1967, the MC-1A Decision,...this decision has its pluses and minuses. Pluses and minuses in the sense of... em... The concept of flexible response, with its selective, gradual use of nuclear arms... this concept is, in fact, encouraging nuclear arms to be changed from a political weapon, as it had been then considered, into a routinely used means of war which is what it eventually became. I see that as a very serious defect of the entire structure of, er... flexible response. The other defect of this structure as I see it is as follows: er... our basic concept is based upon the following facts... upon the following premises: it's impossible, we think, to stop nuclear war once it's started or follow any rules in fighting it. The beginning of a nuclear exchange, even on a tactic, an operative level means, in fact, the beginning of a full-scale nuclear war, especially when vitally important centers are chosen as targets for nuclear strike within a framework of the flexible response. I mean, when or if command centers and/or other important strategic objects of the opposite side have been stricken, this other side could mistake it for a massive nuclear attack, and being unaware of all the details of flexible response, will retaliate with massive nuclear actions. And...In this case... To think that it would be possible to fight a nuclear war while following some sort of rules associated with a gallant duel is to delude oneself.

AGAIN, I'M JUMPING IN TIME. I'VE READ SOME OF YOUR COMMENTS ABOUT THE CHINESE-SOVIET SPLIT. CAN YOU TELL ME HOW IT AFFECTED THE WESTERN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP?

Well, of course, it significantly complicated the strategic position of the Soviet Union, in general; it also forced us to spend a great deal of time fortifying our military positions in the East. If during the period of normal, friendly relations with China, our borders, consisting of more than 6000 kilometers were practically fully demilitarized; after the break, to be precise, when relations took on a negative tone, the situation changed. OK, do you really understand what it means, 6000 kilometers of borders? It means trouble, trouble and more trouble. Additionally, also consider the climate of this region, the polar congelation (soil frozen to the point that it is unusable), wilderness, etc., the necessity of certain financial investments, and the considerable damage to those who serve in such harsh conditions. Nevertheless, I would like to say, in spite of everything that happened between us and China, we always believed, at least the majority of us did, that our bad relations would not last long. We believe that despite everything that happened to China, those were temporary negative trends caused not by some fundamental objective reasons, but rather by the personal incompatibility of the leaders then ruling our countries, and we hope, over time, we will overcome this cloudy phase in our relationship.

MR. FALIN, CAN I ASK YOU... FOR A STATEMENT... COULD WE CALL YOU AGAIN AND ASK YOU FOR ANOTHER ROUND?

(In English) It's very difficult to say... er, OK to you, because in three days I'm... er... not in Moscow...

YOU'LL DISAPPEAR...

Yes, I'll disappear... for three weeks.

SO, IT'S DIFFICULT TO YOU... OK... THE KOREAN WAR. WHAT WERE THE FACTORS IN YOUR OPINION REGARDING THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR, AND HOW IT AFFECTED SOVIET THINKING VERSUS UNITED STATES?

(In Russian) I don't think I could add anything new, specifically regarding questions about the reasons for the Korean War. Er... the state of confrontation here had... m-m-m... Well, Korea, perhaps, became just by a chance...There was probably the thinnest of threads there, and then it gave way. It had to break somewhere because of the general American policy of confrontation; the military pressure on the Soviet Union would inevitably lead to such an outbreak, somewhere, somehow... Well, as far as how the Korean War affected the political situation in general...? You see, I suspect, to some extent, that the general movement toward confrontation which the US chose as their policy during that period facilitated the easy performance of American military policy in Europe if there was an outbreak of military conflict somewhere; it also provided fertile conditions for the US militarization, in general. By militarization I mean deployment of the new, very expensive military programs that had to be justified, approved by both Congress and American public opinion. I mean, the speech... I mean the military...The buildup of a strategic bomber fleet, the Navy program, creation of... ah-m... super weapons, hydrogen weapons, etc... Well, speaking of results, the Korean War certainly played a very negative role, regarding the change of general West European approach to Socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union.

THERE WAS AN IMPLIED ER...NUCLEAR THREAT BY...ER...BY EISENHOWER AT THAT TIME--

No, that was still during Truman's...

YES, YES... --

…when Truman was still in office... The first proposition to use nuclear weapons was made during the Truman presidency. Well, these proposals were initiated by the American military, and when Truman did not approve the proposals, Mac...(General) MacArthur... he decided to artificially create a situation that would force Truman(to use nuclear weapons. Without any particular reason he provoked the retreat of the American troops, reckoning that Truman would have no choice other than use of nuclear weapons, in order to prevent a total defeat of the American forces on the Korean Peninsula. Truman, though, to his credit, recognized this as a manipulation, and eventually dismissed MacArthur from his positions. One should note that that particular decision by Truman became a turning point, sort of, in American military...er... nuclear strategy. If, before, the Americans... er... including the military were playing the nuclear card much too easily here and there, even in local conflicts, after that (Truman's decision), they began thinking more prudently, considering the possible consequences. There were, however, some relapses, particularly in 1953-54 when Dulles was trying to talk the French into receiving American nuclear weapons for use in Indo-China. That was the fact, that was also the historical truth. Nonetheless, what I'm trying to say, it is to Truman's definite credit, and despite my personal dislike of this political leader, that he asserted himself without wincing and withstood all the provocations that were prepared by his military… and not only military. There was, if you recall, a Matthews in the Truman administration. He introduced Truman to the concept of preemptive aggression "in the interests of liberty," as he put it. The US had to became the first aggressor for freedom's sake, (according to his idea). Then, later, during the Eisenhower period, there were still plans under consideration of bringing an ultimatum to the Soviet Union and China, and (to warn them) that Chinese targets would be stricken with the aid of nuclear weapons; that even Soviet objects in the Far East would be attacked if the Soviet Union and China failed to stop the escalation of the Korean War.

ONE MORE QUESTION. LAST TIME WE TALKED ABOUT EUROPE. ER... CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED?... THE SOVIET UNION?

1948? You mean the Czechoslovakian events in 1948? (IN ENGLISH) Er... the events in Czechoslovakia...forty-eight?

FORTY EIGHT...(IN RUSSIAN)

You know, that period... just remember the situation in 1948.In 1947 the United States decided to split Germany and to rearm it. At that time the United States decided, by themselves, that there would be no neutral countries in Europe. There should only be those that, military-wise, would take either the side of the US, or the Soviet Union. That was the decision that climaxed Hoover's visit to Germany in March 1947. We knew about this decision, all the details of it. We also knew which roles, according to the US plans, were designated for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries. Naturally, this was also known to certain forces in Czechoslovakia that faced the choice of taking sides. Naturally, this situation activated that forces, democratic in our opinion, though not considered so by the West, who believed that Benes, then President, and many of the members of his government were responsible for the situation; a situation similar to that which in the past had cost Czechoslovakia her independence and her future, in fact. I refer to the Munich agreement. Well...and...we could have been reproached for not stopping our friends in Czechoslovakia (from coup d' etat), but nobody can accuse us, after all, that it was we who inspired these events. These events were inspired by the natural flow of things. Yes, the United States caused essential, basic changes in 1946-47 in the balance of power, in the very concept of forces throughout Europe. After all, that's what they wanted. Well, if the line (dividing the two forces) happened as it did, it was only due to the fact that the United States had overestimated their power and underestimated the power and decisiveness of the opposite side.