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Agreement was signed, there was the decision to have the Communists withdraw to the north. That is to say, you go back to where you come from. Those people who wanted to have freedom should go to the south to live, below, that the Americans would not dare to carry the war to the North or to Communist China. So naturally they went on fighting and creating problems for the South. The American people, in the meantime, were quite opposed to the war, . What did this Agreement to Vietnam? We saw all kinds of disadvantages to South Vietnam. After the signing of the Agreement, the Communists continue to bring all kinds of weapons and ammunition into the South
Summary
General Tran Van Nhut discusses the effects of the Paris Peace Agreement, Watergate, and the withdrawal of American troops on South Vietnam. He describes the South’s continued efforts to thwart the North at the end of the War. Finally, he recounts the surrender of General Minh in 1975 and describes life under Communist rule in Vietnam.
Date Created
11/11/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / End of the Tunnel, The (1973 - 1975)
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after he had refused to accept the draft brought about by Dr. Kissinger at the end of 1972, but in practical terms Enhance Plus Program didn't represent as much in terms of military value to the South Vietnamese because it was, it was quite a kind of heterogeneous equipment brought from Iran, brought, . Can you describe what happened in March 1965 and how the Americans arrived without any consultation or prior knowledge of the South Vietnamese government? Phone rings in background. Take it off. Camera roll. Mark it. Slate 2. Take 1, ...July when another, when there was another big American buildup? Yes, in July 1965 I remember that ah, President Johnson by this time decided to send to South Vietnam more than 150,000 troops. I was at this time, ah, Special Assistant to Prime
Summary
South Vietnam’s Ambassador to the United States under President Nguyen Van Thieu, Bui Diem recounts the American arrival in March 1965, the troop build up the following July, and the impact this had on South Vietnam.
Date Created
06/03/1981
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Vietnam: A Television History / Vietnamizing the War (1968 - 1973)
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the cease fire, we believed that the South Vietnamese had a bit the better of it in the final jockeying for position and that ah and that the outlook for them was ah was ah a hopeful one. However, we caveated it and we said in the end things will still seem to turn on the Americans, it by themselves they could do a lot? But, but in the end, in the end, they would need to count on the Americans. Uh, why couldn't they do it? Uh, the North had, had nothing like the resources at its disposition that we gave to the South. Uh, and I think the answers, as close as I can get, fire, we said we thought the South Vietnamese had a little bit the better of it, ah, in the positioning that had gone one but that ah in the long run, it was still going to depend on ah on on the Americans and ah that this is what the South Vietnamese believed. And, that if, if, if things went badly
Summary
Richard Moose was on the staff of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1969 – 1975. He describes his mission in Vietnam after the ceasefire in 1974 to assess the situation of how the South Vietnamese were positioned in terms of military equipment provided by the Americans and the possibilities of South Vietnam’s survival... more
Date Created
10/23/1981
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Video, Transcript
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of them, that while the enemy had shown that he could hit a number of South Vietnamese cities, hard, even after years of bombing, and...of search and destroy missions and all the rest of it, that he could still come out...that...that, that was terribly depressing uh, to me, at any rate. But the word came back from the embassy that, in fact, it had been a great victory for our side. The, the enemy had lost these assets, the South Vietnamese, . The cables flowed through from the military headquarters and from the Embassy in Saigon saying that we’re, we have survived, the South Vietnamese have survived, the enemy has suffered a terrible defeat, he made a great
Summary
Harry McPherson served as Special Counsel to LBJ from 1965 to 1969 and was Johnson’s chief speechwriter from 1966 to 1969. McPherson begins the interview by recalling the conflicted mood at the White House following the Tet Offensive. The optimism found in military cables and official information clashed with televised images showing the nation that the war was resulting in massive loss of human life and that a prisoner could be shot at point-blank range... more
Date Created
04/23/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / Tet, 1968
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VIETNAM PROJECT FINAL DAYS Col. Le Gro SR 454 This is the 13th of November, 1981 and we’re in the Presidio in San Francisco for the Vietnam Project for WGBH in Boston. I have been told the correct way to slate for this is the Vietnam Project TVP013. Elizabeth Deane producer, Final Days, . I really believe that the Secretary did the best possible job, but leaving large North Vietnamese regular formations in the South was a situation that the South could not contend with. They couldn't defeat those major formations, and those major formations had the capability, from the very beginning, furthermore denied the South Vietnamese, because they had no capability essentially, any means to counter North Vietnamese continued buildup in the North. In other words, the territory North of the Demilitarized Zone was sacrosanct. The United States agreed not to continue any military action against
Summary
William E. Le Gro was a colonel in Vietnam and author of "Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation." Le Gro reports that he felt the Paris Peace Accord was doomed from the start, at least in terms of maintaining a cease fire, but that its purpose for the United States—to disengage the US from Vietnam and to ensure the return of American prisoners of war—was a success... more
Date Created
11/03/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / End of the Tunnel, The (1973 - 1975)
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the right and wrong of the US commitment in Vietnam for more than indicated between the '65 and til the end in '75. But, eh, I would like to stress the point of view of a Vietnamese who look at the problem and who happen to have ah participated here in Washington in many of the developments at this time. Let us put aside the problem of right and wrong of the US commitment in South Vietnam. But, from the point of view of the Vietnamese, we would say that we think the US in terms of a responsible great nation whether it was wrong or right, we hoped and we believe strongly by then that the United States would believe as a respectable nation. Suppose that you are wrong by this time, you cannot say after committing the more than half a million troops in South Vietnam and well, putting the whole house in shambles and say that well, we are wrong. Let us ah call it quits and you leave
Summary
Former South Vietnam ambassador to the United States, Bui Diem recalls the tension between South Vietnam and the United States post 1975. Bui Diem discusses President Nguyen Van Thieu’s growing isolation from the United States and the trouble Bui Diem experienced as he tried to improve the image of South Vietnam.
Date Created
10/23/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / End of the Tunnel, The (1973 - 1975)
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of Vietnam, South Vietnam would occur, probably by the end of 1965 or early 1966. Ah. We felt that the, the situation in Vietnam was so weak and the, the North Vietnamese exploitation of that weakness was such that they, the victory would have been to the enemy, unless we put substantial U.S. combat forces in to establish a screen behind which something could be built in South Vietnam. We Americans had brought about chaos by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem - I think the most stupid thing we did in Vietnam. But nonetheless, the fact was ah that we felt that if you put troops, do to the north what they were doing to our friends in the south, and ah, that the vehicle was the bombing. I always thought that the key to the war in Vietnam was in the villages of Vietnam, that to the degree to which the villagers took their own responsibility to protect themselves you would
Summary
William Colby was a high-ranking CIA officer during the Vietnam War. He would later direct the Agency. Here he recalls the CIA’s assessment of the Vietnam War in 1965 and the failure of the US to anticipate the Tet Offensive. He discusses the Phoenix Program, which he directed, describing its impact on the War. Finally, he recounts events surrounding the Fall of Saigon and the end of the War, and reflects on the success or failure of US strategy in Vietnam.
Date Created
07/16/1981
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to President Johnson and all of his advisors. We had been led to believe that uh the Viet Cong were pretty well uh defanged by that period, that uh the pacification program had worked very well, that, uh most of the villages in South Vietnam were secure, and that it was virtually impossible for the Viet Cong, and South Vietnamese troops, though uh, was certainly no surprise. Our military people felt that that uh, we would be able to cope with virtually any eventuality and this proved true in Tet. The Viet Cong casualties were immense. The territory lost to the uh, North Vietnamese, and the Viet Cong during Tet, . This was in '67. He made his trip and he came back. Clark Clifford, having been a very strong advocate of the war effort, made a trip to Vietnam, came back with reports indicating that the South Vietnamese leadership did not ever want the United
Summary
George Christian was the White House Press Secretary under President Johnson. Here he discusses the 1968 presidential election, specifically: Johnson’s decision not to run, the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and the transition to the Nixon administration. He also discusses Johnson’s plans for peace in Vietnam, his administration’s internal struggles around ending the war, and the Nixon campaign’s interference with the peace negotiations.
Date Created
04/30/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / Tet, 1968
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Vietnam T-879 Sound Roll 2638 George Ball Special reference tone minus 8 d.b. This is Vietnam T888, WGBH TV Boston. This is May 18, 1981. Sound roll 2638. This is presence only for sound rolls #2636 and #2637, 60 cycle reference tone, 7-1/2 ips. 24 frames per second monorecording. Okay. That's the end of presence. I'll start before you start rolling so you can just say stop. I wanted to start with the Kennedy period and ask you where Vietnam stood on ah...I'm sorry, I have to start again, . I want to jump now on to (clears throat) the period just after the Taylor-Rostow mission at the end of 1961. What was your own reaction to that mission? Taylor-Rostow Mission concluded its visit and came back with a series of reports
Summary
George W. Ball served in the State Department under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and later as Ambassador to the United Nations. He describes the early Johnson Administration as a period of “drift” when the US was becoming increasingly involved in Vietnam, a trend Ball opposed in numerous memos and meetings. Ball discusses his role as the voice of dissent within the Johnson administration, arguing that they learn from mistakes previously committed by the French in Vietnam... more
Date Created
05/18/1981
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themselves were having terrific morale problems too. Ah. Terrific by their own standards. Ah. Nothing to equal the morale problems that finally beset the South Vietnamese. But, they were having morale problems. In part because ah the South ah the cease-fire had been presented to them as the end of the war, terrific casualties from this war. Every year from 1965 up to the end of the war itself at the very least sixty thousand to a hundred thousand North Vietnamese boys had been sent down that trail system through Laos into South Vietnam and never come back. Ah. Every year. So, they had, ... Beep. Beep. Beep. End of Snd. Roll 2420. Frank Snepp Vietnam TVPO13 Snd Roll #2421 Frank Snepp Can we talk again about was there anyone in the South Vietnamese government who really didn't believe that the American stories
Summary
Frank Snepp was the former chief analyst of North Vietnamese strategy for the CIA in Saigon. Snepp recalls the decision of the American forces to pull out of Vietnam. He discusses that Nguyen Van Thieu’s cousin, Hoang Duc Nha was the sole member of the South Vietnamese government who did not believe that the Americans would continue to send support and tried to warn Nguyen Van Thieu not to rely on the Americans... more
Date Created
10/14/1981
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Video, Transcript
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Vietnam: A Television History / End of the Tunnel (1973 - 1975)