WELL YOU TALKED TO JONATHAN ABOUT THE NEED TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NATO ALLIANCE, AND YOU TALKED ABOUT IN TERMS OF COUNTERFORCE. THAT THAT PUT A COUNTERFORCE REQUIREMENT. WE'VE LEARNED THAT THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE WAS A TRIP WIRE CONCEPT, THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF MASSIVE RETALIATION, FOR EXAMPLE. HOW DO YOU RELATE THAT TO WHAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT? BEING A COUNTERFORCE RESPONSE?

The NATO concept basically was described from the beginning as the sword and shield. The shield was represented by the, we'll say tactical forces in place in NATO Europe, including those forces from Canada and the United States, stationed in NATO Europe. But they were tactical forces. That was a shield. And it was somewhat more than a trip wire, because those forces were sizable. That's true today, even though the Warsaw Pact forces are estimated to be greater, as I understand General Rogers the commander of NATO forces. Nevertheless, that was the shield. The sword was symbolic of the United States' strategic forces. First Air Force bombers, joined later by Navy, nuclear missile submarines. So the sword and shield concept really, I think was more than a trip wire. And it was expected that NATO Europe was to be protected first by the deterrence of such a force, and the dual ability of such a force. Second, by ah, effective defense if deterrence failed.

OK, WHEN THE CIVILIANS CAME IN IN 1961 WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY, THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS CAME INTO THE PENTAGON, THEY STARTED RESTRUCTURING THE FORCES IN A WAY IN WHICH DEEMPHASIZED THE BOMBERS. DEEMPHASIZED THE B-57, B-58, B-70, WAS NOT PROCURED. COULD YOU TELL ME, AND THEY ARGUED THAT THE BOMBER WAS STRATEGICALLY NON-IMPORTANT, THAT IT WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT ADDITION TO THE FORCES FOR THEIR MISSION. COULD YOU TALK ABOUT BOMBERS AND HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THEM AND HOW YOU FELT ABOUT THEM AT THE TIME?

I think that perhaps the best answer to that would be the concept that has existed since then and exists today as a matter of national military policy. Called the triad of strategic forces. The triad consists of manned bombers, land launched missiles, and sea launched missiles. Each one has strengths, each one has potential weaknesses. But in combination, these three types of strategic forces compound the enemy's problem. Not only his defensive problem, but his offensive problem, because if he's going to target strategic forces, it's much more difficult for him to do that with three different kinds, each having it's own environment and different nature. So as far as the manned bomber is concerned, to answer your question, I think that it still is an was certainly then even to a greater extent, an important part of the US strategic diversification, which has a real value in terms of making the enemies planning much more complex, both offensively and defensively.

I HATE TO DO THIS, BUT COULD YOU REPEAT THAT WITHOUT SAYING, WITHOUT ANSWERING YOUR QUESTION? I'D LIKE TO DISAPPEAR FROM ANY OF THIS...

Right. The strategic concept that existed then and still exists today as a matter of national military policy, is normally commonly called the triad of strategic forces. The triad consists of manned bombers, land launched missiles, and sea launched missiles. Each one of those three types of forces has strengths and potential weaknesses. But together they complicate the enemies planning problem immensely. For example, if the enemy is going to strike US strategic forces, it's much more difficult for him to strike two different kinds of missiles and bombers than it would be to strike just one of those three forces. Defensively, it complicates his problem because he'll have attacks coming against him from those three different kinds of weapons. To give you a quick example...of his offensive planning being complicated. If the Soviet Union is planning to attack the United States, ah, strategically, with nuclear weapons, as soon as he launches a missile, he's giving some warning. Because of our detection ability. As soon as he launches bombers, he's giving a warning. Now if he launches the bombers, hours before he launches the missiles, so that all the weapons will arrive on their targets at the same time, we're going to have more warning. Because it will take the bombers longer to get there. On the other hand, if he waits until ah, it's time to use the missiles only, then his bombers are not going to get to the targets at the same time. It's a complication of planning.

SO WERE YOU IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING A MANNED BOMBER PROCURING A B-70?

You mean at that time?

YES. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE B-70? COULD YOU JUST...

Yes. It was an aerodynamic breakthrough and I recall being very much in favor of it, yes. And I think that ah, from the standpoint of aerodynamic development, you find a remarkably similar looking air plane today in the Concord. So the B-70 did contribute technically to aerodynamic development. It ah, it could have served a useful purpose militarily, certainly. And, yes, I was in favor of it.

WERE YOU INVOLVED...LET'S, HOW ABOUT THE B-58, DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS WRONG TO RETIRE THE B-58, NOT TO GO ON WITH PRODUCING THEM?

There are pros and cons in the B-58, particularly in the '60s. As I recall, the B-58 was relatively short range. Which meant that it would require much more aerial refueling. Which meant that it would require many more tankers, and people to maintain them and operate them. So there were budget limitations. On the other hand, it was the the only supersonic bomber that the Air Force had. And there were obvious advantages in having a supersonic, supersonic bomber at that time. So probably the limitation of the size of the B-58 force was based on a variety of considerations. Some of them economic, some of them military. On balance, as it turned out in the late '60s, when the B-58 force had been reduced to a very small number, I think two wings, ah, then it became a matter of internal SAC support for a different kind of a force. It ah, it required additional training, not only of air crew but of maintenance. It required a different logistic system. And the basic question at that time was whether maintaining such a small force relatively, could be afforded. And it was decided that it was time to phase out the B-58.

WAS THERE, DID THE AIR FORCE WANT MORE MISSILES THAN THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, ESSENTIALLY SECRETARY MCNAMARA WAS WILLING TO BUY IN THE EARLY 1960S AND WHY WAS THAT?

I think, I can't, I can't recall numbers. But I think it's fair to say that any reduction by the Secretary of Defense, the requirement for strategic missiles stated: (a) by SAC; (b) by the Air Force; and (c) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Any reduction would have been based to some extent on the emergence of the concept of mutual assured destruction. Or, in other words, finite deterrence. Minimum deterrence. Ah, mutual assured destruction is essentially a city-busting targeting concept. In other words it's an attack against urban areas, and the, the population of the country is, in effect, held hostage by the threat to attack principle cities. But the numbers of weapons required to hit large, soft targets, such as cities, is fairly small. And the accuracy of such weapons, need not be as great as the accuracy required to hit a smaller, harder target. So I think that any reduction in numbers of missiles, ah, would have been tied pretty much at that time, to the concept of mutual assured destruction.

WHAT ABOUT...

Or minimum deterrence.

WHAT ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE? WHAT WERE THEY BASED ON? HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THOSE REQUIREMENTS?

They were based on the...

SAY, "THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MISSILES BY THE AIR FORCE..."...

The Air Force requirement for missiles or any weapon was based, and it is based on an analysis of the job to be done. In other words, the target system against which those weapons will be used. So it's a complex problem of analyzing the enemy threat in terms of numbers and types of targets. Then it is another complicated process of applying weapons against those targets to achieve a given likelihood of knocking the target out. That is a, that is called a probability of kill. And guidance is received from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on what probability of kill to achieve. In other words, suppose there are one hundred air fields, enemy air fields that should be attacked, as a matter of high priority. If the Secretary of Defense determines that it would be sufficient to be able to knock out ninety percent, not all, but ninety percent of those air field, in this example ninety air fields, then that guidance is used to analyze those ninety targets, their size, their nature, their location, all the information available about those targets and then to apply the numbers of weapons against those targets to achieve a ninety percent probability of knocking them out.

YOU LEFT THE PENTAGON IN 1962, AND CAME BACK IN 1967, IS THAT CORRECT?

Yeah, that's... I came back in '65.

IN '65. WAS THERE, AND I DON'T KNOW IF YOU'RE AT LIBERTY TO TALK ABOUT THIS, BUT WAS THERE A CHANGE IN THE TARGETING PLANS BETWEEN THOSE TWO YEARS? WAS THERE A DIFFERENT SIOP IN 1965 THAN THERE WAS IN 1962, 1963? OR DIFFERENT GUIDANCES THAT REFLECTED THE SHIFT OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION ON THE PART OF THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS?

I can't really give you a good answer to that question because I wasn't associated with the SIOP through that entire period, that is, directly. My recollection is that the argument between counter force and counter value, meaning city busting, so to speak, was going on and to a degree is still going on. But as far as the targeting is concerned, it was generally recognized officially that enemy forces had to be attacked. And they were included in the targeting work. And targeting, bear in mind, strategic targeting is a twenty four hour a day, seven day a week process.

COULD YOU TELL ME FINALLY A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THIS ARGUMENT, YOU'RE SAYING BETWEEN COUNTERFORCE AND CITY BUSTING, AND TELL ME ABOUT HOW IT WAS IN THE 1960S WHEN YOU WERE AT THE PENTAGON. WAS THERE SUCH AN ARGUMENT GOING ON?

Oh yes, definitely. I think that ah, the ah, the argument between those who advocate counter force and those who advocate mutual assured destruction, meaning attacks against a relatively small number of cities for a maximum population kill, ah, was going on then and was still going on. The ah, the ironic part about the mutual assured destruction concept to me is that it's completely against normal American values. Namely, the deliberate attack against unarmed, defenseless civilians in terms of millions and millions of people. I don't think it's on, and I don't think that the mutual assured destruction concept ah, would ever really gain support by the majority of the American people if it were brought out in those terms. But it does limit the size of the defense budget, and the numbers of weapons and the numbers of bombs required to do the job or missiles.

BUT BEFORE THAT CAME INTO BEING TO YOUR RECOLLECTION, THE AIR FORCE HAD ESSENTIALLY ALWAYS HAD A COUNTERFORCE PLAN, MOST OF THE TARGETS AT THE AIR FORCE WAS TO ATTACK OR COUNTERFORCE, EVEN IN THE EARLY 1960S?

My recollection is that the Air Force always had a counter force concept as a matter of priority, but, tempered by the numbers and types of strategic weapons available. For example, if in the early '50s, near the beginning of the nuclear era, if the weapon to be used had a limited destructive force or a limited accuracy, it would dictate the kind of a target selected. But the idea of neutralizing the enemies' military capability has, to my knowledge always been inherent in the Air Force approach to strategic targeting.

SO THOSE PEOPLE WHO SAY THAT THE AIR FORCE HAD A CITY BUSTING STRATEGY IN THE LATE 1950S KNOWN AS MASSIVE RETALIATION DID NOT REALLY KNOW WHAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT? WASN'T THIS THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME? MASSIVE RETALIATION?

Massive retaliation doesn't necessarily mean not hitting military targets. Ah, it would also by the nature of military installations, include ah, unprecedented damage to some cities. No question. So there's a grey area of definition. And it would depend upon where the military targets are located.

DO YOU RECALL THE 1962 ANN ARBOR SPEECH BY DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA?

Ah, yes, to some extent, yes.

AH, HE SPOKE AT THAT TIME ABOUT CITY AVOIDANCE. HE SAID THAT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE TO WITHHOLD STRIKES AGAINST CITIES. THAT'S, IS, DO YOU REMEMBER HAVING A REACTION TO THAT? OR...

Yes. I, I was glad to hear that.

DO YOU MAKE A WHOLE STATEMENT TELLING ME ABOUT HOW YOU FELT ABOUT THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH?

Well, as I recall, Secretary McNamara's remarks at Ann Arbor, ah, and particularly in the ah, in the context of avoiding direct attacks against enemy cities, for the sake of attacking enemy cities, I was in favor of that concept because if effect, it reflected the counter force concept, which I did favor and do favor.