L. K. JHA, COULD YOU TELL ME FIRST, WHAT WERE PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR INDIA?

Well, first of all, you must remember that Prime General Nehru was a science graduate of Cambridge, so he was always excited about science. And although Hiroshima had been a very, very distressing, deep shock for him, he recognized that atomic energy had a great potential for the future. And it might well be the thing of the future. So he did want India to go in the atomic field. Because it was very late, new opening of science. And also because of its ultimate use as a source of energy. And in this, he was very closely influenced by his friendship and admiration for Dr. Homi Bhabha, a famous physicist. And he therefore give it the kind of support which maybe any other Prime Minister would not have given. And so he welcomed Canadian cooperation in setting up the CANDU project and uh, other development in the power field based on atomic energy.

LET'S GO TO A CLOSE UP. THANK YOU. OK, IF I CAN JUST ASK YOU SPECIFICALLY HOW CLOSE MR. NEHRU AND DR. BHABHA WERE?

Oh, they were very close. Each time Dr. Bhabha came to Delhi, he stayed at Nehru's house. He addressed him as brother, as an elder brother kind of thing. And he had a great personal admiration and affection for Homi. Particularly as Homi was such a remarkably talented person in music, in art, in painting, he painted himself, he played music himself. So though he was a great scientist, he was a man of great culture also. And they got on famously.

DID THEY SHARE THE SAME GOALS FOR INDIA?

Well, I don't know that Homi thought of India in that kind of vision which Nehru had, which was much wider, international, political and all that. But certainly, that India should be in the vanguard of science and knowledge and technology, and not a poor country making do with primitive technology that, that was a thing which both of them shared.

HOW DID INDIA CONTRIBUTE, AND MR. NEHRU SPECIFICALLY, CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE LATE '50s, EARLY '60s?

Well... he was... a crusader for peace. He wanted peace... as a thing by itself. And certainly, in regard to nuclear warfare, he had a feeling of great revulsion and abhorrence after what had happened in Hiroshima. And therefore, his thrust as his own foreign minister, he was making foreign policy as well, was throughout in favor of peace and against nuclear arms. His commitment to non-alignment, or rather his evolution of the concept of nonalignment was again meant to be to create a force for peace which would not be tied to the apron strings and ambitions of the two nuclear powers. So for him, a nuclear peace was almost a basic thing. You know, we, we couldn't dream of any other kind of resolution to world problems. Or uh, world international relationships except in terms of no nuclear weapons, please.

WIDE SHOT AGAIN. I'M GOING TO REPEAT JUST A LITTLE BIT OF THAT. I'LL JUST WAIT FOR THOSE PEOPLE IN THE BACKGROUND... OK. COULD I ASK YOU ABOUT MR. NEHRU'S VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF PROLIFERATION AND NON-PROLIFERATION?

I think at that point of time, as far as I remember, the question of proliferation had not become a very major one. It was very limited possession of nuclear weaponry. And he did envisage the peaceful use of nuclear energy and all that spreading all over the world. But that weapons would proliferate was not a particular possibility at that time. Not many countries would think of going nuclear except those which were already in that bracket. That situation developed really when Mr. Shastri was Prime Minister. And China had the first nuclear explosion.

ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT MR. NEHRU. WHAT WERE HIS VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS? I REALIZE I'M REPEATING THINGS A LITTLE BIT.

Well, he was very definitely against the use of nuclear weapons. I mean, he was striving for peace. He stuck up for non-alignment and a third force which would not strengthen the two nuclear powers or encourage them to divide the world between them in terms of alliances. But so far as... nuclear weapons are concerned, he was distinctly and categorically against their use. He was too horrified and shocked at the Hiroshima happenings to contemplate a repetition of the same tragedy ever again.

AND HIS VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INDIA?

Well, he had never thought of that! I mean, it was just not a question of considering. It was never even contemplated.

WHAT WAS YOUR OWN REACTION TO THE CHINESE EXPLOSION IN 1964?

Well, the Chinese explosion took place just days before the Non-Aligned Summit was meeting in Cairo. And I was there in Cairo with Prime Minister Shastri. And for him it was a great shock. And he, in fact, proposed to the non-aligned powers that they should send a mission to China to say to China, "Call a halt, don't go ahead." He thought that India saying so, on their own, would not be nearly so effective, because India and China had had a border skirmish. So he was not looking at it in terms of increased threat to India, but as a development which was of danger to mankind as a whole. And he, therefore, put forward this proposition. It did not get much support, because, as far as I could sense, though it was not spoken in so many words, many of the countries represented in the Non-Aligned Summit felt that after all, if there are nuclear weapons, there cannot be the monopoly of Europe and America; Asia and the Third World would also have its presence felt in this kind of a framework. So there was no mission coming out. But Mr. Shastri's reaction was very much one of shock and horror at the prospect of China becoming nuclear, quite apart from its strategic implications for India.

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU, HOW DID THE TWO EVENTS THE 1962 WAR AND THE TEST AFFECT INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS?

Well, the 1962 war had certainly led India to re-arm. I mean, we had taken it for granted that we had no threats, and we were dedicating all our resources to development. I mean, the army was there, the navy was there. But it was no match for the Chinese, as the conflict brought out, because it was not equipped to fight that kind of a war. And so thereafter outlays on defense had to be stepped up. Of course, this happened in Nehru's time. And when Shastri became Prime Minister, very shortly thereafter, there was the nuclear explosion. Which changed the security environment dramatically. For the worse. And uh, in fact, the...one of the factors influencing Indian approach towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty was from the security angle, the risks seemed to be high that if India got committed to having no nuclear weapons, well, at least one of the powers from whom India, at that time, did have some security threat to fear about, had gone nuclear.

ARE YOU ABLE TO SUMMARIZE JUST THOSE TWO EVENTS, 1962 AND 1964? COULD WE DO IT JUST A LITTLE SHORTER, THE EFFECT IT HAD ON INDIA, THE TWO EVENTS, THE CHINESE.

Well, the 1962 event, attack on India, led India to spend much more on arms, feel much more concerned about external threats on security. Close on the heels of that, the 1964 nuclear explosion made these concerns much graver and much more serious.

THANK YOU. FOLLOWING THE TEST, WHAT KIND OF EFFORT DID SHASTRI MAKE IN ORDER TO GAIN SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM THE WEST? I UNDERSTAND HE DID...

Well, when he was in Britain, talking to the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson he did refer to the greatly increased nuclear threat for India, and I think had discussions with him on what could and should be done in the situation to meet India's concerns. Now, I wasn't present at the talks, nor was anyone else, nor were there any records for me to say what was actually the exact trend of his ideas on the subject. Newspapers carried the story that he asked Britain to provide a nuclear umbrella, which I don't for India, which I don't think was his thrust. My judgment is that he talked more in terms of what this event means, and what kind of possibilities it opens up, both in terms of security and in terms of danger to mankind.

SO YOU DON'T RECALL THIS PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD FOR A NUCLEAR SHIELD?

No I don't think well, I don't think, afterwards, when the press reports appeared, he dismissed them as, you know, saying that, where do they get these ideas from? This kind of a reaction. But as I said, he left no record of the conversation, which was entirely personal between them.

DURING THIS PERIOD, THE EARLY SIXTIES, THERE WAS A DEBATE, I UNDERSTAND IT, IN THE LOK SABHA ABOUT INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. WHAT'S YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THAT DOMESTIC DEBATE?

I didn't uh, I wasn't a close witness of that debate, so I don't think I can tell you very definitely anything on that. But people were disturbed. There were many who were urging that India should go nuclear. Others were equally strong in the view of India as a peace-loving nation, and this would be going against our basic, fundamental commitment to Gandhi and Nehru, to think of nuclear weapons,

HOW DID SHASTRI RESPOND TO THE PRESSURES OF THAT PRO-BOMB LOBBY?

Oh, I don't think he responded in terms of India moving towards nuclear uh, you know, arms. In fact, if I remember, at Cairo he made in the Non-Aligned Summit the statement as to where India is concerned, our scientists have been told not to strive for nuclear weapons. And that policy holds. And he was asking that China should also be persuaded to be in the same kind of a line.

THERE'S ANOTHER LITTLE REFERENCE IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, DR. BHABHA MAKING A STATEMENT AFTER THE CHINESE TEST THAT INDIA COULD DEVELOP A BOMB WITHIN 18 MONTHS. DO YOU RECALL THAT?

I don't recall the...wording, but it does uh... have a familiar ring. He could well have said something. Because as a scientist, when you are asked, "Can we make it?" I mean, he was answering not a question of whether we should, but if it could be done, and if so, how long would it take? He could have been asked and given this answer.

COULD YOU TELL ME WHAT THE INDIAN PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE WAS AT THE TIME TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INDIAN BOMB OR NUCLEAR DETERRENT?

Well, when you talk of the India public, let's face it, that the vast majority of the Indian people are so poor, or were at that time so poor, and so involved with their day-to-day bread-and-butter problems, that they couldn't have a crystallized position or even a deep perception of what a nuclear bomb in China means to India's security. But among the intelligentsia, there was certainly the feeling that, Are we being too idealistic? Should we not be more realistic and...think in terms of having a capability which would act as a deterrent, rather than leave ourselves so exposed?

WHY DID INDIA THINK CHINA WENT AHEAD WITH THE TEST?

Oh, I have no idea, I don't know.

THE SOVIET SPLIT... OR...?

Could be. Could be.

HOW MUCH PROGRESS WAS THERE IN THE INDIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY WHILE PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI WAS IN OFFICE?

It's very difficult to say. I mean, the entire focus was on power generation. And the attempt was to make the power generation as totally indigenous as possible. Which was a drive all through the industrial scenario, to manufacture the power plant in India, to have Indian know how in regard to— and technology in regard to all the uh, you know, the, the needs. To make a power plant commercially successfully, successful, as distinct from being a scientific performance that you can generate power.

GO TO A CLOSE UP, PLEASE. WERE YOU PRESENT AT ANY OF THE OPENINGS OF THE REACTORS? CAN YOU TELL US ANY ANECDOTES...

No, I wasn't present at the opening of the reactors at all.

INAUGURATIONS OF ANY OF THEM?

No, not of any of them.

NOW, YOU'VE TOLD US THAT MR. NEHRU WAS CLOSE TO BHABHA. WHAT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SHASTRI AND DR. BHABHA?

Oh, Shastri and Dr. Bhabha... was a relationship which was not so intimate and personal. But it is not a fact very widely known that Shastri had invited Bhabha to join his cabinet as a minister in charge of science and technology. And Homi, however, had preferred to remain involved in active research and scientific work rather than take on the responsibilities of being a minister when political work takes the lion's share of your time.

WHY DO YOU THINK HE TURNED IT DOWN?

Well, because of his desire to remain with uh, I mean, his scientific field work. He said, "My place is near the laboratory, and not with the bureaucracy."

DID THEY SHARE THE SAME VISION, AGAIN?

I... would not say so, because... Shastri was basically a man from the villages of rural India, and that is where his heart lay. And while he accepted the need for India's scientific and technological advance as desirable, he did not look at it as the prime target of policy. And his focus was on how to bring to the farmer a better life, a better price for his grain he produced, and other amenities, which he lacked.

AND DID HE USE THE NUCLEAR ENERGY TO THAT END? WAS...

I don't think he felt, out very categorically the possibility of nuclear energy, because power was needed. And he was convinced, as others were, that in vast parts of India...

IN 1965, FOLLOWING THE KASHMIR WAR, PAKISTAN'S PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO SAID THAT IF INDIA BUILDS THE BOMB, PAKISTAN WOULD EAT GRASS IN ORDER TO GET ONE OF ITS OWN. DID INDIA TAKE PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR THREAT SERIOUSLY AT THIS TIME?

No, not really, because... again, it was if India did... uh, in as though... and at that time, nobody in India was thinking in terms of...going nuclear, and the '65 war had gone in India's favor. So, there was little reason for India to start thinking of going nuclear in the context of Indo-Pak situation.

CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE TRIPS YOU TOOK IN EARLY 1967 TO LONDON AND MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS NPT?

Well, let me go back a little. During '65 to '67 there was this growing pressure on India to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the concern about this was... two: one, that we do believe in nuclear disarmament, but not in a nuclear monopoly. And certainly not a monopoly which we create by saying that we shall not go nuclear, but you gentlemen go ahead. So, it was a discriminatory aspect of the treaty, which was seen to be politically indefensible. Then, there was also the threat of, to India's security, that if there is a situation in which India is threatened by China, or either independently or, much more likely, hand-in-glove with Pakistan, then our position would be very vulnerable. At that point of time, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, who had succeeded Homi Bhabha, he made a very valid point; he said, "Look, the real strength of nuclear weapons is the threat, and not its use. We will, may not use it, but, since we can threaten you with it, you can be blackmailed. And therefore, a counterforce has to be built up against this possibility. And that has to be international." At that stage of the game, I also came into the picture. And Indira Gandhi was supportive of some thinking as to what would be done. So the proposition which Vikram and I... put to her was, that if the five nuclear powers, including China, and the Soviet Union, and USA, give a declaration, that if any non-nuclear power was threatened by a nuclear power, with nuclear weapons, they would come to the help of the non-nuclear power, immediately and without reserve. Now, the basic argument for this approach was that if both the USA and the Soviet Union are signatories to this treaty, then the fear that one would not intervene because it was an ally who was involved, or, because of the fear that the other superpower might jump in on the other side and that maybe a world war, would be removed. Both would be equally committed. Secondly, if real force would be in preventing proliferation, because with this kind of a declaration, no country would have a real incentive to go nuclear, because if it did so, with a view to attack a non-nuclear neighbor it would have to take into account the commitment made by the superpowers. So, it would act as a force to discourage proliferation much more effectively than the NPT would, and without raising the two grounds of reservation which signing the NPT implied, namely, creating a monopoly for the bigger powers, or, disregarding your own security considerations.

LET'S DO THAT A LITTLE BRIEFER... HOW DID YOU ADVISE MRS. GANDHI VIS-A-VIS THE NPT?

Well, the advice was... that there was no case for India to sign the NPT, because it would mean discriminating against ourselves, and conferring a monopoly on superpowers. And it would also mean that our security interests would have to be subordinated. So we had an alternative, that if the superpowers, particularly Soviet Union and USA, jointly made a declaration that if any non-nuclear country was threatened by a nuclear power with nuclear weapons, they would immediately come to the aid of the former. Then, it would give a sense of security to non-nuclear powers, and also act as a disincentive for any of them to become nuclear, with a view to threatening their neighbors.

HOW DO YOU RECOLLECT YOUR VISIT, AND WHO WERE THE PEOPLE YOU SAW?

Well, I saw... Kosygin in the Soviet Union; I saw President Johnson; I saw Mr. Harold Wilson; I saw the Prime Minister of France... for, all four countries I'd been to. And this was the kind of proposition which I had to put to them. The Soviet response was fairly positive. They only said that they won't sign a joint declaration with the Americans while the Vietnam War was on. But, they would be prepared to sign a declaration, separately, but in identical terms, and, uh, I had a fairly long discussion on the text of the draft, and though it was not a approved text, I had a pretty clear idea of what kind of a text would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and it was pretty close to what I thought might be acceptable to my government also. In the... USA, uh, President Johnson was facing difficulties with the Senate on so many issues... that he said, "Look, either what you ask is already covered by the UN Charter — if so, you don't need anything new — and if it is not, I'll have to go to Senate, and Senate won't sign it." And so... with this rigmarole, uh, no real advance was possible.

SO HOW DID YOU COME BACK FEELING?

Well, after the... somewhat negative re-, well, very negative response of the US meant that the British also said we would go along with the US as far as they would go, we are agreeable to your approach; the French prime minister defined it in more precise terms: that in fact, what you propose is outlaw-, outlawing the use of nuclear weapons, except within nuclear powers as they are now. So... and they said, well, intellectually it has a great appeal, but your first task is to get the agreement of the USSR and USA So they both left it at that.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO JUST SUMMARIZE THE KIND OF NPT THAT INDIA REALLY DID WANT?

I don't think I could, because I was not involved in any discussion on that.

DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER RECOLLECTIONS OF THE EFFORTS THAT WERE MADE BY THE SPONSORING COUNTRIES?

Oh, I think there was a lot of pressure on India to sign the NPT. I mean, even when I talked in Moscow, Kosygin was very clear that yes, what you say sounds reasonable, but, India must sign the NPT also; I mean, he didn't look at it as an alternative to NPT, but that India should sign the NPT, but the idea of a guarantee was a reinforcing factor rather than an alternative.

WE'VE READ ABOUT THE DISCUSSION IN THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT WHETHER TO SIGN OR NOT TO SIGN. IS THERE ANY TRUTH IN THAT, OR WAS MRS. GANDHI...?

Well, it, a discussion would take place only within the cabinet, and I wasn't present at them.

DO YOU THINK THAT GUARANTEES OF SUPERPOWER DISARMAMENT WOULD HAVE HELPED INDIA SIGN?

Whether India would have signed or not I can't say; I mean, the idea... from the Indian viewpoint was, to present a more effective, and equally credible alternative. That it would act as a deterrent on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And... be much more effective than making country by country sign it.

COULD WE GO OVER THAT AGAIN?

I don't think so, because India's approach really was... to give a credible alternative, and a more effective alternative to the NPT, which would achieve the same objective of preventing proliferation, without the drawbacks which India saw, in signing a treaty.

DURING THIS PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO MRS. GANDHI, IS THERE ANYTHING IN GENERAL THAT YOU COULD SAY ABOUT HER NUCLEAR POLICY?

I don't think she discussed it very often; at least I was with her until '67, so there was nothing on the horizon suggestive of India wanting to... go nuclear, or... being threatened by Pakistan going nuclear. China was known to be nuclear, but at that point of time, although China had made many rude noises during the Indo-Pak conflict of '65, we were not really feeling... that... relations between India and China are deteriorating. It was some hope of an uptrend, so in that period, I don't think she was giving too much attention to this.

WE ALWAYS READ THAT SHE WANTED TO KEEP THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION OPEN TO INDIA. WAS THERE SOME TRUTH IN THAT?

Yes, yes, I mean, I don't think anybody in India... would accept the position that while China has nuclear capability... and... now... Pakistan is developing it pretty fast, that India should voluntarily forego this option. Whether she should exercise the option is a matter on which opinion is deeply divided, even, I suppose, in the mind of the prime minister himself, because he has been very actively propagating for nuclear disarmament, so, it goes against his grain to think of the... nuclear possibility.

CAN I JUST TAKE YOU BACK AGAIN TO WHEN YOU WERE PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO MRS. GANDHI, HOW SHE FELT ABOUT THE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS OPTION.

Well, as I say, at that moment, there was no... sense of acute urgency about going nuclear, but on the point of principle, that we should not forego the option, by signing the NPT, she was quite firm, and there was hardly any debate on that. I mean, nobody questioned the fact that we should not sign the treaty, as distinct from whether we should go nuclear.

WHILE YOU WERE POSTED TO THE UNITED STATES, WHEN YOU WERE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, FROM '70 TO '73, INDIA SIGNED A FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE USSR. WHAT DID INDIA HOPE TO GAIN FROM THAT TREATY?

Well, that treaty was in the context of the deteriorating... situation, vis-a-vis what is now Bangladesh, and then was East Pakistan, as well as the tilt which the United States had towards Pakistan. And so, that there was some kind of an understanding with the Soviet Union was seen as a helpful counterbalancing factor to prevent... outbreak of hostilities. Eventually there were.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS ENTERPRISE TO THE BAY OF BENGAL DURING THE 1971 WAR?

Well, if you ask my candid opinion, I felt it was a stunt, in order to cow down India, but as... the American press reacted I doubted if he would open yet another front in Asia, after what had been happening in Vietnam.

HOW MUCH CONCERN WAS THERE THAT CHINA WOULD INTERVENE IN THAT 1971 WAR?

Well, China... in '71, as in '65, made so many aggressive statement, statements. We got some messages to suggest that China was going to... intervene, to help Pakistan. But again, India had no means of knowing whether it was merely a verbal threat to influence Indian action, or whether it was... backed by actual design to intervene, I just don't know.

WHAT KIND OF FEAR WAS 1971 FOR INDIA, IN TERMS OF ITS SECURITY CONCERNS?

Oh, it was a very, very anxious year, very anxious indeed, and that accounts for the... treaty of friendship with Soviet Union.

IF I CAN JUST ASK YOU TO DESCRIBE WHY IT WAS AN ANXIOUS YEAR

No, because of the deterioration... in the situation, what with the influx of refugees.

IF YOU CAN JUST EXPLAIN IT FOR SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T KNOW ALL THE HISTORY

Well, you see, the, after all... Pakistan had come out of India, one wing in the west, one in the east. The eastern wing had very strong cultural, linguistic styles with our east, and very little with western Pakistan. And there were tensions between them, but that was an internal affair of Pakistan; we didn't come in. But when millions of people from the eastern half of Pakistan began to come as refugees to India, and we had to look after them, provide them shelter, food, everything... then it was becoming an intolerable burden. And, as they were coming out with a very strong military presence in East Pakistan, it was in fact causing them to panic and run to India. The danger of confrontation and conflict was becoming stronger. Now, we were anxious that even if there is a conflict it should remain localized, and not spread to the west, but again, knowing the history and Pakistan's claims on Kashmir... there was always the fear that there might be an outburst on that front also. So, India had to guard the eastern flank; India had to guard the western flank, and it was a period of great anxiety.

WOULD IT BE TRUE TO SAY 1971 WAS A TURNING POINT FOR INDIA, IN SOME WAYS?

Well, one could interpret that; I mean, I was...then an ambassador in USA, so I was not so familiar with the thinking going on in India.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE GLOBAL SITUATION, HOW THE PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA CHANGED?

Well, I think... there was certainly a rude shock to India, in terms of... well, how the whole scenario was changing. Bangladesh became independent, but those are the people who had forgotten they could merge with West Bengal, in India, which was not likely or true, we didn't ever believe that or expect that. Now, that did not mean that they became necessarily friendly to India. There was certainly a wave of gratitude for India's role in their liberation. But, there was another new power there, a power in the west, and on our northeast frontier--

CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN THIS BUSINESS OF THE FEARS THAT INDIA HAD ABOUT A CHINA-PAKISTAN-US AXIS?

Well, in the... developments preceding the Bangladesh War, one of the major factors which changed the whole scenario was Henry Kissinger's visit to China, and the establishment of a new axis. Henry Kissinger was the first man to say to me that the birth of Bangladesh is inevitable. Any-, nobody in India had said that to me, when he said it. This was before he went to China. Now, after that, the whole situation changed, and... the feeling in India grew... that... US had always been an ally of Pakistan, Pakistan had always been friendly with China, US had gone to China, with Pakistan's help and mediation, and therefore, there was a powerful bloc against India's strategic interest. And this was the sense of threat, which influenced a lot of Indian thinking.

AND THE TREATY AS WELL…

CAN WE MOVE ON TO 1974, AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION? COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE TIMING OF THE EXPLOSION?

I couldn't. I was then living in Kashmir valley, so I was not in Delhi or... anywhere.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE EXPLOSION?

I was... just surprised. I mean, I didn't.. I mean, I had no mental preparation for the event. So...

SOME PEOPLE HAVE TOLD US THAT IT WAS A MOMENT OF PRIDE

Well, I, quite frankly, knew that we had a kind of capability, which was within inches of making an explosion, if we wanted to. So, I wasn't as startled by the mere fact of explosion. .. as many other people might have been.

WERE YOU SURPRISED AT THE OVERSEAS REACTION?

Well, I, what I thought was... a little, much stronger than... I expected that people would not like it naturally, but... that it would be so strong as to, you know, create acute tensions, that was, that did take me by surprise.

THE CARTER PERIOD, AND THE EFFORTS HE MADE TO CONTROL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, DID YOU AGREE WITH HIS VIEW THAT A COUNTRY COULD BE PREVENTED FROM BUILDING BOMBS BY DENYING THEM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE?

Well... I, again, was very far removed from the scene — I can't have any considered judgment to give you; I didn't apply my mind in that kind of a focused way.

COULD YOU COMMENT ON THE LATE SEVENTIES WHEN THE NEWS CAME FILTERING THROUGH THAT PAKISTAN WAS EMBARKING ON AN ENRICHMENT PROGRAM? HOW SERIOUSLY WAS THAT NEWS TAKEN IN INDIA?

Well, to begin with, not many people took it too seriously, or as a kind of a threat, but later, when evidence began to mount about... attempts to get... all that it needs to make a really effective nuclear weapon... then of course the concern was the greater. And... what perhaps made it much, much worse was... that the Americans, who knew more about it than anybody else, were at the same time shutting their eyes to it, and saying, "No, no, no, no, nothing is happening," and in fact giving them other military aid, to strengthen their nuclear, uh, military capability.

AND STILL ARE.

Still are.

IS THERE ANY COMMENT YOU'D LIKE TO MAKE ABOUT THAT?

Well, I think it's a very, very disappointing thing, the Symington Amendment should be applied, instead of being... waivered. It should be applied. And then we would know... either... Pakistan decides to give up nuclear weapons, fine, or if they are going to do it anyhow, then at least it's not been helped to aggrandize that power with the help of other conventional weaponry.

CAN YOU COMMENT ON US EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION THIS WAY? DO YOU THINK THEY'RE SOMEWHAT MISGUIDED IN A WAY?

I haven't followed it in that detailed way.

WHEN YOU WERE IN THE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM COMMISSION IN THE 1981-84 PERIOD, WHAT DID YOU THINK OF MRS. GANDHI'S RESPONSE TO MORE AND MORE EVIDENCE ABOUT PAKISTAN? IS THERE ANY THING PERSONAL THAT...

No, I was not important then, no.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT MRS. GANDHI WAS BEING URGED BY HER ADVISERS TO LAUNCH A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. IS THERE ANY TRUTH TO THAT?

No... at least, I've never heard of it.

IN GENERAL TERMS, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE?

Well... Rajiv Gandhi has been one of the very vocal spokesmen in favor of nuclear disarmament. The six-power initiative which he joined is clear evidence of that. On the other hand, it has been clear from the trend of thinking in the country that nobody would tolerate his giving up the option with the growing threat from Pakistan, the evidence of which is mounting. So he is in that kind of a situation. What he will decide I just don't know.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD BE INDIA'S RESPONSE TO A PAKISTAN TEST?

I just don't know, but I think public opinion will be wanting India to take appropriate countermeasures. Now, whether purely conventional weaponry will give to the Indian people a feeling of security, or even to our military people, I just don't know. Because it's very difficult to evaluate... the threat of a nuclear weapon in terms of conventional weaponry response.

HOW EFFECTIVE DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN IN ITS EFFORTS TO IMPEDE THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM?

I don't think they have tried it seriously enough or hard enough. If they had, they could have stopped it.

HOW DO YOU ENVISION THE NEXT TEN YEARS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE?

With fear, because it's not only here, India and Pakistan and China... much more, the escalation between the superpowers, the... talks not progressing, the... temporary unilateral ban... imposed by Soviet Union also not holding, so none of those signs are very encouraging, I'm afraid.

(REPEATS QUESTION)

Well, I have grave fears about the future of mankind, not just of this region. The kind of escalation which is taking place, the breakdown of talks, the non, the Soviet... ban on explosions, unilaterally imposed, being over, all these... make a very dangerous... forecast for the future.

HOW ABOUT SOUTH ASIA IN PARTICULAR?

Well, South Asia has its own problems, but I think... perhaps the bigger danger, which threatens the whole of mankind... has to be viewed much more seriously, because, if the superpowers were determined... to end nuclear warfare, they could jointly put an end to it, and prevent it occurring anywhere else. But if they are themselves preparing for... a mutual conflict, they lose their moral authority to prevent it anywhere else.

COULD YOU MIND JUST GOING, A LITTLE BRIEFER...?

Quite frankly, I'm much more concerned about the world scenario, the threat to mankind as a whole, because of the superpowers getting wider apart, and getting locked into more threatening postures than before. And if that was not so, if they really got together, they could preserve peace in other parts of the world also, and they would have the moral authority, and not merely the physical strength for the purpose.

DO YOU SEE THE FUTURE OF THE PROBLEM AS BEING ONE OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION?

Well, at the moment even without any spread... to other countries, the situation is very, very dangerous. It is the vertical proliferation within the two superpowers, which could be triggered even by an accident, to launch destruction of all mankind.

DO YOU THINK PEOPLE SHOULD CONCERN THEMSELVES MORE WITH SOUTH ASIA OR WITH THE WORLD SCENARIO?

Well, one can't separate the two. I mean, people in South Asia do naturally focus on South Asian problem, but I see it as a part of a global problem, and not a regional problem.

MAHATMA GANDHI, IN 1947, SAID THE WEST IS DESPAIRING OF THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE ATOM BOMBS, BECAUSE THE ATOM BOMB MEANS THE DESTRUCTION NOT MERELY OF THE WEST BUT OF THE WHOLE WORLD. IS THIS A SENTIMENT THAT YOU SHARE?

Yes, definitely. Because whether you have a proliferation of weapons or not, the impact of a global war will proliferate all over the world. So, you cannot draw a line of non-proliferation of whatever is generated by a nuclear holocaust.