GENERAL, YOU PIONEERED THE WORK ON THE ABM SYSTEM. WHAT DID THAT ENTAIL?

Well, this involved building a missile that would shoot down another missile. Everyone said it was impossible. Like, ah, well, the expression generally used was 'you can't hit a bullet with a bullet.' However, I felt we needed to do something. The Air Force was starting an intercontinental missile. Russia would soon be doing the same. So I felt we needed to start a defense against it. And ah, but as I say I had some opposition but the ordinates finally responded to my suggestion that they employ or contract with Bell Telephone Labs to study the problem. And from that initial study gradually evolved the ABM project. In other words we did find there was a pros, there was prospect of having a official defense with another missile. And that was the ABM project. However, ah, well, I'd left the army by that time and retired. But the thinking was that we should control defense. In other words, we agreed with Russia that we'd control the number of ABMs on each side. Well, if that wasn't bad enough, but then after the agreement was signed Russia continued with building an ABM project around Moscow, and then later started a big radar system, which expanded defense, and I believed it was ah, in violation of the treaty. When we decided to abandon the one project we had for an ABM which was around a missile site. Now I could never understand that line of thinking. The argument seemed to go that if we build a defense that would make Russia think that we were about to have a first strike. In other words, that we could safely deliver an atom, a nuclear attack and then defend against retaliation. But ah, I don't agree with that theory, because I believe that for every weapon if you look at it historically we've always been able to downgrade that weapon in time by having a defense against it. That... that that...that's what I mean a perfect defense. But warfare is really ah, a contest between what you can do aggressively or offensively and what the defense against your particular offense might turn out to be. And it's part of the problem of deterrence. In other words, I think the reason that we have had, well, let's see now, better than 40 years of peace, is because of the deter... deterrence of nuclear weapons. No one in their right mind is going to start a war with nuclear weapons unless they can think they can get away with it with a quick easy victory. In other words, not have response. And as long as Russia thinks that we're, that we will strike back and have the capability to strike back, I doubt if we'd have a war with the USSR. However, ah, going into the business of first strikes, Russia is now building weapons, warheads that ah in time they will have enough of them that can endanger our retaliation. Because they can strike at our missile sites and they're not high enough...the warheads that they are now putting on some of their missiles. In addition they're going in for a deep defense. In other words, they have civil defense and they have ah, they're working on various forms of defense called Star Wars if you want to. And yet they've tried to stop us from going into it mainly by convincing our public that we shouldn't have it. And of course there are some of our so-called intelligentsia that think that's right. We shouldn't have a defense. It's too costly, and we never can make it perfect. We don't need to make it perfect. In other words, if we can get a defense that's 60 to 80 percent effective, it will give the Kremlin a lot to think about if they're considering a first strike. In other words they not only have to worry about how many missiles they can knock out, but also how many of theirs we will knock out in the defense. Now that is like a stud poker. In other words, defense is your whole card, that's the part they... they can't evaluate, in fact, we can't be too sure either. But at least it's one more factor that an aggressor would have to evaluate before they would ever think it's safe to launch a first strike. So that is what I'm, ah, my line of argument as to why we should have a... a defense. And I'm very pleased that our preside... President Reagan finally came up with the idea of a strategic defense initiative. Now I don't think anyone at this time can say how effective it will be in time. But we need to work on it with the hopes that we can make a reasonably effective defense as another major part of our deterrence program to keep Russia in hand. And ah, so I hope that the public will support SDI and to my mind there's not Star Wars, that's just a name given to it because they think, the media thinks that probably is more objectionable to the public than just saying it's a defense.

CAN YOU MAKE THE STATEMENTS YOU JUST MADE SEPARATELY, SO THEY CAN BE USEFUL FOR ME, AND THEY'LL BE IN RESPONSE TO SOME OF MY QUESTIONS. YOU PIONEERED THE WORK ON ABM AND WHAT DID THAT ENTAIL?

Well, I... I... I...a defense entails the ability for one missile to strike another missile. In other words, to knock it down. Many people say that's impossible, and they use the term which is more understandable, "you can't hit a bullet with a bullet." And that is a very reasonable assumption. At least it was back in 1952. However, as time goes on you can improve your... ah, your possibilities, and back in '52, I thought it advisable to start studying the problem in spite of all the people who said it can't be done. And I encouraged the ah, Army ordinates to contract with Bell Telephone Labs to study the problem. And from that study eventually evolved the ABM project. In other words, a anti-ballistic missile defense.

TERRIFIC. THEN AFTER ABM PROVED, AT LEAST TECHNICALLY SUCCESSFUL, YOU COULD HAVE AN EXPLOSION, WHICH WOULD DESTROY AN INCOMING MISSILE, IT WAS CANCELLED. WHO CANCELLED THIS ABM SYSTEM?

I don't know for sure who cancelled it, but I give credit to it to what I call the intelligentsia in our government who have ah, theoretical thoughts about war and I don't believe they ah, really know the psychology of war and the will to fight and what's involved and that type of thing. And I think the best demonstration of that is that the people who conducted — the civilian chiefs who conducted the Vietnam War, I'm sure will not go down in history as great strategists.

I'D LIKE TO HEAR THAT AGAIN FROM YOU WITHOUT THE REFERENCE TO VIETNAM. AND YOU MENTIONED TO ME BEFORE SOMETHING THAT THEY WERE WORRIED ABOUT NUMBERS... THE STATEMENT I'M LOOKING FOR IS... THE INTELLIGENTSIA CANCELLED IT BECAUSE THEY WERE ONLY THINKING ABOUT NUMBERS AND YOU CAN'T THINK ABOUT A WAR LIKE THAT.

Well, it was cancelled, I believe, by the intelligentsia, who think more in line of numbers and costs rather than the psychology of war and the will to fight. In other words, I don't think they are really good at studying their past history of what wins war, what ah, loses war, and why will people fight on one issue and not on another. And it's that type of thing involved in... in this besides just numbers and costs.

GOOD. DO YOU THINK THEY SHOULD HAVE CANCELLED THE ABM SYSTEM?

Definitely not. They should have continued to work on it. Because no one knows at the beginning of a project just how successful it will be, and what new discoveries will come up. For example, in the ABM you needed a nuclear warhead because you couldn't insure an actual hit, as one missile actually hitting another. Ah, I didn't think that was possible either, but today you can do it. With laser... laser guidance the army has hit a missile launched from California with a defense on the island of Kwajalein, actually physically hit it. In other words, you didn't — you wouldn't need an explosive warhead. Now that doesn't say you won't use nuclear weapons on — as part of the defense, but the accuracy of missiles, with new types of guidance and computer systems, with the strides we have made in computers have changed the whole prospect of what you might do in the line of defense. They should not have cancelled the ABM in my opinion. I think it was a mistake and they should never have agreed to ah, control the ah, number of ah... of ABM... ah... I think I've used the term IBM before. They should never have cancelled the ABM. And ah, they should never have ah, signed the agreement to limit the amount of ah, defense we would have. But the two together to my mind is a terrible mistake. As to neglect defense... defense and rely on an exchange...a deterrent, to where say Russia threatens to bomb New York City our only defense at present would be to say, well we will hit Moscow, and that would set off a... a thermonuclear exchange, and that to my mind is not satisfactory to anyone. In other words, we need to deter war, and part of the deterrence should be a defensive system. Ah, offense is probably the main feature. But if you have a defense that throws one more factor for Russia to appraise, the Kremlin to appraise on any decision on whether or not they could get away with a first strike to where they would not have a severe retaliatory attack from us. Now as long as they know they will ah, receive a severe attack in return, I doubt if Russia would ever start a thermonuclear war.

THEY ARGUE — ONE OF THE REASONS YOU MENTION THAT THE INTELLIGENTSIA HAD CANCELLED OR AGREED TO TRADE OFF THE ABM SYSTEM WAS BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD CREATE THE FEAR IN THE RUSSIANS OF A FIRST STRIKE. COULD YOU REPEAT THIS STATEMENT FOR ME AND TELL ME WHY? WHY WOULD AN ABM SYSTEM, A DEFENSE SYSTEM CREATE THE FEAR OF A FIRST STRIKE IN THE RUSSIANS?

Ah, the statement that that might create that fear in the Russians that we would — we were planning a first strike is certainly giving a lot of credit to the ABM. In other words, the Russians had an ABM at that time, I think about equally effective. We both knew it would not ah, not stop enough of the thermonuclear weapons to where it would really be effective so I don't see ah, and also the same people now detract ah, from the possibility of creating a defense. Yet if you can't create a defense that people believe in well it's not going to bother Russia for a first — in thinking we're having a first strike. A defense to my mind never threatens anyone unless they have aggressive atten... intentions. So why...why should we worry about Russia worrying about our defense? Let's make it as good as we can and if that is an added deterrent, which it will be, why that's so much in favor of another forty years of deterrence.

WHAT ABOUT THE — HOW WOULD- WHAT ARE THE MECHANICS OF A DEFENSE BECOMING A FIRST STRIKE THING?

Well, in...ah, in regard to a... a defense tied in with an offense and a first strike, I doubt, seriously doubt if the United States ever would tolerate any thinking of a first strike against the USSR. We had a little of that right after the war, in the so-called 'preventive war' concept, promoted by one or two Air Force generals which I disagreed with very heartily. Ah, we are not made up of people who I think would tolerate the idea of a first strike. However, I don't give Russia the same credit. In other words, I think Russia would, if they felt they could get away with a first strike, even if there was going to be a serious retaliation, as some of their generals say, we can, we suffered 20 million casualties in World War II and came back to win. To where they are more apt to think in lines of a first strike. That is what we should be thinking about. Their possibilities of a first strike, not ah, our own.

MCNAMARA ARGUED AND AGAIN WE DISCUSSED THIS AND I DON'T NEED YOU TO REFUTE THE ARGUMENT DIRECTLY, BUT HE — ONE OF HIS ARGUMENTS WAS THAT YOU COULDN'T HAVE A PERFECT DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND I BELIEVE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO ANSWER THIS DIRECTLY ACTUALLY. WE COULDN'T HAVE A PERFECT DEFENSE SYSTEM. WE COULD ONLY HAVE A DEFENSE THAT WOULD GUARANTEE THAT IN THE CASE OF WAR 60 MILLION AMERICANS WOULD DIE. THIRTY PERCENT 70 PERCENT SURVIVING OF THE POPULATION. AND HE SAID THAT HE COULDN'T SEE ANY WAY IN WHICH WE SHOULD SPEND MONEY TO DO THIS. HOW WOULD YOU, YOU KNOW, DO WE NEED A PERFECT DEFENSE? IS THAT...

I doubt if... rather, put it this way. I do not believe we need a perfect defense in setting up a defensive system against thermonuclear weapons. I would hope we could achieve 60 to 80 percent effectiveness, You never could achieve a 100 percent effectiveness on a defense in my mind, so we shouldn't plan on it, we shouldn't count on it, and ah, if we get it we're lucky, but I doubt if we ever would.

DO YOU THINK THAT WE SHOULD SPEND — DO YOU THINK THAT IN I960... IN 1960 WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AHEAD AND SPENT THE NECESSARY MONEY TO SAVE 30 PERCENT OF... 70 PERCENT OF THE US POPULATION IN CASE A NUCLEAR WAR BROKE OUT?

I think we should have continued working on defense from the very start, and we should never at any time have lessened our emphasis on it. Now that doesn't mean spending billions and billions of dollars every year. It means spending the number of billions that you can spend effectively. In other words, as you get a new discovery, for example, laser came in since the initial decision on the ABM. And a method of guidance. And computers have improved. And all these things make it more possible to get a better defense. So we, it's a... there's nothing static about warfare. You have to keep on trying to improve your methods of offense and defense. The too much of one to the detriment of the other is wrong.

WHAT IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE?

Well, defense ah, as a deterrent means it lessens the effectiveness of a Russian attack. In other words, they have, if you have no defense they know there's nothing to stop their missiles from reaching the objective except malfunction of the missile itself. So if they need ah, say four missiles to get one effective or four to get two effective, if you add defense why it means there just have to be that many more missiles to try and overcome the defense. And it's also ah, ah, they can test their own missiles to where they can have a pretty good idea of what the effectiveness might be, in other words, their accuracy, how many they need for a particular target. But if you add the factor of a defense that just gives one more variable that they have to estimate and they do not have all the facts on it. So that it, it is, it does add a deterrent.

WHAT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ONLY THING THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO IS ADD MORE MISSILES, AND THEN YOU WOULD KEEP ADDING MORE MISSILES ON THE OTHER SIDE, SO ALL THEY WOULD HAVE IS AN ARMS RACE. MORE DEFENSIVE MISSILES, MORE OFFENSIVE MISSILES.

That's always the argument that ah, but what I would hope is that if you had a defense both sides might realize that first strikes flew out the window, and that then there might be more inducement to have ah, what I consider the real control of ah, of weapons, is to start reducing them. See so far all we've done is agreed with Russian plans for the future to where they won't build anymore of what they presently plan. But then when they need some more well they go right ahead, just what's happening today. They're only supposed to be ah, working on one extra new missile. There are at least two. And they also are producing missiles now that ah, they're trying to put them in production in numbers that ah, can knock out our hardened missile sites. So they are striving for a first strike capability. And that is one thing we must, can only match them in two ways. One is by defense, the other is by ah, bigger and better missiles on our part. Now you can continue this forever. There's no one thing that says well, this is the exact cause of why they want to have more missiles and why we should have more missiles. The thing we should be looking at now is how do we both agree to reduce missiles and to my mind, a defense would make it safer to reduce missiles than no defense. And if you ever got the ultimate, which is zero missiles, which I think they're, we've probably never will get to, well then you'd have to worry about the Khadafy's ah, the madmen, you know, that might secretly build five or six missiles and launch them on New York City. And the other thing you would have to worry about then is how do you increase your conventional forces so that Russia ah, can't sweep through Europe with a conventional attack. So there's no., there's no real peace until you get a meeting... meeting of the minds that we're going to live on this planet together without constantly striving to ah, take over the whole business, which is the announced Russian intention, in other words, to communize the whole world. And to mind we have to stop them.

GOOD. I'D LIKE YOU TO GO AGAIN AND TELL ME DID YOU FEEL VERY STRONGLY IN THE 1960s, IN 1967, DID YOU FEEL REALLY STRONGLY ABOUT THE CANCELLATION OR REDUCTION AND LIMITATIONS ON ABM?

Now... in regard to my feelings in the 1960s I think everyone should keep in mind that I was off then working on conventional pop, thermonuclear, or rather nuclear power, and I was busy trying to ah, help people develop safe plants and get them into power production. And I listened to what was going on with ah, considerable unhappiness, but I was in no position to do much about it.

UNDERSTOOD, BUT YOU WERE ASKED AS A PERSON WHO ORIGINATED AND WHO GOT THE FIRST ORDINATES GOING AND WHO TOOK THE FIRST $50,000 TO BELL TELEPHONE LABS FOR THE SYSTEM IT MUST HAVE MEANT A LOT TO YOU WHEN THEY CANCELLED IT IN THE 1960S.

It did mean a lot to me, in other words, the ABM system meant a lot to me and I wanted to see it continued. But I was in no position to ah, really be effective.

WELL, WHY DID IT MEAN SO MUCH? TELL ME, YOU KNOW, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO BE EFFECTIVE. BUT WHAT I THINK IS INTERESTING IS THAT YOU SAW ITS BEGINNING AND YOU WERE THE ONE WHO STARTED IT AND YOU SAW IT ENDING, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A STATEMENT LIKE YOU BEGAN THAT STATEMENT AND THEN TELLING ME WHY YOU WERE SO UPSET THAT THEY HAD NOT CONTINUED DOING IT.

Well, when I saw the cancellation of the ABM, I was very unhappy about it but was not in a position to do anything about it effectively. But the, I had strong feelings, because I have thought about this problem since, from about '42, 1942. In other words, when we started working on the ah, atomic bomb, not the nuclear bomb, the atomic bomb, that was the name of it then, why I realized as many of the others did, that we were introducing into warfare something that was going to be new and destructive and beyond anything that we'd ever conceived of before. And it was going to change the warfare. And when we delivered the first strike on Hiroshima, my hopes and the same hopes, same... as many other people, like Arthur Compton had the same hope that it would prevent war in the future. In other words, I had always had the hope from the time of Hiroshima on that that would be the last, well, Nagasaki, but I mean the... the end of the war, but that would be the last time you'd ever have to use them. But you had to be ready to use them at the drop of a hat if... to stop aggression and I would hope stop all wars, big and little. Now we have been successful in avoiding a confrontation between Russia and the US, but we have not been successful in deterring small wars.

LET'S SEE, WHAT... WE'RE GOING... AS I TOLD YOU WE'RE GOING FROM THE...TO THE...

I don't know that they call it that today.

OH, THE NIKE X, YEAH. THE SECOND SYSTEM IS CALLED THE NIKE X. NOW YOU WANTED, YOU YOURSELF WENT FROM WORKING ON BOMBER DEFENSE TO WORKING ON MISSILE DEFENSE. HOW DID THAT DECISION HAPPEN? HOW DID YOU GO FROM ONE TO THE OTHER?

Well, ah, initially ah, because the only way Russia could strike us is by bringing one hidden in with a ship, ah, hidden in a ship into New York harbor, something like that, or by air. See that was the period all through the ah, '50s, before intercontinental missiles became effective, where we went after a defense, a strong defense during that period. We built a dew line, we ah, went, I moved over to guided missiles primarily because ah, people asked me to and the idea of getting a defense against a possible Russian attack. In other words we wanted defensive missiles to strike down bombers by missiles air to air, and the Nike was a big ground to air missile. We put in a very effective and... and extended system of Nike to defend against ah, Russian bombers. It finally would have had to be one way bombers, but we felt there are plenty of Russians to fly that type of mission. But we were strong on defense at that time. So I... I had never understood the sudden change to where defense is no longer important.

WAS THAT BECAUSE OF THE MISSILE?

Ah, it's because of the so-called intelligentsias concept.

AND WHAT IS THAT CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENTSIA?

The concept would be that ah...

THE INTELLIGENTSIA. IF YOU CAN BEGIN THAT BY SAYING, "THE INTELLIGENTSIA..."

The intelligentsia thought that it would be better to have no defense, because that, a defense might make Russia think we were planning a first attack, a first strike, and that would destroy their confidence, Russian confidence that they could ah, execute what did they call it? Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD, I think the term is very appropriate.

THAT'S A GOOD ANSWER. SO WHAT DID IT MEAN BUILDING A DEFENSE IN THE MISSILE AGE?

That meant that we would have to develop a missile that could knock down another missile. And in 1952 when that was first proposed, why everyone said, it's impossible. They used the term, you can't hit a bullet with a bullet. Well, I didn't know whether you could or you couldn't, but I felt that we should study the problem. And so I urged the Ordnance Department, they were responsible in the army for missile development and all ordinates to have... to sign a contract with Bell Telephone Labs to study the problem. And from that initial study it gradually developed that there was, there were prospects for knocking down a missile with another missile. And you finally developed the ABM Project. And that ah, unfortunately was ah, ah, hindered by the so-called intelligentsia who agreed with Russia as a part of control to have only I believe one system for each country. Ours was to defend a missile site. Ah, Russia selected to defend Moscow. I suppose we couldn't do that because politically that's difficult for a government to say well, we're defending our self but not the rest of the country. But to make matters worse, after the agreement, we then cancelled our effort to defend a missile site and as a result why ah, work on defense was interrupted and to my mind that is wrong. It was a terrific mistake. You should continue to find a defense. Now ah, the initial defense there we thought we needed to use nuclear weapons or atomic warheads, ah, because you couldn't hit a missile, but if you got a big enough explosion you could knock it down. That of course is a questionable use, particularly over your own land. But ah, if we had kept going, we did to a certain extent but not to ah, you might say, I always say, use the optimal amount of money depending upon the state of the art. Well, later it came along, we improved guidance. As computers improved you could do the calculations faster. So actually we did achieve in one test flight to where we launched a missile from California with a defense set up on Kwajalein Island where a missile actually struck another missile. In other words, we hit the missile with ah, with a solid material, which would be enough to destroy it at the speed it's going. You didn't need a warhead. Now that doesn't necessarily mean you wouldn't use warheads because ah, you might have near misses which you would achieve with a warhead. But the state of the art of the military is never static. You constantly have to work at it. And ah, whenever a new weapon is introduced you should do as I've sponsored and worked on, introduce a defense. And in time and in most cases the defense gets good enough to where it will blunt the effect of a new missile. Just look back on the history of gas. Terrific ah, effect the first time it was used, but eventually why you get enough ah, defense to where you ah, discourage the use to where people agree not to use it. The same way, the first tanks were very powerful. But then you soon find a bazooka to knock one out. Later it takes more, but you have to constantly keep at this thing. And to stop development on any type of offense or defense in my mind is wrong, as long as you have ah, countries in the world that threaten your existence.

TERRIFIC. WOULD YOU LIKE TO ADD ANYTHING?

Well, let's see. No, I think I've given most of the arguments. Of course ah, ah, the other strong factor is the psychology to the people. And that's going on in peacetime. That's a whole different aspect. See Russia's waging psychological warfare on us right now, just by Gorbachev's speeches. He doesn't mean what he's talking about. He knows that ah, he knows that ah, our Congress has people that supp... support the views he's expounding. So he... he's expounds them. It's psychological warfare.

AND YOU THINK THAT DEFENSE PLAYS A ROLE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE?

Well, he's trying to ah, why is he so darn anxious to kill ah, SDI? Figure that one out.