Interview with Paul Nitze, 1987 [Part 2 of 2]
Summary
For nearly half a century, Paul Nitze was one of the chief architects of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed Nitze assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs. From 1969 to 1973, Paul Nitze served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). Nitze's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: "One Step Forward" focuses on SALT I and SALT II. He recounts how he became part of the SALT I delegation, the key issues within the negotiating process, and the initial position statements he drafted for the Soviet delegation. Nitze describes the useful role that "back channel" negotiations can play and discusses the particular problems with national security adviser Henry Kissinger's negotiations in the final days of SALT I. He also addresses Watergate's impact on his participation in SALT II. Increasingly critical of U.S. arms policy, Nitze re-formed the Committee on Present Danger, which argued for a massive military buildup of U.S. forces in the post-Vietnam period. He spends considerable time in his interview going over the then-persistent threat of Soviet expansionism. Nitze explains his objection to President Jimmy Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke as his chief arms negotiator. He also explains his opposition to the SALT II Treaty, which he saw as codifying Soviet superiority in missile megatonnage and throw-weight.
Topics
Nuclear arms control, Nuclear weapons
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Transcript
The Back Channel
Nitze:
It's not unusual to use a back channel in, in a, in, in, in an important negotiation, particularly at the final stages of such a negotiation. The two sides got locked in to some very important positions on both sides. How does one explore some way of resolving those important issues? The usual way in which that is done that some, somebody on one side together with somebody on the other side gets together and tries to informally, without rep... giving away his side's position negotiate with the other fellow who's not giving away his side's position, and see whether they can't get to some compromise which then both sides can agree upon. So that this is not an unusual way of doing it. It is, however, important that the person who does that really understand the problem. I think the difficulty involved here was that on our side Henry was not quite adequately versed in all the details while Mr. Smirnov, who was the person on the other side who worked out these details, was in charge of the entire nuclear weapons production program for the USSR, and knew every detail to h-his fingertips. And so that the agreement that finally resulted was in some respects uh, different than what I think Henry understood it to be. Subsequently it was corrected, but I think at some cost to ourselves by a subsequent corrective agreement.
Interviewer:
I just want to jump ahead to 1974. At this point you remain on the delegation, you're beginning the negotiations on SALT II and the United States is a little bit in crisis because of Watergate. And you had specific concerns that led to your resigning from the delegation. And I'd like you to tell us why. What those concerns were.
Nitze:
I'd spent a good deal of time worrying about what the objectives of an arms control agreement between the U.S. and the USSR should be. And this is a very complex problem, that it is not right that there's just one single objectives, objective -- there're a whole series of objectives and there're whole series of restraints and difficulties involved in actually getting to an agreement. And I'd spelled all that out in a piece of paper. And that paper had cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Laird, with people in ACDA, with others in the government. But I was unable to get that piece of paper approved by h-highest authority in the government. And I continued to argue these points and the points that flowed there from to the best of my ability. And when it became evident that uh, n... that highest authority was not going to pay any attention to this, then it seemed to me I had exhausted everything I could do within the government and that I'd had the feeling that Mr. Nixon wanted to maintain negotiations with the Soviet Union and get to some kind of agreements. Primarily because of the fact that his relationship with the Russians was his best defense against impeachment. And I thought that this was going to lead to a, an improvident agreement on the part of the United States. And I'd done everything I could to prevent that. And I felt I'd better get out. So I resigned.
SALT I
Interviewer:
So your feeling was that because of the domestic pressure at home that Nixon would be willing to give too much away to the Soviets just to be able to have a major foreign policy victory?
Nitze:
I think. In fact, I think he did a few months later when he met in Moscow and entered into the Moscow Agreement which gave up on the idea of having an agreement with respect to limiting offensive forces of indefinite duration. And settled on the idea that we, the two sides would agree on merely an agreement that would cover ten years from that date and that's after all what SALT II did.
It oc... it was scheduled to expire in 1985 and that period of time to my view was not adequately long, cause it takes you at least ten years to develop and deploy a new weapons system and restrictions which last for only ten years would really have no useful effect that I could see.
Interviewer:
What, in a nutshell would you say was the major effect of Watergate on the SALT negotiations.
Nitze:
Well it... It... Are you referring to the fact that Mr. Nixon was under the threat of impeachment or are you referring to...?
Interviewer:
Yeah. The clouds gathering over him. I don't if the Soviets across the table--
Nitze:
I've just said what I think was the major thing.
Interviewer:
Okay. Just take you back to one other concern. I know that in developing proposals for SALT I, you were very concerned about the larger Soviet missiles and that that concern was rooted in the fact that several years down the road, those missiles could carry larger payload of warheads, and that would make our land-based missiles -- put them in extremely vulnerable position. And you advocated deep cuts in the larger missiles. I was wondering if you could address that and also, what I don't understand about it myself is why you were opposed trying to pursue some sort of limitations on MIRVs to solve that land-based vulnerability problem.
Nitze:
That's two entirely different questions. We better separate those two questions. Um, first of all you've asked me why was I opposed to the deployment of large, fixed ICBM missiles which could be MIRVed. I had a very strong feeling about that, because it was clear that the threat to the survivability of our ICBMs depended upon whether or not the Russians could develop warheads which were sufficient size and weight so that their yield was large, and also develop sufficient accuracy so that when those weapons hit, they would destroy the silos in which our missiles were deployed. This would be a very destabilizing threat to the survivability of what I considered to be an essential leg of our deterrent on which our security depended. Therefore it seemed to me to be much better if one could get an agreement which would limit the weight and the size of the missiles on each s... on each side. I felt strongly that this was the way in which to reduce the instability, the danger to both sides which would occur if we both had these big missiles which could threaten the silos of the other side.
Interviewer:
Okay.
Nitze:
And I think everybody agrees with that. This was not a unique view to me. It's a perfectly obvious consideration which everybody has agreed with. The difficulty has been could you get the Soviets to agree to that. And we all tried, including Henry Kissinger.
Interviewer:
Okay. Just a concise answer to how did you feel after the treaties were concluded? Did you support their ratification in the senate and support the jackson amendment?
Nitze:
I th... f... I felt that net, the virtues or the, the advantages of the ABM Treaty were such as to outweigh the defects in the interim agreement which in any case was supposed to last only a few years. It expired by its terms in five years. And it was agreed by both sides that it was to be replaced by a permanent of indefin... a, a, treaty of indefinite duration to be promptly negotiated between the sides. So that if that really had no long term merit, no long term commitment on either side, then one could forget about its, or take lightly, more lightly, its defects. While the ABM treaty was a treaty of indefinite duration and if it had merit and could be further improved in the future which it was, then that was something that merited being for. You couldn't get one without the other so I did testify on behalf of the package.
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