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VIETNAM SR 447 Richard Moose CH Turn. Mark it. Forty seven. Clapsticks. I'm ready. Okay. We ah went out to Vietnam sixty days after the cease fire to assess, . I suppose, I suppose the Russians were doing the same thing from their side, but I suspect that it was not on such a massive scale as this. We tried to put a dollar figure on this. The report that we wrote in April or May of 1969 we ah we called the ah we called the figure... No, I'm sorry. Wrong, , at the time when Nixon's Vietnamization Program had been ah a few months in operation and things seemed to be going well and and Vietnam was out of the news, and... We went out for the Committee and we came back and I think the Committee really wanted us despite its record

. So I said I'd like to have a list of these hamlets, and where they were. I'd like to visit them. It took months for the Vietnamese to give me those lists. They were very reluctant. And finally I said, "Look, I'm not going to sign the papers unless you give me the lists." When I got the lists, the combination of security and nation building. And these things, this was... Out of film? VIETNAM Richard Holbrooke/mc SR# 2 (?) Tape 5, Side 2 Americanization program 9-16-82. End of 772, sound 2723 USADP reference. (BEEP) Well, the... I'm sorry, I wasn't ready. The villagers knew

. Ok. Kissinger came increasingly under fire, in the first negotiations of SALT II, in Nixon's second term. What was the fear about his handling of those negotiations, . Was there a sense of distrust that because of Watergate and President Nixon's decreasing, what's the word for it, credibility, that they would be willing to give more concessions to the Soviet Union in order to get some positive accomplishments? There, there was a point when, uh, Nixon was enmeshed in Watergate, when we feared that there would be a desperate effort to conclude an agreement in order to substitute, uh, one set of headlines for another recurring set of headlines. Uh, and that our national security was being put at risk in order

about it. Could you say, Prince Sihanouk. I’m sorry. Well, I believe that Prince Sihanouk knew about it... Sorry, it—the bombings. Uh, I’m sorry. Apropos of the bombing, I think that Prince, , I'm sorry, yes, you're not, you’re not speaking! Heheh. Before the incursion and after the coup, I actually observed from a distance what was going on. I was called in by the government and asked for help. There also

strategic buildup, because he could see the trends, and where the Soviets would eventually arrive if those trends were permitted to continue unencumbered. When the SALT I agreement was concluded, the, uh, the argument for it from Mel Laird and Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and others, was that it had, . I'm going to ask you to just make one more concise statement saying that the Nixon-Kissinger theory was wrong, and why. Senator Jackson thought, negotiator had to be, uh, selected. Uh Scoop was under no illusions about who had, uh, who was responsible for the unbalanced, as he saw it, SALT I agreement. It wasn't the negotiators, and it wasn't officials of the arms-control agency, it was Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon. And he was never under any