What were the conflicting views about Germany between the Soviet Union and the United States?

...The problem, you see: First of all, there was agreement among the... heads of states, about the necessity to de-militarize and, uh, de-Nazify Germany, and the process has been started -- you know that Germany was, uh, split into various zones; and, uh... the first months, you see, it worked... rather well. But then, you see, the... western powers started to create a, actually, separate state in, uh, in the western part of Germany. And paradoxical as it may sound, you see, the Soviet Union was continued to be much longer the... proponent of the unified Germany, than the western powers. We, we still were fighting for a unified Germany, for not splitting it among, uh, several states, and so on so forth. But the... there was, uh, this, uh, thing that the... those... those reparations that had to come from western part of Germany, were sort of, uh, stopped, that, uh, uh, the western powers started to make uh... their own currency in the western zones, and so on, so that Germany was actually split; and then, uh.... uh, that was the beginning of a confrontation between the... western powers and the Soviet Union, on the matter what to do, what to do with Germany. And while, uh, paying lip service to the German unity, the western powers wanted, uh, only united Germany in such a case that it would be, uh, dragged into some sort of a... western bloc, while the Soviet Union was, uh, fighting for a united, uh, neutral Germany to, to, to the, to, in the first years after the, after the end of the war.

Why wasn't the interest of the Soviet Union served by a divided Germany?

You see... Finally, finally, so we accepted the de facto division of Germany; now there are two states existing in Germany; but, first of all they wanted to stick to the, to the wartime decision and the, to the wartime decisions of the... the leaders of the great powers, said that, uh, Germany ought to be unified, but it too to be made peaceful, and made neutral; but when we saw that in the western part of Germany, there were upsurge of, uh, rebuilding of, uh, military potential, that, uh, there was an idea to use Germany, uh, western part of Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and maybe as a spearhead, ah... against the Soviet Union, then we had second thoughts on, uh, finally, you see both sides were satisfied that, uh, there were two German states, uh, created. But they, uh, I say, initially it was unilateral actions of western powers that, first of all the United States and Great Britain, that actually made the first steps to split Germany into two parts, and put the blame on the Soviet Union.

Tell me about the Berlin crisis. How does one understand it from a Soviet point of view?

I don't think I... just on an impromptu basis I, uh... could remember all the nuances of the Berlin, of the Berlin crisis, but I understand that it was, uh, on the part of the, mmm, on the western powers sort of a test of will, with the United States, of just browsing to, through my book and, uh... remember that, uh... Mr. Forrestal, who was the.... first Secretary of Defense of the United States, and that was a, a quotation from, uh, David Lilienthal, diaries, who used to be a head of the American atomic, Atomic Energy Commission, who wrote that Mr. Forrestal was, uh, strongly pushing the President to use atomic weapons, uh, in the, with regard to Berlin. Uh... So, that was the trial of strength; the western powers... were trying, in the first, really, first very strong demonstration of the threat of atomic force vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were trying to make the Soviet Union yield to western demands and to accept all the arrangements that were, uh... deemed necessary by the western powers in, in central Europe. And since we didn't yield, ...after some sort of a... blockade and a, and a, airlift and so on, you have to accommodate, and so... Berlin crisis, uh, actually, um... makes two things: first of all, that's the first thing of confrontation, and the second thing, in the, uh, how the confrontation can be resolved. And, by the way, the interesting thing that you see, that even during this, um.... Berlin crisis, they are traffickers on both parts. You see, somehow worked in preparation during the acute crisis, in order not to make, you see, collisions in the air, uh, so, you see... this example shows you, how even in confrontation, the parties may, uh... have to observe some rules of the game, so to say, in order not to really confront; because as far as I understand it, western powers made this, made this, especially the United States, made this trial of strength, but they were not prepared to go to the, actually to war with the Soviet Union at that time in central Europe, which was, uh, simply the... crazy idea, despite, you know, the atomic bomb, because they knew that if the atomic bombs would be brought, would be dropped on the Soviet Union -- the few that the United States had -then the western Europe would be occupied by the Soviet forces, who would be trying, you see, to sort of, to clear the... danger. And then the, all this whole thing would be counterproductive. So.... at that time, we actually, we neutralized the American threat of nuclear, uh, weapons, by our own, um, uh, land power, in order to somehow to survive and to, to make, not to allow... the western powers to replay the, uh, the results of the second world war, because the, the, the, the essence of the situation in Europe for 30 years, that by hook and by crook, western powers were trying to, to, um, to squeeze from the Soviet Union by military pressure, by atomic blackmail and so, the thing that, uh, they couldn't squeeze or the thing that they... actually to, to, to change the results of the war in Europe, you see, to, to, to, to make, to correct it, in, in western favor, and this didn't work. And this didn't work. And then, then it was a dead end, and after that was Helsinki Agreement, was, uh, Helsinki final act, and so on, and finalization that, all right, we agree that the situation could not be changed and then we start anew; but for 30 years, uh, there was trial-and-error and attempt to change the situation.

Tell me more about Soviet point of view of equalizing U.S. nuclear weapons with Soviet conventional man power?

It was not actually equalization, but the, the thing is that, you know... a lot of, uh, military strategy belongs to the psychological thing, you know, that there was a threat from the position of strength of the United States, which were trying to impose upon the Soviet Union its solutions, whether it consul-, concerned Europe, or, or, whether it concerned the Middle East or Asia, whatever it is. But the, the fact is that United States were of course unwilling, or unwilling to, go to the actual war with the Soviet Union; we know about the dozens of plans that existed at that time and now are, uh, public property, so to say, declassified, about war with the Soviet Union. There was, uh,

Drop : Shot,

uh,

Gunpowder,

ABC,

101,

and many other, you see, coded names. The actual, the first plan, for war with the Soviet Union was made out... six months after the end of the war and the, and the Eisenhower staff and the American forces that were occupying Germany. But the fact is that, there was always this thing, you see: all right, we, we will start a war, and what will be, what will be the result? -- there was a, there will be result with some devastation of the Soviet Union, but... the American bridgehead... in western Europe will be liquidated. So, in a way, at that time, this kind of possibility was always a, a, a, a holding factor on American decision to sort of, uh, to, to, to roll back the Soviet Union in a way, in really military way. And there was always some consideration that,

Let us wait for five more years; we implement one more plan of military buildup and then we would succeed finally to, um, make a trial of strength with the Soviet Union,

and this kind of psychology persists up to this day, this day, and this SDI is one of its, the last implementation on this very psychology, "Let's build this final thing, and then they could be, would be able to push the Soviet Union..."

That's number 13 or 12.

Oh, but I mean, I am always trying to, to, to sort of uh, to, to... continue it, in the mentality. . .

Tell me... tell me about ... tell me how did you first learn about the Soviet nuclear weapons, and tell me how you felt about it, personally.

MMMM... You see, the, the, I don't think at that time I was really, very much keen about this thing! And you see, in my mind, something is mixed up because I've done a lot of research after that, you see; but I guess, you see, the feeling was, we made it, we made it, you know; we now, now we feel ourselves better; we could talk to the Americans on a more equal footing; that was the, that was the feeling after, after it was, at, after it was officially announced, officially announced. Of course, we didn't know about this American, you see, announcement; we didn't read foreign, uh, newspapers at the time; but we announced that the Soviet Union has, uh, solved the, the secret of atomic weaponry; and, uh, that it now could do whatever it, uh, whatever the United States could do with, uh, with atomic energy; and so, that was the feeling, you see, of somehow, of really great relief, that this kind of a blackmail would, would no longer be possible. It, it was a feeling of a, of a, of a... normal, uh, rank-and-file person, and a young boy. Due, of course, speaking in a more... in a more sophisticated way, the fact that one probed the, the, the... secret of atomic weapon doesn't mean that one immediately possesses... the, ah, United States still kept a lot of, uh, big lead vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but the moral... knowledge, or, uh, satisfaction, that we've made it, you see, uh, gave.... the energy to the, to the people that, uh, there would not be.... that much, you see, looking to the United States for... and they could, uh, be more independent in their foreign policy, and in, especially in their home pursuits.

How was the policy of containment -- the Truman Doctrine -- viewed by the Soviet Union?

Well, the policy of containment was viewed as a, actually as an attack on, on the United States; it's this, this trying to, if not push around the Soviet Union, then at least trying to, to do whatever is possible, maybe short of direct military intervention, to push the Soviet Union into subservience, you see, to impose on the Soviet Union various, various American's designs, vary-, uh, American rules, the American wishes in the United Nations, when the United States, uh, had a sort of a mechanical majority and so on and so forth. The policy of containment was actually the policy of attack on the Soviet Union, and the interesting fact, you know, that the policy of containment was later changed... when the Republicans came to power, into the policy of liberation, liberation, and roll-back of the Soviet Union -- that was Dulles's policy. But the paradox is that, when the United States, uh, uh, Dulles and Eisenhower spoke about liberation, rollback, it was more lip service, because at that time, there was no possibility of rolling back, while, uh, during the containment was milder in formulation, it was more severe, more aggressive in, in actual operation, because, at that time, United States was using its atomic monopoly to the maximum, in order to blackmail the Soviet Union. When Dulles came, he actually, he compensated in, you know, in this, um, very aggressive phraseology, that he could make in practice. So that's a paradoxical thing, you see, the, the, um, the formulations of the doctrine become more aggressive, though the possibilities for implementing it are, uh, curtailed.

Tell me about the Marshall Plan, and why didn't the Soviet Union join it?

You know, the Marshall Plan --, it is very difficult. It's probably, it's a very interesting story, maybe some economists or some people who are dealing more... in detail with this stage of American policy would tell you better; but I guess the Marshall Plan was finally viewed, in the, the Soviet Union, as a, as a plan to supplement, you see, atomic blackm-, blackmail with, uh, with, uh, well, atomic blackmail with economic pressure. You know, we... we understood that we were very much devastated, and Americans while promising to give us something, you know, for, uh, they would, uh, require some sort of, uh, political concessions, to make tremendous concessions, especially, uh, what, uh, regarded the other socialist countries emerging in Europe; and that was the idea that we shouldn't, you see, buy this economic, um, aid, whatever it might be, for, uh, for, uh, uh, uh, those concessions that might be political concessions, or concessions in the field of security that might be, that might be required from, uh, the Soviet Union. You know, the decision was not straightforward; we thought about it for a long time, but, of course, the Marshall Plan and the... Lend-Lease, were different things. Lend-Lease were really, United States were giving us generous aid, in order to crush the enemy, which was as much as the United States' enemy as the Soviet enemy. In, uh, in, uh, Marshall Plan, the thing was different; the Marshall Plan was to, to, to help restore the American... bridgehead or the, the capitalist one, let's say, in western Europe, in order to continue this... playing on the balance of power politics, as, as, as regards to Western Europe, as regards to the socialist countries, first, uh, the Soviet Union in the first place. It was the, actually the offer of some money for, uh, the, on political conditions. Which is the usual practice of the United States, uh, up till the, this time.

How do you understand the kind of fear that the Soviet bomb produced?

You see, it's really for me to speak, to speak about the... to speak about Americans, uh, somehow I didn't, I didn't, the Soviet bomb produced. MMMMMmmmmm...

There was, for example, a discussion on whether United States should continue into developing a thermonuclear bomb.

You see, the problem is if one puts it in a more philosophical context, the problem that United States were threatening the, in the, in the first, uh, years after the second world war, the first stage of the world... American nuclear strategy, the United States was threatening the Soviet Union, not because the Soviet Union wanted to attack the United States. It has no, no possibility, it had no planes, no atomic weapons, and it simply couldn't... bring its military forces to the Americans, so... so the threat was, to the Soviet Union, was, that the Soviet Union and the, in the, in the, so-called, you know, in a twisted idea of American, a twisted, um, thinking of American, um... leaders, was that anyone who was doing whatever it is anti-American, you see, striving for national liberation, striving for, uh, independence from Britain, from France, or... it was all the design of Moscow, the lawless hand of Moscow. So in the first place, you see, the American nuclear weapon was designed, not to ward off the attack on the United States or threat of the attack on the United States, but to make the, um... Soviet Union, so to say, behave. Not only the Soviet Union, but all the, all the progressive forces around the world.