What would be Pakistan's response if India went nuclear?

Our response would be to follow suit. And we made that clear to India and I made it clear to the world. But the government hasn't. There's a [scholar]. But if India goes nuclear, we will go nuclear. And we know that if we go nuclear India will go nuclear. The two countries -- we are the protagonists of South Asia. We'll actually cross the threshold together or not cross it at all. If they go nuclear we will too.

What would be the consequences of that?

The consequences would be awful... awful in that both the countries will then get involved in a nuclear weapons race. With weapons it's not a case of making two bombs and saying, "Look" and wave the bomb, brandish a bomb. You get caught in a tide, or a movement if technology -- you've got to have delivery systems. You've got to perfect the bomb, put it on a plane. You have to have surveillance. You have to have space engineering, program, infrastructure, first-strike capability. It's -- you got to go on and on and on. You can't just make two bombs, then stop. And both countries will be caught in this nuclear rush. And by the end of the century we will have a kind of South Asian MAD. And we'll say both are nuclear powers able to destroy each other and we'll be s... weill, we'll both have destroyed the economy of both the countries. It'll have a bad effect on the economy, on the antipoverty programs. It'll have solved nothing. It'll solve no problem. Kashmir will still be there. Everything will still be there. We will have added another dimension to our conflict. And this is why we are opposing it. We are saying to India, "For heavens sake, don't make the bomb. We don't need it." We are saying, "You don't need it except against us. You can't fight China with a bomb. China's much too powerful. We don't need it except against you. We can't fight the Russians with a bomb. It's only needed against each other. It'll not be made except against each other and in response to the other one's move." So we've said, "Let's not make the bomb. It'll complicate an already complex situation and let's stop at this." I hope it'll work.

There's been a lot of press coverage in the West about Pakistan going ahead with the nuclear test, that Pakistan is holding all the cards in her hand.

Uh, well about that nuclear test in September, there was a report -- now that was very childish for anybody in America or anywhere in the world to imagine that we could have a secret explosion. It's not a cracker, like a little cracker that you have or fireworks. A bomb is a bomb. And we have satellites allover the sky everywhere watching every bit of the earth. It was rather childish to suggest that Pakistan in September had an explosion in Balochistan. Unthinkable. It was rejected by the world. The world said, "Nonsense. Indian's took it up. They blew it up. "The danger of Pakistan." We have not done any tests of any kind. We are not quite sure what tests we have to do. I'm not a nuclear scientist. I don't understand the mechanics of it, how it is done. I just know in terms of policy that we have the ability but I don't know more than that. But as for their report in the Washington Time... Washington Post about the September thing, it was childish. How can you have a nuclear explosion and nobody knows that -- knows where it has been done.

What about an Islamic bomb?

Now that is part of the propaganda against Pakistan. Somehow -- you know my view is that in the West a lot of attention is paid to cliches. They go by slogans, cliches, Islamic fundamentalism. No one knows what it means. Islamic bomb. You don't have a Christian bomb. If you say London has a Christian bomb and China has a communist bomb. And the Kremlin has a Red bomb or a Blue bomb but they -- the slogan came up of the Islamic bomb and so on. There is no such thing as an Islamic bomb. If we were to make the bomb as a reaction to India's capability it would be a Pakistani bomb. It would not be a bomb for anybody else to use. Not for anybody else in the world. There's no question of an Islamic bomb any more than you'd be allowed, you'd be prepared to give the Canadians your bomb. You use our bomb. There's no Islamic bomb. Well it's a bomb? There's no American bomb or Western or White, Black or Brown or Yellow bomb. It is just a bomb like any other bomb.

Could you comment on the application of the theory of nuclear deterrence being applied in South Asia? Do you see that as a possibility?

I see uh, an advanced stage of nuclear deterrence which in some way would predate the emergence of nuclear weapons. Now let me explain. India has the capability of making the bomb. We have the capability also. I know -- I'm convinced India wants to make the bomb not to use it against Pakistan but just to have it as a status symbol so it'll fit in with this aim of becoming a world power. But India fears that if Pakistan also makes the bomb we'll be caught in this tide of forward movement and there'll -- lot of mistrust of Pakistan in India. They think these mad Pakistanis might use the bomb. In spite of the difference in size between the two countries there's more fear of Pakistan in India than vice versa. So because of that Indians hesitate to make the bomb. If we did not have the capability they would make the bomb because nobody in the world can stop them. The Americans can't. The Russians can't. No one can stop them making the bomb. If they make the bomb the world will say, "Well, they made the bomb. It's, it's bad luck but they've got it. That's all you can do about it." The only thing will stop them from making the bomb is Pakistan's capability of making it. Now I maintain that this will probably come out to be true in the nineties and you'll realize that the only thing which is stopping India from making the bomb and thus it is preventing South Asia from going nuclear, is Pakistanis capability. That if India makes the bomb, we will. And if both sides had the bomb there is a danger of somebody using it. And therefore neither side should. And, and thus it in my opinion that just as between East and West the possession of the bomb is a guarantee against its use by the other side. In South Asia the capability of manufacture is a guarantee of its manufacture by the other side. So we've gone one step pre... pre-bomb, that even before the bomb is made the capability of manufacture is preventing the manufacture of the bomb in South Asia. I maintain that Pakistan and India by having the capability are stopping each other from making the bomb and this is the best way not to make the bomb. I hope.

Do you think that nuclear weapons are the currency of power?

I haven't thought about it. I think the effect is exaggerated. I have a feeling that uh, the uh, the currency of power -- it is, this is exaggerated by the Indians quite a lot. They are pressing the government to go nuclear because they regard that as a currency of power. But I'm not sure if it is. Anyway, I haven't thought a great deal about this particular question.

Are there any other countries which Pakistan is concerned about in terms of actually getting weapons capability?

Well, no. Not really. Mind you, we are very Pan-Islamic and we feel very closely for the Arab countries. We re... we regard them as brothers. In fact, if I may just -little digression. When you speak of Islamic fundamentalism and so on, with us the Islamic ideology is a case of a mystical bond of Islamic brotherhood. It's not fundamentalism. It's not a particular sect. There's that mystical bond which is something beautiful in Islam. We feel for every Muslim as a brother. And so we support every Muslim cause. And because of this we are anti-Israel. We are not anti-Jew. You know enough about Islam I think to know that Moses is my prophet too. Moses is the prophet of Islam. It's not being anti-Jew as a religion. It's anti-Zionism. We're anti-Israel because of the Arab situation as it is. And if they have the bomb we fear for the Arabs because they might use it one day if they have a difficult position. But that is rather far away from us. And I don't think we've -- I've -- We have studied that at the institute as uh, a matter of, of geopolitical significance for Pakistan.

When Israel attacked the Osiraq reactor in Iraq were there fears that India might do the same in Pakistan?

I won't say there was fear. There was some concern that India might do that. Some even thought that Israel might do that in collusion with India. As far as we are concerned the two of them, since they're both hostile to Pakistan might collude on this matter but we are prepared for it. If that happens we are prepared. And it is -- we, we were led to believe that India did consider that as a possibility. It was studied by the high command. When Indira Gandhi was still alive. I think in '82 or '83. Uh, but then they gave up the idea because they were afraid that Pakistan would strike an Indian nuclear installations at Trombay and Tarapur, the two major ones at -- near Bombay. They're called Trombay and Tarapur. So it was a fear of a reprisal which was the biggest uh, factor in preventing the Indians from going further into a possible attack on Kahuta, on our nuclear establishment.

Could you forecast the next ten years in the nuclear age, what you think is going to happen particularly in terms of nuclear proliferation; horizontal proliferation.

No. I'd be guessing. Because frankly I h... I haven't thought about it and I, I don't really know enough to be able to volunteer an opinion.

Can you recreate for me the 1965 war and your role in it and also explain the antagonism which was -- date back to beyond '65.

Well... The '65 war was the first major war between India and Pakistan. And in that war I was Chief of Staff of an infantry division at the front. It was a war which we enjoyed fighting. You may think it's funny enjoying a war but as soldiers we enjoyed the war because we fought it against a power much bigger than us and we fought them to a standstill. We claimed it as a victory. And later we found the Indians also claimed it as a victory. So it was actually a drawn war. But just the fact that we could fight a giant like India and fight them to a draw was a feather in our cap. Now the war started off ostensibly on, in Kashmir in that Pakistan went into Kashmir. And India said, "You attacked us." And we said, "No. We attacked Kashmir. Kashmir is not Paki... is not India. It is different." But actually it is my view that the tension which eventually led to the '65 war and which continued after that was not because of Kashmir but, but part of a deeper divide which exists between India and Pakistan. And that divide relates... relates to the role consciousness of the two peoples. The Indians think of themselves as a potential great power -- a world power, that they have world role to perform. And we thought of ourselves at partition as a leading Islamic, Islamic nation of the world, as a powerful force for, for Islam. And we thought we'd act as the leaders of the Islamic world. We were not going to accept Indian hegemony or Indian domination of South Asia. And so the role consciousness of the two countries put them on a collision course and they collided again and again. And in a way they're still colliding it is the national aim of the two countries which projects. You, you could say that both sides are being a bit arrogant in their aims. But the fact is that they have an aim of becoming a world power. We regard ourselves as the strongest Muslim power in the world, which we are. But we think of ourselves as a servant of the Muslim world and not the masters. Now we don't. And this has put us on a collision course and this is the main -- the deep divide between India and Pakistan. Kashmir is a symptom, not the cause. It is a symptom of a deeper disease which I'll explain. If Kashmir were not there there'd be something else to create friction between the two countries.

If you could explain the sort of human side to this debate... how do you explain this animosity between India and Pakistan?

Well it has to be related not to specific issues which create discord but to general, general trends or the general feeling of the nations. In my opinion disputes like Kashmir -- are not the cause of trouble. They are the symptoms of trouble. Uh, they're symptoms of a deeper disease. The trouble between India and Pakistan arises from their role consciousness and this began with partition with independence in 1947. Uh, India suddenly emerged as a potential world power. And Nehru said, "We are cut out for greatness. We'll wear the mantle of glory of the British. We'll take on the role of the British and we'll be a big power." And Pakistan said, "No you won't." Because we also had ideas of bigness. We were the bigness Muslim state at that time. The largest Muslim power in the world. And we set ourselves up as the leading Muslim nation of the world to guide and help all Muslim causes. And we were not going to accept India as the leading power of South Asia or of any region. And this was a bit of a clash. It started a clash because we were not going to accept India as a potential or real world power, or the eminent power of South Asia as the Indians thought they would be... or were. And somehow because Pakistan was not prepared to accept India as a potential world power it made Pakistan an obstacle in India's march to greatness as they saw it. And that obstacle had to be removed from the Indian's part. This put us on a collision course. And we went on colliding. It was actually a role consciousness and then it was a matter of the national aim. India's aim was then identified by the Indian elite as to become a world power. In a short term, to be the leading, leading power of South Asia. In the long term to be a world power like the present big five. Our aim mainly was to, to, to, to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan in the light of Islamic ideology. But somehow India had to make its weight felt against Pakistan and the aims also clashed. So generally we thought that uh, with Indian aim as it is and ours as it is it's going to keep us on a collision course and both sides then were prepared for future collisions. And somehow the capability of collision, encourages collision -- armaments and so on. So the basic reason for the animosity is not a specific issue like the sea question today or the uh, uh... the Kashmir question which is now forty years old. It is the basic role consciousness of the national personality of the two countries.

When was the biggest amount of tension between the two countries?

The biggest moment was right at the very start when Pakistan came into being. Pakistan and India. It was a most literally bloody bath... literally it was a bloody bath and the tension was highest in just a few weeks or months which followed partition. In those few weeks, we killed a million people. A million people were killed in a holocaust which spread across the border of the two countries in the India-Punjab and the, and the Pakistani-Punjab -- on both sides. And a few other cities also in both countries. A million people of whom half were Indian, half were Pakistani whose only crime was that they lived on the wrong side of the border. Men, women, children. They were slaughtered. It was shameful. It was disgraceful. And no remorse on either side either. I, in my opinion, the gravest tension was at the very start. Sometimes it rises, it f... it, it rises and falls. It goes on. It's not easy to say when again it became the highest. It rose in '50, '51 down again. Rose in '65 down again '71. It's high again now. It has been rising and falling. So the tension remains as a permanent condition of the relationship. India and Pakistan will remain in a state of tension. What we hope to achieve is to reduce the tension, to control it -- not pre... not, not allow the tension to explode in war. But the tension was worst at partition and after that there has been a rise and fall in the last forty years.

What's your recollections of the 1971 war?

The '71 war was a traumatic one for Pakistan in that we suff... suffered a defeat technically which we did not in '65 and we lost a part of our territory which was cut away by the Indian armed forces. East Pakistan was taken away by the Indian armed forces. It became Bangladesh. And now the, the Bangladeshis are happy to be Bangladesh. Well that's fine. But as far as we were concerned we lost it because of the Indian armed forces assisted by the liberation forces. What was horrible was the whole campaign which was orchestrated by the Indians against Pakistan to show Pakistan as a brutal, horrible people, West Pakistanis brutalizing and ill-treating the poor little East Pakistanis. It wasn't true at all. As a matter of fact this campaign worked in turning world opinion against us -- not entirely. Because I know the Americans as late as, as October -- President Nixon thought he had received a promise from Mrs. Indira Ghandi that she would not launch an armed invasion of East Pakistan. She gave him that understanding and having done that she prepared for the invasion. In fact President Nixon was hoping that we would be able to solve our problem in East Pakistan without resort to war. But Indians didn't wait for that. They wanted to cut away East Pakistan and they did. I was a, a divisional commander in that war in the western part of the country, what was then West Pakistan at the front. We didn't do a great deal because the main action took place in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. But it was a horrible war for us because for the first time we actually lost the war. Well, technically. Nobody could have won it.