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after he had refused to accept the draft brought about by Dr. Kissinger at the end of 1972, but in practical terms Enhance Plus Program didn't represent as much in terms of military value to the South Vietnamese because it was, it was quite a kind of heterogeneous equipment brought from Iran, brought, . Can you describe what happened in March 1965 and how the Americans arrived without any consultation or prior knowledge of the South Vietnamese government? Phone rings in background. Take it off. Camera roll. Mark it. Slate 2. Take 1, ...July when another, when there was another big American buildup? Yes, in July 1965 I remember that ah, President Johnson by this time decided to send to South Vietnam more than 150,000 troops. I was at this time, ah, Special Assistant to Prime

. If Watergate had not occurred, I still believe that there would have been Congressional action to preclude the kind of military support which was necessary to help South Vietnam. Watergate may have had an impact, but there was still this tremendous anti-Vietnam war reaction that was reflected in the Congress, went down to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue and opposed the War Powers Resolution because it was impractical on the one hand and, I think, unconstitutional on the other. I still believe today that Congress ought to either repeal the War Powers Resolution or significantly, in August of 1974, I wrote the heads of state or the heads of government of all of our allies, including President Thieu of Vietnam. In the particular case of the letter to President Thieu, I reaffirmed US support for the South Vietnamese in a very general way, but I specifically indicated that I

the cease fire, we believed that the South Vietnamese had a bit the better of it in the final jockeying for position and that ah and that the outlook for them was ah was ah a hopeful one. However, we caveated it and we said in the end things will still seem to turn on the Americans, it by themselves they could do a lot? But, but in the end, in the end, they would need to count on the Americans. Uh, why couldn't they do it? Uh, the North had, had nothing like the resources at its disposition that we gave to the South. Uh, and I think the answers, as close as I can get, fire, we said we thought the South Vietnamese had a little bit the better of it, ah, in the positioning that had gone one but that ah in the long run, it was still going to depend on ah on on the Americans and ah that this is what the South Vietnamese believed. And, that if, if, if things went badly

of them, that while the enemy had shown that he could hit a number of South Vietnamese cities, hard, even after years of bombing, and...of search and destroy missions and all the rest of it, that he could still come out...that...that, that was terribly depressing uh, to me, at any rate. But the word came back from the embassy that, in fact, it had been a great victory for our side. The, the enemy had lost these assets, the South Vietnamese, . The cables flowed through from the military headquarters and from the Embassy in Saigon saying that we’re, we have survived, the South Vietnamese have survived, the enemy has suffered a terrible defeat, he made a great

and to eventually end their aggressive war against South Vietnam. The objective of the strategic offensive in the spring of 1968 was to create severe losses to the enemy in their very nerve centers. It can be stated that virtually all towns and cities under the enemy's control were attacked, realized that victory was close at hand. On April 30, 1975, when we climbed out of our bomb shelter we were met with one of the many contingents of our liberation forces and were glad that our job at the Joint Military Commission was now ended, ended with the liberation of Saigon and of all of South, For the Resistance fighters who went up North, what happened to their families which remained in the South under the Diem regime? The Geneva Agreements of 1954 recognized the complete liberation of one half of Vietnam, from the 17th parallel up north

VIETNAM PROJECT FINAL DAYS Col. Le Gro SR 454 This is the 13th of November, 1981 and we’re in the Presidio in San Francisco for the Vietnam Project for WGBH in Boston. I have been told the correct way to slate for this is the Vietnam Project TVP013. Elizabeth Deane producer, Final Days, . I really believe that the Secretary did the best possible job, but leaving large North Vietnamese regular formations in the South was a situation that the South could not contend with. They couldn't defeat those major formations, and those major formations had the capability, from the very beginning, furthermore denied the South Vietnamese, because they had no capability essentially, any means to counter North Vietnamese continued buildup in the North. In other words, the territory North of the Demilitarized Zone was sacrosanct. The United States agreed not to continue any military action against

, who made up the South Vietnamese opposition at the end of the Vietnam War? A certain number of people, some of whom were extremely sympathetic, extremely brilliant, honest, patriotic, yet who along with the rest, was that the Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam- given the position of Thieu's government- was bound to suffer progressive disintegration. Little by little, bit by bit, towards what it was difficult to predict. And in a corner lay, reaction, snowball, which would lead to rapid crumbling of the regime. It was an hypothesis that I always had in mind, because without going too far back into the history of South Vietnam, in 1972 there was a communist

the right and wrong of the US commitment in Vietnam for more than indicated between the '65 and til the end in '75. But, eh, I would like to stress the point of view of a Vietnamese who look at the problem and who happen to have ah participated here in Washington in many of the developments at this time. Let us put aside the problem of right and wrong of the US commitment in South Vietnam. But, from the point of view of the Vietnamese, we would say that we think the US in terms of a responsible great nation whether it was wrong or right, we hoped and we believe strongly by then that the United States would believe as a respectable nation. Suppose that you are wrong by this time, you cannot say after committing the more than half a million troops in South Vietnam and well, putting the whole house in shambles and say that well, we are wrong. Let us ah call it quits and you leave

SR 2040 Beep tone. Roll 40 of Vietnam Project, 7860 328. Interview with MAJ. GEN. TRAN DO Clapstick Could you tell us how you went South in 1965? When in 1965 did you join COSVN? And could you describe COSVN, what it was like, where it was located and how life was? As I have just told you, by 1964 the Americans already carried out an extremely fierce Special War in the South. The population in the South suffered heavy casualties as they themselves had to organize armed units in order to resist the American aggressors. In face of this situation, the Central Committee of our Party decided that it was necessary to give support to the people in the South and help them to organize their armed struggles against the Americans. To this end, it was necessary

definitely and distinctly on the defensive. That's it. Cut. Turning. Mark it. Slate nine. Clap sticks. The realization that the South Vietnamese forces... Excuse me. I think we better start... The realization that the South Vietnamese forces were not doing well in this particular area of South Vietnam concerned me particularly because, when I had been fighting with the 21st ARVN Division in the '67-68 time frame, one of the distinctive features I thought of the success of that division was that they were operating