You were quite intimately involved with those negotiations with the Americans over the repeal of the McMahon Act. Can you think of any anecdotes or stories that would reveal the mood of the times and the mood of the Americans?

Well, uh, uh, as, uh, as so often in negotiations of this sort, um, there were, uh, different views held in various parts of the United States administration; uh, the, the State Department and the people we were talking to, uh, were on the whole very sympathetic and were anxious to, uh, make progress in these negotiations. Uh, but on the other hand, uh, there were certain senators, uh, who were quite hostile, uh, to any further collaboration. Um, and, uh, the, uh, uh the American negotiators of course had to take account of the, of the political atmosphere in which they were working. And of course a lot depends on personalities, and, uh, some of the personalities were, were, were braver, shall I say, in, uh, what they were prepared to, uh, uh, concede, uh, than others. Um, and, uh so it was a, it was a very interesting time, and, uh, uh, if a little frustrating, uh, uh, nevertheless, uh, uh, there was a great deal of goodwill on the American side.

Can you remember any particularly important American political actors on the stage you had to deal with quite a lot?

Uh, um well, there was, uh, just hold it for a moment while I think. Um, uh names don't always come very easily.

Don't worry. how much did Aldermaston, in your view, rely on United States assistance for the actual design of the polaris warhead?

Uh, well, I, I, but the, the Polaris, uh, uh, warhead came after my time. And so I'm really not informed on that at all. What I think is clear is that after 1958, uh, the collaboration in the weapons field between, uh, the, uh, uh our weapons establishment and the American weapons establishment was pretty well complete, and as far as I know it continued to be so. Um, so, uh, you may say that there was a, a great deal of benefit, uh, from the collaboration, uh, to us, and I think some advantage to the United States.

You told us a story a little while ago about the transfer of the design for the nuclear submarine reactor, the PWR, from the United States to Great Britain.

Well, I, it was, uh, of course, uh, very largely due, I think, to the influence of Admiral Rickover, who was the, the, one of the strong men on the American side, uh, and, uh, uh, it was of course a very valuable, uh acquisition for us, to have the, uh, the specifications of a, of a working reactor; um of course the, uh, uh, I think the Admiralty and other British institutions, uh, tend to be a little bit, uh, uh, uh affected by what is, uh, sometimes called the

not-invented-here

syndrome, um, and I, I think they, as I remember, they did think they could improve, uh, on the American design in certain respects. Um, and this held up the, uh, uh, the development, I think, uh, a little while, because, uh, the improvements turned out to be, uh, not as great as had been hoped.

You were clearly very friendly and had a lot of contacts with some of the people in the French program and whilst this country, whilst the United Kingdom was getting considerable support, despite the McMahon Act, in reactor design and so on and so forth, for its military program. There was a considerable amount of information and technological exchange. What was the mood, in your view, of the French scientists and technicians who were perhaps slightly, were they at all jealous?

Oh, I suppose they felt, uh, rather in the same way as we felt, in relation to the Americans holding back on us. Uh, but, uh, I think they understood perfectly well that it wasn't we who were holding back on them; it was the Americans who were holding back, uh, on both of us. Uh, and, uh and they also knew perfectly well that under the agreements that we'd made with the United States, we were not in a position to transfer information without any American agreement. I mean, I think it was a perfectly clear situation, which the, the French with their usual clarity, uh, understood perfectly well. Uh, meanwhile the relations between the people involved, uh, in London and in Paris, uh, were very good, because they were by that time old friends.

You accompanied Attlee when you went to Washington, when Attlee went to Washington and you spent four days on the presidential yacht.

This was the time of the Korean War. Indeed I remember it very well.

How, first of all... I mean there's two or three questions I'd like to ask you about that. How alarmed was Attlee really about the potential threat to use the atomic weapon in Korea?

I don't know what his inner thoughts were; I know what mine were. Uh, I thought that it was a storm in a teacup. Uh, it ha... it happened in, it was a, it was a, it was a crisis which blew up, uh, in the, uh, in, in the course of a, a House of Commons debate. Uh, when a, a, a message came, a message came from, uh, uh, Washington to the effect that, uh, the Americans were considering the use of the atomic weapon, uh, against the Chinese, uh, in the Korean War. Now, I don't believe that whatever the military, Amer... certain members of the American military might have been thinking or planning, that the president had the slightest intention of using the uh, nuclear weapon. But, uh, and I suspect, but I don't know, that, uh, Attlee realized that. However, it was a very good move, of Attlee's, he immediately, uh, the, the, arranged this meet... trip to Washington; uh, that, uh, calmed the House of Commons. Uh, uh, we went to Washington, we had, uh, took the opportunity of three days of going over a whole number of issues, which, uh, had been under discussion with the Americans, such as economic issues, the, the, uh, um strategic position, Europe, and there were a, a great many things were covered. Uh, the actual, uh, the actual issue which took us there, namely the use of the weapon, was not taken up until the conference was at an end, uh, when, uh, the prime minister and the president, uh, went to, went, uh, into a, a, a, a room together for a, a, a, a, a while and then came out, and announced that they'd agreed that they wouldn't use the bomb without consulting each other. Well, uh, Dean Acheson, who was there, and the, uh, other Americans realized that this was a, this was impossible, they, uh, that to, that the effect on the Congress would be very serious, if Con... uh, Congress being already very suspicious about this whole negotiation. So, um, uh, a form of words was found, uh, which, um, uh it, which was, were put in the communique, I can't quote them, uh, a form of words was found, uh, which enabled uh, Attlee, uh, to, uh tell the House of Commons that he was quite satisfied with the assurances that he'd got from the president. And enabled the president to tell the Congress that he hadn't given Attlee any real assurances. So, they, uh, they, they, it was a very successful operation it calmed, uh, the incident was over. Uh, and it was a useful, it was a useful conference from this point of view, that there had been a lot of differences in Anglo-American relations at that time, over Palestine, and, uh, there are other difficult issues. Uh, and, uh, but, uh, this, um, uh, conference, in a way, reestablished, uh, the idea of a special relationship with the United States, not a word I, expression I use much. Nevertheless, it was, it was clear to the world that, uh, the British and American leaders had had a long conference together, and had come out with a, a certain measure of agreement. It sort of put them, it, it put the record rather straight, and erased the, uh, dissentions which had been created over Palestine and other matters.

So, really, what you're saying is that the nuclear threat in Korea was never as serious as perhaps other people have made out.

I never thought so myself. I didn't think that there was, uh knowing Truman, and, uh, um, the Americans involved, uh, I, I, I was quite convinced in my mind that there was no, really no risk of them, uh, agreeing to that. Now, there are, may be, as I say, there there may have been those in the American...

Could you actually say that there was no risk of the use of a nuclear weapon or something? Can I get, can we start it again, start the question again. How important was that threat to use nuclear weapons, in your view?

Uh, in my view, uh, the, uh, American president and his advisors, uh, had no intention of sanctioning the use of an atomic weapon in the Korean War. Now, there may have been other views in the American military establishment, uh, but, uh, uh, but, uh, uh, the, President Truman, uh, showed very very clearly the, that he had complete control over his military advisors, because very shortly afterwards, he, um, uh, he recalled MacArthur, uh, from the battlefield, so, uh, I myself, I can't, I don't know what, uh Mr. Attlee, the prime minister, thought about it, but as, as an advisor, I was, I, I, I did not believe that it was a real crisis.

You mentioned Dean Acheson being present in those negotiations with Truman on that yacht. What would you have said was his view and his role in the relationship between the United States and Great Britain over the whole question of nuclear matters and defense.

Well, I mean, he was a, he was the most important influence, uh, in American foreign policy, uh, for a number of years. And, uh, so his role was, uh, extremely important; the president had complete confidence in him, uh, and, uh, uh, he was a, he was the, he was the, one of the, the architect, one of the principal architects of American foreign policy in that, at that time.

Was his influence on the president perhaps a benefit to the United Kingdom's position?

I think it was a benefit. I, because Dean Acheson was at, at heart a great friend of this country, but also a candid critic, uh, and, uh, that's a, that's a, that's a good thing for a friend to be, from time to time.

You spent four days on that yacht. What was that like?

Well, we spent, uh, two days on the yacht, and a couple in the White House, or in, uh, somewhere else. Uh, well, it was a, it was a very agreeable conference, uh, uh, uh, the atmosphere was extremely good, very friendly, we knew, we disagreed about a number of things, but, uh, that was, that's normal, uh, but they were, but, uh, they, they were good discussions. Um, the, there is, uh, uh, uh, a brilliant description of that conference in Dean Acheson's memoirs, uh, which, uh, anybody who is really interested, uh, in the subject would do well to read.

When we met last, you spoke to me about the role of Bevan in British foreign policy. What would be your views of the development of his policy about United States involvement in Europe?

Well, uh I, I, I think Ernest Bevan had a quite clear policy. Uh, it was to build up Western strength, and he started with the treaty of Dunkirk, with France: that was the first step. Then he formed a Western European union. Uh, uh, that was the next step. Uh, then came the Marshall Plan, and, uh, uh, uh, uh Ernest Bevan was, uh, we in the foreign office were, were, had previous knowledge that this was going to come, so when it, the Harvard speech of General Marshall was made, we were ready to go into action. And, uh, it was, it was clearly something which, uh, was a major development in American policy, and one which we must immediately take up and welcome. Uh, so that was the Marshall Plan. Well, then the next step, of course, was NATO. Uh, now, uh, uh, through all this period, uh, there was, uh, an, an element in the two elements in American policy advocated by different people, one, one of which was that, uh, that, uh, they should press, uh, for a federal Europe, or a, with which they could then deal as a entity, the implication being that they could then withdraw a little from it. Uh, and, uh, the, there were those who, on the other hand, I think, understood the sort of attitude which the labour government at that time were taking. Uh, now, I think that was always a concern, uh, uh, in the British administration, uh, that, uh, the Americans might withdraw, and, uh, that would be a very unfortunate development; after all, uh, two wars had occurred because the Americans were not involved in Europe, and, uh, there was a, certainly there was an anxiety that this shouldn't, American involvement shouldn't cease, uh, for a third time, as you might say. So I think that, uh, that, uh, under, the, that, uh, explains, uh, there was quite a lot of hard argument and negotiation with the Americans at that time, uh, but, uh, that was one of the reasons why, uh, um, Attlee, uh, certainly, uh, was not willing, uh, to, to contemplate a federal solution for Europe. Now, a federal, uh, uh, the, uh, the, the, that's not the same as, uh, full collaboration with Europe in every field, but that, uh, it, it was a, it was an important distinction, uh, which in the end, of course, faded.