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. This was to go until Dien Bien Phu, until the end. Cut. Take 4, . I often forget that there were two Chinese generalissimos at that time, General Chaing Kai Shek to be sure, and the other Lu Han in the south of China. Lu Han, this was still 17th, . End Side 2 VIETNAM T 876 (SYNC) Side 1 #2810 Take 8. Camera Roll What was your

Vietnam T-879 Sound Roll 2638 George Ball Special reference tone minus 8 d.b. This is Vietnam T888, WGBH TV Boston. This is May 18, 1981. Sound roll 2638. This is presence only for sound rolls #2636 and #2637, 60 cycle reference tone, 7-1/2 ips. 24 frames per second monorecording. Okay. That's the end of presence. I'll start before you start rolling so you can just say stop. I wanted to start with the Kennedy period and ask you where Vietnam stood on ah...I'm sorry, I have to start again, . I want to jump now on to (clears throat) the period just after the Taylor-Rostow mission at the end of 1961. What was your own reaction to that mission? Taylor-Rostow Mission concluded its visit and came back with a series of reports

regime not only did not implement the clauses of the agreement but also carried out repression against families who had members who regrouped to the north. The relatives of these people in the south were, Agreement allowed us to remain in the south. But after that we had to go underground; that is to say, to live in tunnels. But in spite of the repression, the population really loved the cadres and took care of them, Nam, Danang, Hue and other areas in the South. In prisons, the tortures were more barbaric than in any previous period. As far as Quang Nam was concerned, let me tell you a typical situation. Women who were faithful to their husbands

started this struggle in this area at the beginning of 1960. But by mid 1960 and by the end of 1960 people all over the South did likewise. This is to say, political struggles in coordination with military struggles in a general offensive against the enemy. Later on, when, the end of 1960 that other provinces followed suit. It was only later on, when the movement became widespread, that we began to be in frequent contact with our superiors. By that time there was now a general uprising in all of the south. As I found out, in the West the strongest movement was in Tay Ninh, the province of Ben Tre and a number of local areas elsewhere. But the movement there was not as strong as ours. But from the middle of the year to the end of the year the movement became widespread in all of the South.

activities, I think what you, friend, would like to refer to here is a trick by Nhu to scare the United States. But this was the wrong move on their part. Servants can never out finesse their masters. Therefore in the end, was your view of the situation in the South after Diem's assassination? And the background of the so-called Tonkin Gulf Incident? Let me talk mainly about this Tonkin Gulf, , to connect the North and the South. Naturally the United States used every means at her disposal to block this trail. But all to no avail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail developed day by day and became a system of roads over which

for 1975 and 1976 for the complete liberation of the South were then decided on. There was a contingency plan which stated that if the opportunity permitted either at the beginning or at the end of 1975, the liberation of the South should take place at once in that year. Therefore, the plans for the General Offensive and Uprisings which led to the victory in 1975 were decided on in these historical meetings, of the battlefront in the South into two halves. The second military campaign was the campaign to destroy the enemy in Hue and Da Nang, which was their I Corps area. The coordination of the Central Highland Campaign

Clapstick Now your mission in the South in the end of 1963, after the downfall of Diem. During the last months of 1963 we had the shooting of Diem and the assassination, the Command of the Campaign was headed by General Vo Nguyen Giap who made the decision to put an end to this attack based on the human wave tactic. The entire plan was changed. The attack was stopped and all the heavy artillery pieces were pulled back to a distance. Then strong, put a temporary end to the war and created the bases for future gains. At that time we were also happy because our troops did not have to fight in the war anymore and the situation was poised for a period of political struggle. But looking back, I should frankly admit that we

good. That's not... End of SR #6F. VIETNAM TVP 002 AMBASSADOR ALEXIS JOHNSON SR #7F ch This is Sound Roll #7F, WGBH, TVP 002 Vietnam, eventually it was agreed that Foster would meet Mendès France in Paris ah and they would discuss the situation there. I ah accompanied...this was shortly before the end of the conference...I accompanied Mendès France to Paris and we had some thirty-six hours of very, very intense, intense meetings, between the North and the South. It started with the ah Viet Minh insisting that it be drawn just north of Saigon and ah with the French insisting it be drawn just north, south of Hanoi and the ah final final agreement was that it would be brought, drawn at the ah 17th parallel, which very importantly

that was trying to overthrow them and set up a new political system. In Vietnam, the officials in South Vietnam were either foreign — meaning French — or were appointed Vietnamese, so that the association and image that they gave to the people was not of being their own officials, . End Part One

. It’s...I was relatively optimistic about the state of the war towards the end of ’67, uh, but I should frame that, uh, response by telling you the position I took in April of ’67. That was when Westmoreland came back and asked for additional troops, uh, something like a quarter of a million, , and by decisively, I don’t mean heavier bombing, I mean that we should go into North Vietnam as far north as Vinh and when the weather’s right, on to the Ho Chi Minh Trails with US forces, and force an ending of the war on the ground.” And that was the view that I held, and, uh, because I, intermediate strategy. And at the end of ’67, I was optimistic for these reasons: First, there was no doubt at all there had been military progress since we came in mid ’65; there had been extraordinary political progress, and economic progress, including a turnaround in agricultural policy, where they finally