ADMIRAL MOORER, IN 1969 WHEN YOU BECAME CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE SOVIETS HAD REACHED WHAT...

Excuse me. It was '70.

1970.

Yes.

OK.

Same thing. Same question.

WELL YOU WERE STILL IN THE...

I was a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1967.

OK. SO AROUND THE TIME IN 1969 WHEN NIXON TOOK OFFICE, THE SOVIETS HAD REACHED A CENTRAL PARITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO ABOUT THAT?

Well I thought that in the first place we should you know, keep abreast of technology. And in the second place I felt that we should increase our forced according to the rate at which they were increasing them because of the perception factor. But not that so much a perception on the part of the Soviets, but perception on the part of the Third World. We cannot afford to permit the world at large to perceive the United States as being weaker than the Soviet Union.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF PRESIDENT NIXON AND HENRY KISSINGER'S CALL FOR AN "ERA OF NEGOTIATION" TO REPLACE AN ERA OF CONFRONTATION?

Well I think that a position that all politicians continuously take. Because the public, our public in particular expects the politicians to strive for peace all the time. And we run into this today over and over again and I p... expect it'll continue. Because that's the nature of our society. So I viewed that as a political objective and as something like you know, motherhood and low taxes. Everyone would like to do that. But you have to live in a real world.

AS A MILITARY PROFESSIONAL DID YOU CONSIDER THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS TO BE CONTRARY TO YOUR INTERESTS?

No. Um. It depended of course on what steps were taken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never opposed arms reductions. What we did oppose however, was you know reductions that were not equal and not verifiable.

YOU WERE A MEMBER OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL AT THIS TIME.

Correct. Beginning of 1970.

WHAT WERE YOUR PRIMARY CONCERNS THAT YOU WERE EXPRESSING TO HENRY KISSINGER AND THE PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME?

Well again, our primary concerns

CAN YOU START THAT OVER WITHOUT SAYING AGAIN?

Yeah. Our primary concern related to the effort being made in the ABM field. We were concerned as to whether the, two things. First would the Soviets comply with the terms that were being proposed which they did not. And secondly would the United States take action to build what we were permitted to build. Namely, a defense of Washington, D.C., the command and control system and a site which could be used to continue research and development. But in this particular discipline.

WHAT DID YOU WANT OUT OF SALT WHEN THE PLANNING WAS BEING DONE TO ENTER INTO THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS? WHAT DID YOU SAY? WHAT WAS YOUR GOALS FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS TO ACHIEVE OUT OF THAT NEGOTIATION?

Well equality. In other words I --

CAN YOU START OVER SAYING, "WHAT WE WANTED OUT OF SALT…?"

Yes. What we wanted out of SALT was certainly equality. I took the position at the outset that we should have equal aggregate with freedom to mix. In other words, recognizing that we will never have a force that's a mirror image of the Soviet force because the Soviets are a land power and we are maritime power.

DID YOU WANT ANY SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF ABMs OR FOR INSTANCE, THERE WERE FOUR OPTIONS THAT WERE INITIALLY PRESENTED AT THE VERIFICATION PANEL MEETINGS. AND THERE WERE VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON ABMs AND OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. WHICH ONE WERE YOU IN FAVOR OF?

Well the...you must recognize that two things. In the first place, when you stand today to examine questions such as you are asking the technology at that time was a key factor. And one of the mistakes made in reviewing the historical aspects of a problem like this is that people cannot resist putting themselves into the environment of today's technology and wonder why things happened like they did many years ago. And so at that time the ABM was just getting off the ground. It was I had some problems with it because if the other side MIRVed, which they were determined to do, then for every ICBM they built, that meant we had to build six or ten missiles to shoot them, shoot the shoot them down. So you got into a arithmetic problem there as to the size of the force. And also, what were you going to do with the ABM? Were you going to protect the United States at large, in other words have a total envelope over the United States through which the Soviets couldn't penetrate? Or you were going to attack the vital elements in our retaliatory system, namely Command and Control and some of the missile sites, so that the Soviets would know that no matter what preemptive action they took against us, they could not accept the results?

SO AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF HAVING A SAFEGUARD DEPLOYMENT, BUT ARGUING, TRYING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS FOR LIMITATIONS ON THEIR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IS THAT CORRECT?

Well that was the second phase of the discussions. The initial discussions focused almost entirely on the ABM. And ...as you may recall, the ABM was approved by the Congress by a tie vote which was broken by the Vice President. I believe that was what happened. In any event, there was a there wasn't a unanimous enthusiasm over the utility of the ABM in that time period, which is 15 years ago. Uh, but at the same time the Soviets already had a system circling Moscow, called a Galosh System. And so we had different problems to deal with than they did, namely that many in the Congress were opposed to it. And it was questionable to whether they were going to fully support permit us to build one in the first place. And so I think that bearing in mind the environment in which we lived at the time, I supported the ABM Treaty, but I would not have had I known that the Congress was going to take the position that they did. Namely, that they would not allow a system to be built in the vicinity of Washington because what they told me, "How can I build a system in Washington and protect me and leave my constituents naked?" And so they wouldn't vote for it. They, they missed the whole point, you see. And so the thing degenerated to the, finally it was Teddy Kennedy that introduced a revolution resolution to, in the Congress, to abandon the experimental site. So we wound up not with anything nearly equal, but with nothing in the ABM field, until President Reagan you know...revived, you might say, the idea of having a defensive system.

WHY WERE YOU A PROPONENT OF THE ABM SYSTEM?

Well my being a military man and having watched technical development, I felt that we should never completely abandon a concept that would use technology which I was confident would change rapidly and permit you to build better and better capabilities into the system. So it was my policy when I was Chief of the Navy, and even when I was Fleet Commander, to support and to the best of my ability, all new technical items. For instance, the Marines have an aircraft that's a, you know, the Harrier, which is a vertical take-off aircraft jet plane. And that there was a tremendous amount of opposition to that. I fully supported it, because I knew that sooner or later we're going to build a better one, and then it would give the Marines a superior capability. So I have never opposed technological development. And furthermore, there is nothing as dangerous as a technological surprise so far as the military people are concerned.

SO WHEN THERE WERE ARGUMENTS IN CONGRESS, AND SCIENTISTS WERE SAYING, "WELL, THIS SYSTEM, IF IT'S USED FOR AREA DEFENSE, WILL NOT WORK BECAUSE IT'S NOT COST EFFECTIVE; AND IF IT'S USED FOR SILO DEFENSE, WE'VE GOT THE WRONG HARDWARE FOR THE JOB," WHAT DID YOU SAY TO THEM?

Well, I tried to explain to them what the facts are in the real world. They just make flat statements you know, "This won't work." And they don't have the slightest damn idea whether it'll work or not. And you're always faced in the bureaucracy of our country with these types of confrontations. If frequently the Congressman will make the statement like that because it's not being manufactured in his district, or because he prefers to spend the money on you know welfare, for instance, or social programs. Many, many of them take that position just for that reason alone. And so you have to very patiently try to explain the relationship of this particular question to the overall security of the country.

IF YOU HAD TO SUMMARIZE VERY CONCISELY WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT FOR THE ABM WAS, WHAT YOU WOULD SAY TO THEM, HOW WOULD YOU PUT IT?

Well, I'd start by pointing out that (a) the Soviets already have a system. And (b) I thought that to be left with no alternative but mutual destruction retaliation was wrong, bearing in mind what was possible in the future. Because this was a type of confrontation unlike any other in the sense that it would be this being a nuclear confrontation, that I didn't like the idea of being absolutely zero, having zero defenses. And I feel the same way about air defense, too. And we don't have any air defense over here in the United States, even today, to speak of. The Russians have 25 thousand fighters available and thousands of missiles. There's not a single surface to air missile in the United States today.

WHAT I WANT TO KNOW IS WHY DID YOU AGREE TO GO AHEAD AND GO INTO SALT TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS? WHY DIDN'T WE JUST SAY, "LET'S BUILD SOME MORE WEAPONS AND GO FOR SUPERIORITY"? WHY DID WE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM?

Well I would point out to you that the military does not make decisions of that kind. The, the decision to conduct any kind of discussions with a foreign country is solely the responsibility with the authority of the our civilian masters. And so the military never queried as to whether they should go talk to Russia or not. They would ask many questions about the military impact and the you know propositions to made and so on, proposals to be made. But I've never known any President to ask a military man whether he should go talk to some Chief of State in a foreign country. That's never going to happen in our system where we have total and complete civilian control.

BUT AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS?

Yes, I thought it was in the interest of I wouldn't limit it to national security unless you, depends on how you define national security. I feel that you cannot have should not have a country of millions of people and never talk to them. But you don't have to agree to the, with them when you talk to them. The same thing goes for Red China. You see.

WHAT ROLE DID YOU THINK THAT THE VIETNAM WAR PLAYED IN THIS DÉTENTE PERIOD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

Well, the Vietnam War seriously weakened the administration as well as the United States. And therefore we were not in a, as strong a position as we would have been for negotiating purposes if the Vietnam War had never occurred. The press of course put their the blackest picture before the world at large. And it made the United States appear to be involved in a war or a, or a confrontation that many people opposed, and including our allies, right on across the board. And so it's obvious that if we hadn't of had the Vietnam War, we would have been in a much stronger position to negotiate.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THE CONCEPT OF LINKAGE? DID YOU THINK WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET SOME LEVERAGE ON THE SOVIETS TO HELP US WITH THE VIETNAM WAR BY INITIATING THESE TALKS?

No. I never felt that the Soviets were going to help us at anything and they never have, and I don't think they ever will. I didn't buy that idea at all.

OK. WITH THE OFFENSIVE ISSUE, VIS-A-VIS THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION, HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THE PROPOSALS THAT WE SHOULD MAYBE HAVE A MORATORIUM ON MIRV TESTING OR LIMIT MIRVs?

We tried that, of course, with the Soviets

CAN YOU REFER TO THE MIRV LIMITATION?

Yeah. We, we tried the to get the Soviets to agree not to MIRV, because when these discussions were commenced they did not have the MIRV in their operational forces. But I think I was impressed by a statement Mr. Brezhnev made when he was over here for his visit. When the subject of MIRVing was brought up, and he drew himself up and said "You should realize that we are never going to be denied any technology the United States has." So in other words to try to get the Soviets to agree not to MIRV while we MIRVed or while we at least had the capability to MIRV was a lost cause. But we spent a awful lot of time on that.

AS I UNDERSTOOD, AT THE TIME YOU ARGUED IN THE VERIFICATION PANEL THAT WE SHOULD NOT EVEN PROPOSE A MIRV, THAT WE SHOULDN'T GIVE UP OUR CHANCE TO HAVE MIRVs.

Exactly.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU ARGUED THAT?

Yes. Because, again...

START WITH SAYING THAT "I WAS OPPOSED TO..."

I was opposed to any idea of agreeing to for both sides to refrain from MIRVing their missiles, simply because the Soviets, I was convinced, were going to do it anyway. And therefore, we would be probably caught with a force without MIRVs when they were suddenly introduced a force with MIRVs. That was one thing that concerned me. And the second thing was that the Soviets were always going to outnumber us so far as the rockets were concerned, simply ...the count of rockets as they launched forth on their SS-7s and 8s and 9s and 17s and 18s, etcetera. And consequently I felt that any imposed limitation on us would be far more disadvantageous to the United States than it would be to the Soviets.

DIDN'T YOU THINK IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT IF THERE WAS A MIRV BAN AGREED TO AT SALT I, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES WENT AHEAD WITH MIRVING ITS FORCES, THEN WE MIGHT HAVE AVOIDED THE SITUATION WHERE THE SOVIETS WOULD END UP WITH MORE MIRVs AND HEAVIER MISSILES? WE COULD HAVE SORT OF NIPPED THAT TECHNOLOGY IN THE BUD ON BOTH SIDES, WOULDN'T THAT HAVE BEEN...

You can never nip...

EXCUSE ME, COULD YOU START AGAIN, AFTER I STOP, AND LOOK AT HER?

Yeah, OK. So far as feeling that it would have been a good idea to nip MIRVing in the bud well that's a dreamer's concept. You can never again stop technological development, and I keep saying that about SDI. And since the different in— difference in the societies is so marked, whereas they roam around the United States with freedom, and we can never verify on the spot—

CAN WE START OVER WITH "WHEREAS THEY..." THE DIFFERENCES ON THE...

COULD YOU PICK IT UP WHERE YOU WERE EXPLAINING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR SOCIETY AND OUR SOCIETY?

Yes. Insofar as comparing the forces of the United States and Soviet Russia, and checking whether or not the limitations have been violated one must never overlook the major difference in our societies. Whereas one only has to buy a copy of Aviation Week and the Congressional Record, and he can find out everything that's going on in the military activities in this country, so far as technology is concerned. But I defy you to get into the Soviet laboratories or even to visit any of their bases and so on. And, and consequently, in the United States we've gotten to the point now no one can keep a secret. Whereas the Soviets do a very good job of that. So it's a unequal fight in terms of verification of agreements. And you know, determining whether or not they've been violated.

WHAT WERE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL ALISON AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SALT DELEGATION?

Well what happened there was that there were frequent visits over to Helsinki Vienna, so on, with the whole group, and then they would come back to the United States, and we would have several meetings in order to determine what was the next step. And therefore what happened so far as Alison was concerned, he would brief me on... very carefully on what had taken place preceding the time that they returned. And then he would get his instructions insofar as the JCS position was concerned for the new proposals that were going to be put forward. So , I don't think that I could tell you in three or four days all the instructions I gave him, because this thing went on for years and years. But that was the system. He was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative. And we therefore he was given instructions as to what position we wanted him to put forward as the JCS position on these various proposals that were worked out in the verification panel. Actually, it was named at the outset, "Verification Panel." It and it was envisioned I think it would only deal with this subject of verification, how are you going to verify compliance. It rapidly ex-expanded into simply a planning group for you know, discussions across the board, with the Soviets on nuclear matters.

PAUL NITZE WAS APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THROW-AWAY ISSUES, AND THAT ONCE THE SOVIETS MIRVed THEIR HEAVY ICBMs THAT WE WOULD HAVE A VULNERABILITY PROBLEM WITH OUR LAND-BASED ICBMs. WERE YOU CONCERNED THAT WITH ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR MIRV PROGRAM THAT EVENTUALLY WE WOULD HAVE A BIGGER PROBLEM TO HANDLE FROM THEIR MIRVs THAN THEY DID FROM OURS?

The Soviets had larger rockets than we had. And consequently they had heavier throwaway capability. And if this trend was allowed to continue without any compensating action on our part of course I was concerned about it.

BUT THIS WASN'T A REASON TO NIP MIRVs IN THE BUD?

No. No, I don't think you know, it would be wonderful if we'd remove all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, Oh, that would be great, wouldn't it? But you know, the facts are that this is not going to happen. I mean I think the military people are more prone to live in the real world than the politicians. The politicians want to accomplish something great that makes everybody take a sigh of relief and sit back, and say how wonderful it is, you know? They generally have the hearings on these SALT I, SALT II right before the election. You know? Carter had SALT II before the election, and President Nixon had SALT I before the election. And so that's why I think you see military people are not as hopeful. Whereas the politicians like to raise the expectations far beyond anything they can reach.

OK. AT ONE POINT IN THE SALT PROCESS, AT ONE POINT IN THE SALT PROCESS, KISSINGER WORKED OUT A DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS WHERE THEY WOULD LINK AN OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT TO A DEFENSIVE AGREEMENT. BUT HE FORGOT, DIDN'T MENTION, I DON'T KNOW WHY, SOBMs AT THAT POINT. WERE YOU CONCERNED THAT POSSIBLY THERE WASN'T GOING TO BE ANY KIND OF LIMITATION ON THE SOVIET SOBM PROGRAM?

Yes. And there finally was in 62 there was you know, this Soviet submarine program was limited to 62.

CAN YOU START OVER?

So far as the SLBM program was concerned, the final agreement limited the Soviets to 62. And, and we had, of course, about two-thirds of that. But the whole approach to this initial agreement, so far as the offensive systems were concerned, that was an executive agreement and not a treaty. It was to be re-examined in five years. And in the discussions with the President you know, the first thing that the JCS put forward were certain conditions. Under which we could support the SALT I treaty for a limited period of time, assuming it would be reexamined at about five years later. Mr. Nixon agreed to all these conditions, which, for instance, were building the Poseidon submarines and the, improving our verification capabilities going forward with several special R and D programs, and things like that, and building a B-1 bomber. Of course this is one of the problems military people get into. Mr. Nixon said, "Yes, we'll build a B-1 bomber," and, which we thought was necessary in order to keep us in some kind of balance with the Soviets. Soon as Mr. Carter comes in, he canceled the B-1 bomber. So when you have Presidents serving four and eight years the people in uniform, I was in the Navy 45 years, you never know how stable you, the agreement you get with a politician is. Because you know, you can't depend on them sticking with it. That's one of the problems we have.

I THINK YOU MIGHT HAVE MADE A MISTAKE WHEN YOU SAID YOU WANTED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE POSEIDON PROGRAM? YOU MEANT THE TRIDENT PROGRAM—

The Trident program, yes.

CAN WE GO BACK AND YOU SAY WHAT YOUR POSITION WAS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SALT I AGREEMENT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON, AND THAT YOU HAD THESE THREE CONDITIONS, AS INCLUDED THE TRIDENT, THE B-1 AND OTHER R AND D PROGRAMS?

Yes. When the negotiations had reached their final point, and President Nixon was actually in Moscow, and about to sign the SALT I treaty by telephone I was asked whether JCS would support the treaty. And my answer was, under certain conditions, which included the building of the B-1 bomber and the uh. Trident submarine, and improving our verification capabilities to the extent we could. And certain other research and development programs should be pursued. And he agreed to all these, and in all fairness the Secretary of Defense, if you read the Congressional Record supported this fully. However since we felt very strongly about the B-1 bomber, as soon as Mr. Carter came in, he cancelled it.

OK. WHEN THE TREATY CAME BACK HERE FOR RATIFICATION, SENATOR JACKSON WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE UNEQUAL LEVELS FOR THE OFFENSIVE LAUNCHERS. AND HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT JACKSON'S AMENDMENT?

I think, so far as Jackson's amendment was concerned it was ... a good idea. But there's no way to you could make a case for it, for the simple reason that the Soviets had already run off and ahead of us. We had a thousand and fifty-six missiles, as I recall the number. And then all the production lines was stopped. And so we had no, it would means of rapidly equaling them. And secondly, at the rate they were going, they could have had far more missiles than the 15 hundred or so that the treaty permitted, and the same thing goes for the submarines. If, had they continued their rate of production, we sitting here with no production -we didn't have a single keel laid for a submarine, we didn't have a single production line for a missile you could see that they would run in five years they would be far more ahead of us, in terms of numbers, at least, than we could possibly reach. We, we could not do anything during that interim period to increase our forces. So you were dealing with a situation that as to whether you know do you want to permit or prevent? We permitted in the treaty for them to have the 15 hundred missiles and the 62 submarines. But the argument was made that we prevented them from having far more. We were just sitting here, top dead center, we weren't going to do anything. And so there, you were dealing entirely with the Soviet forces. And they had production lines all over the place, going full speed. And so the objective in that executive agreement, to slow that down, and then see if we could get the Congress to break away from the McNamara concept of Mutual Assured Destruction to the extent of building new equipment.

APPARENTLY KISSINGER SAID THAT HE GAVE YOU AN OPTION OF EITHER NOT MAKING AN SLBM AGREEMENT AND GOING AHEAD WITH THE POSEIDON PRODUCTION LINES THAT WERE ALREADY SET UP AND MATCHING THE SOVIETS WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, OR HOLDING OFF UNTIL THE TRIDENT WOULD BE READY AND MAKING AN SLBM AGREEMENT THAT WAS ON EQUAL LEVELS. WHAT DID YOU SAY TO HIM ABOUT THAT?

Well, I would point out so far as the proposal that Kissinger made, that there were many proposals made in these discussions with respect to every little point. And I was firmly in support of the Trident, because it gives us the advantage of having a sufficient range to be able to cover to operate in far greater area, because you're talking about, pi r squared you see, if you increase the r, then that's one point; and the, even in port. And so I thought it would be a serious mistake to trade that off and voluntarily say going to build only the Poseidon.

APPARENTLY SENATOR JACKSON HAD A LOT OF POWER IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON DEFENSE ISSUES. AND APPARENTLY, ONE OF THE THINGS HE ASKED FOR, IN RETURN FOR HIS SUPPORT FOR THE SALT AGREEMENT WAS A CHANGE OF PERSONNEL...ON THE SALT TEAM. AND APPARENTLY HE WANTED TO HAVE GENERAL ALISON DISMISSED AND SOMEONE ELSE REPLACE HIM. HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

General Rowny. He wanted to put General Rowny, who was a verified... and he was had just been assigned to NATO. In the NATO organization there. And so Jackson of course, was getting ready to run for President at that time, in fact, he was on the front cover of TIME magazine. And I didn't like it at all. Not that I objected in any way to General Rowney, but that was the first and only time in my Naval career, and I've had many commands, where someone was detailing people to my staff, I mean, I didn't, I wasn't opposed to General Rowney in any way, but I was opposed to the idea of each and every Congressman coming on there and saying, "I want you to take Bill Jones and Jack Johnson and so on your staff." That was really none of his business. And I went over to see him and had a hell of a argument with him about that.

AND HOW COME HE HAD THE POWER TO DO THAT?

Senator Jackson had the power to detail officers to the JCS because President Nixon permitted him to do it. In exchange for his support. Now, in this connection, one thing he did, which I was very much in favor of, was to attempt at the outset to assure that the scientists who had been working on ABMs were not dissipated. And that was the purpose of that second installation. And of course, but that quickly withered on the vine. The, the United States Congress will never support a program like that you know, a in-case program. And so these scientists quickly dissipated throughout the country and started working on something else. The scientist is not going to work on something that he doesn't think is ever going to be built.

SENATOR JACKSON ACCUSED YOUR REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL ALISON, OF NOT LOOKING OUT FOR THE BEST SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SALT DISCUSSIONS. HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT?

Well, so far as Jackson's accusations that Alison didn't support the interests of the United States, I don't agree with that. Alison did what I told him to do. Alison you know, is a kind of a person that sometimes he hard to follow. But nevertheless, he didn't to my knowledge take positions that opposed by the JCS. I think he said that because he was you know, a very determined to put Rowney in that position. And so that's the tactic you use when you start to you know, take some kind of action. You, you weaken the opposition and strengthen your man. And that's what he was doing with Rowney and Alison. Alison had been there long enough, and I was in talking to the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force about his relief. I thought he'd been there too long in that particular role. But the of course, that had nothing to do with what Senator Jackson stepped in and did.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN THE SALT AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED, AND IN PARTICULAR, ABOUT THE ABM TREATY? DID YOU THINK IT WAS A GOOD IDEA?

I thought it was a first step...

CAN YOU START OVER?

My views so far as the ABM Treaty was concerned was that it was it had flaws it was divided into a treaty and a executive agreement. But from the discussions, I felt that it was more or less temporary in the sense that it would be you know fine-tuned later, as the weapons systems changed, and so on. And I didn't object to the fact that it was really constituted a first step in arms discussions. I, as I said a short time ago, I never did oppose talking to the Russians, at all, and trying to make some kind of take some kind of effort to reduce the burden of arms of this type. So long, again, as they were always equal, in terms of the restraints that were imposed.

GIVEN THE FACT THAT YOU WEREN'T IN FAVOR OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION AND YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF THIS COUNTRY HAVING SOME ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF, DID YOU THINK THAT WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER OFF WITHOUT MAKING THAT ABM TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS?

I think it's possible that it the treaty did re-uh, restrain if not prevent technological progress that would have occurred during the 1970s. I think you'll have to say that.

I WANTED TO ASK YOU IF YOU THOUGHT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT SALT I SUFFERED IN ANY WAY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. AND IF SO, CAN YOU GIVE US SOME EXAMPLES OF THAT?

I think that the treaties made by the United States, regardless of whether it's SALT or whatever always suffer by the, "because of the nature of American negotiators or American people. We are a very impatient people. And when we have a problem, we want to solve it and get it over with. And so, no negotiator wants to spend a couple of years in Geneva and come back and tell the President, "Well, we didn't accomplish anything." And no President wants to listen to the pounding he gets continuously from certain members of the Congress as well as these individual groups in the society that, you know, "Why don't we have a treaty? Why don't we... I've heard Senator after Senator say that you know, that "The first thing I would do if I was President, I would go call on the Soviets and sign a treaty." And so I think that the United States always is at a disadvantage with trying to make any kind of agreement with the Soviets because of the nature of the American people.

THINKING BACK TO AROUND 1970 WHEN YOU FIRST BECAME CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS AND THE STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AT THAT TIME, WHAT DID YOU SEE AS THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HERE WE WERE ENGAGED IN WAR IN VIETNAM, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ESSENTIALLY USELESS. WHAT ARE THEY FOR?

Well, for deterrence.

COULD YOU START OVER AND SAY NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Yeah. Oh, ok. I forget. Un, a ni, the main purpose of having nuclear weapons as I told you before...

EXCUSE ME. PRETEND WE'RE JUST STARTING NOW.

All right we're just starting. Go ahead

OK. SO WHAT DID YOU SEE AS THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

The role of nuclear weapons has always been the same in my view. Namely to provide deterrence. Because if we would permit ourselves to be without weapons entirely whereas the other side, in this case, the Soviets were building up the large numbers, I think they would dictate to us without any difficulty exactly what we were supposed to be and where we were supposed to be and what we were supposed to do under any situation. I don't believe that there's ever going to be a massive nuclear exchange between United States and Russia as long as we maintain a survivable command and control system and a modern force. But on the other hand I think it would be ridiculous for us to make a unilateral reduction.

YOUR DON'T FEEL THAT AS LONG AS WE HAVE A MINIMUM OF DETERRENCE, THAT'S GOOD ENOUGH? YOU'RE SAYING THAT WE NEED TO KEEP BUILDING? WE NEED TO KEEP IMPROVING?

Yes. I think you cannot permit the force to become obsolescent or obsolete and secondly, I think that if we do not have a force that's comparable to the Soviets, then we will be perceived by the rest of the world as weaker and that in turn will have major impact in the political and economic areas.

IF WE DO, AS YOU SAY, YOU FAVOR, THAT IS ALWAYS PURSUE A NEW TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOP A NEW TECHNOLOGY WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. HOW THEN CAN WE EVER STOP THE UPWARD SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE?

Well I don't think it can be stopped. The, that...

I'M SORRY. SAY THAT AGAIN.

The if we continue as well as the Soviets also to keep a modern force, that is to introduce new technology as it becomes available the race may not spiral upward, but it would increase in capability in terms of accuracy and speed of launch and things of that kind, so that's what I mean by modern force. I think in terms of just pure kilotons or of megatons if you will that you get to a point where that is not significant. As one might think. As long, again, as we have a force that has a survivable command and control system and modern weapons.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE INCREASE IN SPEED AND ACCURACY COULD LEAD TO A MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR US?

No. I don't think it would be that the increase in speed and accuracy will create any more dangerous situation. As I believe that as once again, that there's not going to be a major nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia because in both cases the result is unacceptable. That no, that's not to say that nuclear weapons may not be used by some of the smaller countries who do not have the place in the world and the responsibilities in the world that the United States does. But at the same time, I believe very strongly that it would be the height of folly and extremely dangerous for us to do any kind of unilateral disarming.

DO YOU THINK THAT ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES IS THAT IT ACTUALLY PUSHES THE ARMS RACE TO A NEW LEVEL? THAT PEOPLE ON THE BACK SWING FROM AN ARMS AGREEMENT WANT TO MODERNIZE AND PUSH FORWARD?

No. I don't think so. I think that essentially the same force levels would exist whether we you know, discussed treaties or not. And so to say that discussions and negotiations push the levels higher is in my view not a sound statement.

SO ARE YOU SAYING THEN THAT TREATIES DON'T MATTER?

I would say that treaties do matter because they indicate a willingness on the part of the Soviets to talk about the problem. At the same time I think that to matter as you, as you and I are using the words the Soviets have got to agree to some kind of verification. As long as the Soviets do not agree to on-site verification, in my view, they don't matter. But look what's happened to ABM treaty. Already. In terms of massive violations. And that's what's going to always take place as long as we are dealing with a society such as they have in the Soviet Union.

IF WE GET BASICALLY THE SAME FORCE LEVELS WHETHER WE ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS OR NOT, WHAT'S THE POINT OF ENGAGING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?

The point of engaging in arms negotiation is that I... hopefully, the society in Soviet Russia would change. And little bit little we can get down to meaningful discussions. And so if we have to start sometime so we must start now and see if we can't little by little make some kind of progress in this area. I'm in favor of attempting to make a treaty. I am, once more, violently opposed to unilateral disarmament, which many of our citizens want the President to accept.

HOW IS IT THAT YOU WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO CHANGE? YOU WERE ENGAGING IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN HOPE THAT THEY WILL CHANGE. HOW DO WE WANT THEM TO CHANGE?

Well I want them to I want the Soviets to change their outlook, the way they operate, their intent to violate the treaty in such a way that we can in fact have a sound verification on the site; which they certainly have in the United States. And until they get an open society far different from the one they have now, I think that you can almost take it for granted that the Soviets will violate any treaty you make with them.

CAN YOU SAY THAT AGAIN?

Until the Soviets change their current way of thinking, their... type of government and so on and permit some kind of free access that will result in on site inspection, I think it's reasonable to say that they will violate any treaty they make.

OK. IN 1972, I THINK WHEN WE WERE HERE BEFORE YOU MENTIONED THAT YOU THOUGHT THAT NIXON AND KISSINGER HAD SORT OF SET THE DATE FOR THE SUMMIT, SORT OF AN ANTICIPATION IN THINKING ABOUT THE COMING ELECTIONS. WERE YOU CONCERNED AT THE TIME THAT MAYBE THEY WERE WILLING TO GIVE A LITTLE BIT TOO MUCH AWAY TO THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF THAT CONCERN?

I am always concerned that American politicians will give away too much. Because in our society one has difficulty accepting failure. And unfortunately our negotiations are more less tied to the timing of administrations. Whereas the Soviets on the other hand have essentially permanent government central authority and they do not alter their policy or their objectives. And so we are dealing with a on again/off again Finnegan situation in the United States depending on the position of the ind... the in administration. Whereas they are always consistent in what they do.

YOU MADE THIS GENERAL POINT SEVERAL TIMES. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS ABOUT THAT SPECIFIC NEGOTIATION, WHETHER YOU WERE HAPPY WITH IT, THE LAST MINUTE COMPROMISES THAT KISSINGER MADE.

I accepted them. I wasn't you know...

SPEAK IN TERMS OF KISSINGER'S LAST MINUTE...

Well the last minute negotiations were made by the President Nixon, not by Kissinger. Kissinger was present and so I think that people are inclined to think that Nixon was not involved, that Kissinger was putting forth all the ideas and all the proposals and that's not the case. So I like to think that it was Mr. Nixon that made the proposals. And consequently I thought that you know, he went about as far as he could go to influence or get the Brezhnev to sign. But I think one step further would have been too much.

WHAT ABOUT IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE MAY '72 TREATY, THE BEGINNING OF SALT II, WHEN WATERGATE HAD HAPPENED AND NIXON WAS REALLY STRUGGLING FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE HERE. WERE YOU WORRIED AT THAT TIME THAT MAYBE THERE WOULD BE TOO MUCH INCENTIVE FOR PRESIDENT NIXON AND HENRY KISSINGER TO BE A LITTLE BIT TOO LENIENT WITH THE SOVIETS?

No. I was not worried that President Nixon was going to be too lenient with the Soviets. Regardless of the circumstances of the moment.

WHAT DID YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAID LAST TIME THAT YOU FELT THAT AT THAT POINT THEY HAD SORT OF ABANDONED LINKAGE, THAT THE TALKS WERE THE ONLY THINGS LEFT TO SAVE THEM POLITICALLY?

I don't think I said they thought that the talks were the only thing that'd save them politically. I don't believe that's a fact. I think it certainly they thought there would be a political plus.

YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF THE ABM SYSTEM AT THE TIME AND OF MAINTAINING AT LEAST A SMALL SYSTEM, WORKABLE IN THE US DID YOU ARGUE AGAINST THE OPTION THAT WAS PRESENTING THAT EACH SIDE WOULD ONLY HAVE ONE SITE TO PROTECT THE CAPITAL? DID YOU ARGUE AGAINST PRESENTING THAT PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS?

I thought that it was very important in presenting proposals to the Soviets to include in the total package a system which could be used to, as a development base as new technology became available while at the same time building the best you could with today's technology to protect the command and control systems, namely the command authority. It was the President and all the people that work with him in event of emergency.

OUR PROPOSALS WERE SORT OF COUCHED TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO MOVE MORE OF THEIR FORCE OUT TO SEA. WHY WAS THAT?

I think one of the reasons we encouraged the Soviets to move more of their forces out to sea was that there's a unique characteristic about sea-going forces. Namely you can't hide them behind a mountain in Russia. In order to train or to function in any way, they have to come out in the ocean where we can take a look at them. And that's why we were more concerned about what the Soviets were doing ashore than we were afloat.

ISN'T IT HARD TO TRACK SUBS? HARDER THAN TO FIND THAN ICBMs? DID WE HAVE OTHER ADVANTAGES OVER THEM AT SEA?

We have several advantages over them at sea over the Soviets at sea. One is geography, which is a vital factor in this whole contest. They today have four fleets all separated. They cannot join without passing through what would be hostile areas in event of war. And second, I don't think that they although they are moving ahead I don't think that they can compare with our people in terms of the quality of the equipment or the skills which it's operated and so we are a maritime nation. They are... a land nation and I think have a major advantage at sea if we properly exploit it.

WHAT TO YOU WAS THE MAJOR SOVIET THREAT TO US AT THAT TIME?

The major Soviet threat to us at that time was I think expressed by the tremendous buildup. They had not just nuclear forces, but conventional forces, all the military forces across the board. And the fact that they were of course gradually increasing their presence in the Pacific Ocean and spreading out over the world. And so overall it was clear that the Soviets as I said many times was embarked on a grand design of world conquest or at least establishing a world presence like they did in Angola and Mozambique and Cuba and Nicaragua and Cameron Bay, etcetera.

AROUND THIS TIME YOU WERE ALSO FACED WITH SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS REGARDING VIETNAM AND ONE OF THEM WAS THE CAMBODIAN INVASION IN 1970 AND TWO WAS IN MAY OF '72, THE NEED TO BOMB HANOI AND MAI AND HAIPHONG HARBOR. WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION, WAS IT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE FEAR THAT MAYBE THE SOVIETS WOULD SORT OF WALK OUT OF SALT USING OUR IDEA OF LINKAGE IN REVERSE?

The in during the Vietnam action as a matter of fact during the time of the signing of SALT I we rained the Haiphong Harbor. So there was concern by what I call the "hand wringers". My position was that we were spending maybe twenty-six billion dollars a year and the Soviets were spending one billion and so they didn't want the Vietnam War to ever end. But nevertheless, there were those in administration that thought the Soviets would rush down and sweep the mines and of course was ridiculous. They, they wasn't going to go down and sweep up those mines and as a matter of fact when we laid the mines they Soviets that was right before Mr. Nixon went over there the Soviets put out a press release which said something to the effect that those naughty old Americans are at it again, but they never did name President Nixon in their press releases and they were particularly anxious for him to come. And so unlike all the... you know the doomsdayers that we have always in the government the Soviets weren't interested at all in us mining Haiphong Harbor because they didn't have really a national interest down there.

SO COULD YOU SUMMARIZE AND SAY THAT THEY WEREN'T INTERESTED IN CANCELLING SALT BECAUSE OF HAIPHONG BECAUSE SALT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM?

Exactly.

CAN...

The Soviets as I tried to state many times during the meetings were not interested in Vietnam as compared to SALT I. And consequently when we mined Haiphong Harbor in May of 1972 they made no move whatever or even in a, expressed any dissatisfaction relating to, relating the mining of Haiphong to the SALT I negotiation. As a matter of fact the advance party was in Moscow when the mining took place and they never... they were escorting our people around for lunch, dinner, etc. They never mentioned it.

WHY DID THEY WANT SALT I SO MUCH THAT THIS DIDN'T MEAN ANYTHING TO THEM?

Well I think that... Soviets are... wanted SALT I wanted some kind of negotiation because they felt at that time that force level wise they were above us considerably and second the Soviets have a ingrained fear of our technology. And they never know what minute we're going to come up with something that they can't cope with. And so they wanted to have a treaty to try to stop the expansion of the IBM system and for that matter hopefully do what they could with the offensive systems. But it's interesting to note that practically during the entire negotiations they didn't want to talk about offensive systems. They kept coming back to the defensive systems which was their real concern I think. And they did not...

The main concern of the Soviets during the negotiation was to at least in my view, put a halt to the development of ABM, because they felt they had an advantage in the offensive systems. And they didn't want to talk about the offensive system and as a matter of fact, finally President Nixon instructed the negotiating group to tell them that they either talk about the negotiating... I mean the offensive systems now, or all negotiations were over. I mean he in fact gave them a ultimatum that they had to shift from the defensive to the offensive systems for discussion or he wasn't going to negotiate anymore. Which was the proper thing to do. Then that's where we got into this executive agreement.

WHEN JACKSON WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SALT I AFTER, WAS PART OF THE DEAL WITH HIM THAT THE TRIDENTS WOULD BE BASED IN THE PUGET SOUND?

I'm not aware of a deal, but I think that the way things go in the Congress, there was probably a commitment to build a base on the west coast more than likely in the Puget Sound area. But I did not get involved in that because I was at that time not Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff does not get into discussions of that kind.

I INTERRUPTED. MAYBE YOU COULD SAY THAT JACKSON WANTED AS PART OF, YOU KNOW, THE DEAL THAT YOU KNOW, CONSIDERATION FOR A BASE IN PUGET SOUND.

I think it's fair to say that Senator Jackson was most interested having a submarine base, a large base in the Puget Sound area. From the very outset. Although I would say that's not any different from the position taken by most of the Congress when they're senators.

WE HEARD THAT KISSINGER PRESSED THE AIR FORCE TO PUSH AHEAD WITH CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN HIS CONCERN THAT WE NEEDED SOME BARGAINING STRENGTH FOR SALT II.

I think that when the cruise missile question came up — now it really the technology become, became available and we began to talk about it right towards the end of the major part of the SALT I discussions. But I believe it's fair to say that the deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Clements who's now governor of Texas was probably the most enthusiastic supporter in the high levels of the cruise missile. And it was not just by Kissinger, but by others who have pointed that would be one more alternative in the delivery systems which would strengthen our position.

AFTER SALT I WAS CONCLUDED, FOR SALT II WERE YOU STRESSING IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE VERIFICATION PANEL IN THE NSC THAT WE SHOULD BE REALLY STRONGLY STICKING TO THIS EQUIVALENCY RULE, THAT WE SHOULD GO FOR EQUAL AGGREGATES? IS THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT YOU GAVE TO GENERAL ROWNEY?

In general, yes.

COULD YOU STATE WHAT YOUR CONCERN WAS FOR SALT II, YOUR CONDITIONS?

Well I had the concern about SALT II that I have about most all treaty negotiations when I sense that there was a, having a taking the first step with SALT I that then, now there was a move in the country and particularly in certain interests in the colonies to go for another treaty. And so I felt that we had to be very careful about that. As a matter of fact my concerns were certainly born out when SALT II took its final form. And of course it was quite advantageous to the Soviets. So much so that the Senate refused to you know, confirm the treaty. And it's amusing to me that there are several there was a Democratic senate and now there are democrats standing up there right now that criticize the President for violating the SALT II treaty that they wouldn't vote for.

WERE YOU IN SUPPORT OR AGAINST AND WHY THE KISSINGER PROPOSAL THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE SHOULD TRADE OFF UNEQUAL AGGREGATES FOR UNEQUAL MIRV LEVELS.

Why, I didn't think that was a feasible approach, simple because when one trades off MIRVs versus you know, you're talking about really quality versus quantity there in a sense. It's the kind of thing you can't verify. You cannot verify what the... the Soviets have MIRVed because you can't look inside the warhead. You can photograph the rocket from a satellite but you don't know what's inside the warhead.

WAS YOUR POSITION DIFFERENT FROM THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S?

Sometimes.

IS THERE...

I mean Secretary of Defense had his own Allison. And or Rowny. And we had some back and forths.

IN THE END HOW DO YOU THINK SALT I AFFECTED OUR MILITARY POSTURE...THE SOVIET UNION?

I think that SALT I probably had a very positive political affect because the public took a deep breath and leaned back in their chair in a sense, but I think it had a negative effect on the development of a workable ABM. Because the Congress stopped all support. They said, "Hell, we have a treaty now we don't need to do anything else." You know.

HOW COULD THEY HAVE GONE ON WITH ABM WHEN THEY JUST AGREED IN THE TREATY, RATIFIED THE TREATY THAT SAID WE COULDN'T HAVE ANY MORE THAN TWO ABMs.

The could have at least maintained a research and development program of high order and continued which was allowed by the treaty to develop the best system possible and if the development so indicated of course we had the option which was in the treaty of then aggregating the treaty and going ahead with our program.

SO YOU'RE SAYING THAT YOU WERE SATISFIED WITH THE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. YOU WERE SATISFIED WITH THE UNEQUAL NUMBERS.

I was satisfied well, I wasn't satisfied with unequal numbers. I was satisfied with accepting it for temporarily until we could get our production lines going for ICBMs and submarines and then talk some more. The general understanding was that we would take a new look in five years. And that wasn't really done. As a matter of fact, we're still arguing about the ABM and when people discuss the ABM treaty they don't mention the executive agreement which was related to offensive system. They're still talking about you know, they're relating it really to SDI.

WERE YOU AFRAID THAT IF WE WENT AHEAD AND MATCHED THE SOVIETS AT THAT TIME WITH THE SUBMARINES WE HAD, THE POSEIDONS, THAT CONGRESS WOULDN'T FUND THE TRIDENT PROGRAM?

No.

THIS PERIOD HAS OFTEN BEEN CALLED THE PERIOD OF DÉTENTE, DURING THE NIXON, KISSINGER, DURING THAT FIRST TERM. AND MANY PEOPLE SAID THAT DÉTENTE STARTED TO CRUMBLE DURING THE SECOND NIXON TERM. I WAS WONDERING HOW YOU FELT ABOUT DÉTENTE AND WHY DID IT START TO END?

My feeling about détente was that it was perhaps a reasonable proposal so long as the Soviets carried out their side of the bargain which I didn't expect them to do. I wasn't surprised at all when détente went out the window. For one thing very few people knows what knew what the word meant. It's a French word. The French didn't know what it meant. And so it didn't really amount to too much. So I didn't really spend much time concerning myself about détente because subsequent negotiations for instance Carter's negotiations up at Camp David had Sadat you know, up there and so on and Begin and Sadat and Carter were hugging and kissing one another in the, in the White House, but nothing ever came of that. So when the politicians get together and come out with these grand ideas, I always very skeptical.

WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT NUCLEAR ALERT DURING THE MIDEAST CRISIS?

The what?

THE NUCLEAR ALERT, THE DEFCON III.

Oh that was action taken in response to a very strong letter we received from Mr. Brezhnev and the United States was obliged to take some kind of action, because the Russians were going to, threatening to go into Egypt.

DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE? JUST BACK ON THE DÉTENTE, WE HAVE A CUTTING FRAME OF THE QUESTION JUST PRIOR TO THIS ONE. WERE THERE ANY EVENTS IN THE SITUATIONS THAT WERE DEVELOPING IN THE MIDDLE OF NIXON'S SECOND TERM THAT REALLY SIGNALED THE END OF THIS SO CALLED DÉTENTE PERIOD WHERE YOU SORT OF SAID TO YOURSELF, "WELL, THAT'S THE END OF THAT POLICY."

I don't think that there were events that were you know, oh, watersheds. That indicated the end of détente during the last part of Nixon's term. I think what really threw it, détente out the window was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when President Carter said that he for the first time learned what the Soviets were actually like... which was an amazing statement for a President of the United States to make. He said, "Talk to me."

BUT WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THIS WHOLE DESIGN THAT NIXON AND KISSINGER HAD FOR THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE, THAT IF WE ENGAGED THE SOVIETS IN NEGOTIATIONS AND WE SET UP TRADE RELATIONS WITH THEM AND GAVE THEM MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS AND ALL OF THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACTUALLY SOMEWHAT SUBDUE THEM AND KEEP THEM IN LINE?

I think that the situation which exists between the Soviets and their satellites and the western world is such that anyone in a position that the, a President of the United States has and I think you see that argument made about this current incident. I know you want to take that out. But in any way, I think that all...are groping for some solution to this seemingly unsolvable problem. And so in this case, they came out with the, "Well, let's try this. Let's see if they if we trying to be a little more cooperative and provide them more in the economic and cultural political field." If they want in slack off from this pell-mell development of weapons. And so they tried it and it didn't work. But I don't fault them for trying it. Because nobody can ant, anticipate what the outcome of these efforts might be. And so I don't get very enthusiastic about them. But I don't mind them trying them. And you're going to hear the same thing that I just said when the administration explains the Iranian thing. Here's Iran sitting in a most strategic... position in the Middle East. It's, it's a stride that, it runs up and down the Persian Gulf and you got all the moderate Arabian nations right across the water from them. The... and Saudi Arabia and so on. And then on the other side, is Afghanistan where there's thousands of Soviet troops. And to the north they point us of Iran, the 26 divisions just waiting to come down the mountain. There's six hundred Soviet agents in Iran and when the Iran gives the Soviets something that they've longed for ever since Peter the Great the access to the Indian Ocean. And so, if the United States permitted the Soviets to dominate Iran, we'd be a hell fix. And so it's the same kind of a thing that happens in every administration. Kennedy had his Bay of Pigs and his Cuban Crisis and Ford had his Cambodian thing and then after that Nixon had Vietnam and Watergate and now well Ford then followed him and then Carter had debted one and Reagan's got Iran. I mean, everyone of them are going to have a problem like that.