Interview with Nguyen Cao Ky, 1981
Summary
Nguyen Cao Ky served as Prime Minister of South Vietnam from 1965 until 1967 and then Vice President unti 1971. Nguyen Cao Ky recalls wanting to move the war north as a way to stop the Communists from infilitrating South Vietnam. As much as Nguyen Cao Ky wanted to see a unified Vietnam, he knew that was not possible and that the higher priority was to stop the spread of communism. Nguyen Cao Ky also talks about the Buddhist unrest in 1964 and his arrangement for the departure of Nguyen Khnah.
Topics
Nationalism and communism, Military assistance, American, Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Influence, War--Economic aspects, Prostitution, Political psychology, Presidents--Election, Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Protest movements--United States, Capitulations, Military, Armed Forces--Officers, Ex-prime ministers, Propaganda, Communist, Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, Vietnamese, Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Public opinion, Vietnamese reunification question (1954-1976), Buddhism and politics, Vietnam--Politics and government
Annotations
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Transcript
Pursuit of victory in North Vietnam
VIETNAM
Nguyen Ky
SR #2633
Tape 1 Side 1
T 385
Huntington Beach, California Tone will be minus 10. Speed. Mark it.
Clapstick
Nguyen Ky
SR #2633
Tape 1 Side 1
T 385
Huntington Beach, California Tone will be minus 10. Speed. Mark it.
Clapstick
Interviewer:
Mr.
Ky, in 1964...you wanted to take the war north.
Why did you do that, what did you hope to accomplish?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well,
because militarily speaking I think that's the only way we could stop
them. I mean you could stop the invasion of the Communists.
Interviewer:
You
can't just fight within South Vietnam?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
There's no way. I remember during the Guam conference with President Johnson I instructed Cao Van Vien the Chief of General Staff at that
time to give to the American Delegation a complete briefing about our
plan, you know. In that I asked the the agreement of American government
to...support the idea having me as a volunteer to go north with uh two
or three uh Vietnamese divisions...or what we asked them is to provide
us with air support or you know ah naval supply.
Interviewer:
But
but back in '64 when this question first came
up, what uh, what was the reaction of the Americans?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I
remember many...many conversations I had with Secretary Dean Rusk for example. I had
the feeling that ah, American government always a...afraid that if we go
north and the Chinese
Communists will you know come south to rescue the Vietnamese Communists.
And um...em...
Interviewer:
What
did you think of that? Would they have come?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
I, I remember at that time I, I told uh Mr. Dean Rusk that that thing
will not happen. I don't think the the Chinese will come south to rescue the the Vietnamese
Communists.
Interviewer:
Why?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
...Well, because I don't think, first I don't think the Vietnamese
Communists will ask the Chinese
to come south and second, I think, um, even at that time we knew the
Vietnamese Communists leader are more or less side with the Russians and that's
something that the Chinese
don't like...and you see what happened today showed that I, I am right
in my judgment.
Interviewer:
But
you...Our goal was always independence for South Vietnam. Was yours the
same?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I beg
pardon?
Interviewer:
The
goal of the United States was always independence for South
Vietnam.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yes.
Interviewer:
It
wasn't to conquer the north. Was your goal the same?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh
yes. Yes.
Interviewer:
But,
but did you want to reunify with all of Vietnam?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yes,
sure that every Vietnamese want to see Vietnam unify but, ah, at that
time our first priority is be bring peace back to Viet...the whole Indochina and the worse to stop
the communist invasion first. And then let the people of both south and
north live in peace for a while and then maybe later on let the people
decide by themselves.
Interviewer:
But
the best way to stop them was by heading north?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah.
In order to destroy the enemy capabilities to sustain our invasion
war.
Interviewer:
You
finally had a chance to go north in ah February
'65. You were in the lead plane of that uh reprisal attack at
Chap Le.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeh.
Interviewer:
Tell
us what happened and how you felt about it?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah,
but it again, it’s a very limited mission you know using only air power.
(cough, cough) and, ah, but even for a you know very limited mission,
ah, incursion into the north...ah it provide us a big excitement at that
time. I was commander of the Air Force at that time and I remember that
for the first air mission...ah, when we crossed the border I had more,
you know, pilot volunteer than what we we need for the mission.
Interviewer:
It
was good for morale to finally to be heading north?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeh,
yeh.
Buddhist unrest and Nguyen Khanh's leadership
Interviewer:
Uhm,
there was a lot of Buddhist unrest on 1964 from
August on. Was Khanh stirring this up, what was he doing at that time, why all
the unrest?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
why all the unrest? Because remember uh the Buddhists raised to power not only ‘64 but back in ‘63, you know...after
the coup against the President Diem...and...the Buddhists become a political force, strong and well organized.
But then I think the Buddhist leaders ah they thought that they they are
the true the real power...so they begin to ask you know too much...Khanh trying to play a, a
smart politicians.
He
tried to accommodate, you know ah not only the Buddhists but other other groups, other factions
ah also and that's the cause of the downfall of Khanh because ah there so
much groups, so much faction you know, so much differences that you
couldn't ah please everyone and get the support uh from everyone.
Interviewer:
Were
you instrumental in trying to get him out?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I
arranged ah the departure of Khanh but I never want really wanted his departure. I
arranged his departure only after ah he shows that he could not ah
govern any more. Remember at that time um, coup and anti coup uh, happen
uh every two or three weeks, every month in South Vietnam you
know.
Interviewer:
So
you gave him a medal and sent him on his way.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah,
I think that's the the best arrangement I can get fr...for him...I like
him but, uh, because his instability you know, political instability so
the feeling among the senior you know ah general officers at that time
ah was against him.
Relations with Maxwell Taylor in 1964
Interviewer:
Tell
me about your relationship with Ambassador Taylor, in particular about the incident I
think it was December 1964 when he got you and some of the other
generals into a tongue lashing.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well,
when, when Jim [sic]
Taylor was Ambassador
in Saigon you know I
was a Junior officer I think...one star general commanding of the air
force...so actually I I didn't have too much you know relations or
conversation with Taylor but uh we had met once I had the impression that ah...he
looked down, you know, on us like you know big brother you know looking
down the young uh junior officer.
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Interviewer:
Tell
us what what happened when you first went into the American Embassy to see
Taylor.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
I think that day the armed forces ah had decide to abolish the national
high council you know the civilian body. So I think Ambassador Taylor was very you know
unhappy so that morning we were all ah meet together at the headquarters
of the chief, general chief of staff and uh, General Khanh after talking with
Ambassador Taylor in
the telephone he said to us, he said that ah "Taylor wants to meet with
me, but I am not going so why don't you" he asked me and General Thieu and Admiral Cang
,
I think, commander of the Navy and General Thi, so four of
us, ah we went down the uh, American Embassy to see Ambassador Taylor so when he first
came in, you know, in his office he was, he looked very, very you know,
uh... unhappy.
He
didn't even shake hand with us, just say sit down. So we sit down and
listen to him. And he said, “Ah, well gentlemen remember a few days ago
ah I gave a, a dinner and I told you that ah, ah we want stability, we
don't want any trouble, any changes in, and now you see what happened
you know, you abolished a national council and so and so,” uh, so he
says something like “Ah, it's a waste you know,” either waste of time or
waste of a food that he gave to us but well I, I understood that that it
was a waste of a food.
So
I said to him I said, “Now listen General, I don't think it’s a waste
because I remember that (cough) the piece of a steak that you gave to
me, it, it’s the best of a piece of steak I never had in my, you know,
whole life. I was poor Vietnamese. So I really appreciate the food, it’s
not a waste.”
Ah,
so he said “Why you ah did that, why you did that.” I said well why you
did ah because we thought ah, it’s in our interest, the interest of a
Vietnam. That's that's the whole, you know, conversation because he
didn't convince us that we are doing wrong or either convince him that
he's wrong and and we are right.
Ky becomes prime minister
Interviewer:
How
did you feel in, in, in June of 1965 when
you finally became the Prime Minister? How did you feel then, were you
optimistic, were you excited?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Frankly, remember that ah...that day because the the uh...the fight
between the civilian factors. Uh at that time we had Chief of State and
the Prime Minister both civilian but they belong to two different
political parties you know, so at the end they couldn't govern because
the Chief of State, you know, is against the Prime Minister.
So
I remember that night about 11:00 they called all of us the armed forces
council to the Prime Minister's office and they decide both you know,
resign and handed the power back to the military and after that uh, we
had a long meeting at the headquarters of the marine corps to decide who
will be you know the next uh Prime Minister.
And
I remember that we first proposed General Thieu cause he was the senior officer at that
time but uh facing the difficult situation at that time, Thieu, ah,
refused...
Interviewer:
So
then...
Nguyen Cao Ky:
...and then after that we proposed a few more.
Camera Roll 661
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Interviewer:
When
you were finally appointed the Prime Minister, how did you feel? Were
you excited? You finally had a chance to run your government.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well,
not excited because first I didn't want that responsibility. I didn't
want that job, but as I mentioned earlier after you know almost two days
meeting and after uh we proposed few more you know senior army general
like
Cang
and Thi and all they
declined ties you know refused responsibilities, so that at the end they
all come to me and said, “Well what about you, Ky, because now that the
civilian handed the power to us you know uh we must have someone you
know responsible for the government.”
So
when we come back to the meeting and I asked all of them 60 or 70 of
them you know in the room I said okay ah, one more time anyone wanting
to be prime minister...and said no so Thieu said "I propose Ky” and all of them just
stood up and you know uh accept uh the offer.
Then I I didn't give them the answer. I said I have to go back and talk
with my wife first. And when I told her about that offer you know she-
she- you know she was not excited. She said oh no not that job, not as a
prime minister. I said what can I do now ha, ha.
So
I accept I accept the role and responsibilities with only one goal in my
mind which is to bring back stability to South Vietnam, to write a new
constitution, and to establish a new regime, a democratic regime in
South Vietnam.
I
was not excited you know, I accept the role, responsibilities, as any
other responsibilities toward my country.
Role and achievement of A.R.V.N. in relation to the Americans and Tet
Interviewer:
The...How did you feel when the American troops were building up in
‘65, did you uh, was this necessary or were
you worried they would take over the war. Were you glad when they
came?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No,
I, I didn't uh think they would take over the war, you know of the
responsibilities of the Vietnamese uh. But then '68, '69 ah, they really took over you know the
responsibilities and...
Interviewer:
But
at the beginning they were necessary?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No.
Interviewer:
They
were not necessary?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
at the beginning when I was Prime Minister I think ah we need additional
troops right at that time ah, so, ah, arriving of an American troops,
w—was welcome. But instead of ah strengthening you know the Vietnamese
armed forces to replace you know the American unit...you see in the next
years more American troops coming. They bu...they really build up uh a
big massive armed forces - air ah, sea and ground forces.
So
after that they are so you know, involving in the war that they took
over everything. And that's bad because at the end we lost our own
identity. The Communists became the true nat—nationalist and we become
American puppet. And that's American press help a lot too, to make it
appear that we are you know puppet of American.
Interviewer:
Well,
get to that later. Let me ask you about this...the Tet Offensive.
Let’s
just cut for a minute.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Maybe you could try.
VIETNAM
Nguyen Cao Ky
SR #2634
Tape 1, Side 2
Clapstick
Nguyen Cao Ky
SR #2634
Tape 1, Side 2
Clapstick
Interviewer:
Mr.
Ky, let's jump back to the to the Tet Offensive. Why wasn't there a general
uprising as the Communists took over?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Because the majority of the Vietnamese are against communism. That's ah
that's what I am trying to tell everyone you know, for many years that
ah basically we we are against communism and not only the southerners
but even the pe...many people in the north are against communists.
Interviewer:
So,
their goal of trying to inspire a general uprising do you think that
this was a realistic goal?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
That’s what they thought but the Tet Offensive shows to them and to the whole
world that uh, the, the Vietnamese armed forces are capable to stop
their offensive, and also to show that uh the majority of the Vietnamese
people are supporting a non-communist regime in South Vietnam.
Interviewer:
You
won the battle, didn't you?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I won
the battle. I can say I won the battle because I was by myself that
night. Thieu was out
of town and I was by myself. At 2:00 in the morning ah, the base
commander he called me, he said well better you took a helicopter with
your family and go somewhere because is no longer safe at the base. They
are inside the base.
And
uh th...he said to me that ah he had many casualties he had no
reinforcement and ah...he didn’t think he could hold them longer. Well I
said that uh if you stay and then I will stay, and then we we stay and
fight them and we stop them.
Interviewer:
This
is at Tan Son
Nhut?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah...So the next morning I took over the command uh, direct uh, the
troops, uh, secur...security forces, the police forces and I uh dispatch
General Tong down to the IV Corps the delta, and uh
we actually clean them out of the city ah within two months and they
suffer a lot of big heavy casualties.
Interviewer:
It
was widely reported in the American press as a...as a, a victory for the
Communists.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Ha,
ha, ha. I don't know, during the wartime you know everything they did ah
the American press make it a big noise and big victory for them while I
had the impression that all the all along the war the western press
siding with them.
Interviewer:
But
wasn’t the...?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No,
you can you can see by yourself that uh...the people stay with us and
the soldiers stay and fight and it was it was a victory for the
non-communist.
Political and social impact of the American presence in the South
Interviewer:
What
was ah...The press also gave us pictures of vast social changes in, in
196-...after 1968. You know, prostitution and
overcrowding because of refugees and so on, did this tear apart the
fabric of South Vietnamese life? Can you comment on that?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh,
prostitution...now the tell tell me somewhere in this world that there
is no prostitution. Tell me some city, some country where there is no
prostitution. So there is prostitution in Vietnam, in Saigon of course. There
is corruption of course. There is black market, yes.
Ah
but, because we are living in in war for long time - thirty years, and
with the vast, the big presence of a foreign troops in you know in
Vietnam it created a lot of social problems...but we f...we recognize
the problem and we face them and try to solve them. But we we lost the
war not because prostitution, not because corruption, but uh, uh because
from the beginning we uh, we had a adopt strong, a strong, a strong...a
wrong strategy. That's all.
Interviewer:
Military strategy.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeh.
Interviewer:
What
was the...When you came to the United States in 1970 what was your reaction when the demonstrations and the
media uh uh comments. Did you think that the U.S. support for South
Vietnam was running out?
End of Roll
Roll 662
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(Phone rings)
Roll 662
Clapstick
(Phone rings)
Interviewer:
Near
the end of the American involvement when there is all the American uh,
people and the American wealth and money, and didn't this have a real
effect on South Vietnamese customs?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh
yeh, oh yeh.
Interviewer:
Tell
us about it...What did you feel personally that it was doing to your
society, the American presence?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well,
like like a black market you know. Uh, the press at that time tried to
blame it on ah Vietnamese official or Vietnamese people but uh, you know
that most of the goods came, you know, ah that selling at the black
market came from the various PX...and uh it’s wartime and a lot of
people both sides, American as well as Vietnamese are involving in the
black market you know, so it it created a big uh, uh upside down
society.
Interviewer:
Did
you feel your society was losing its identity and, and how?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah,
well losing id—identity because first because at that time all y...you
heard about war, you know, from American side...ah, so people are paying
more attention about what Mr. Johnson said, what ah, General Westmoreland said,
what McNamara said
but, uh, concerning what we said, what we think the people just ignored
it. That's the big...biggest lost we suffered.
Um,
even among the military y’know the Vietnamese unit who fought alongside
American unit uh had received more ah commodities, you know, more
facilities ah, ice cream, food, cigarette ah...so at the end you know,
they are so uh, Americanized that I remember one day I told Thieu and Vinh that if
it continued like this and someday when American withdrawal, go home ah
the Vietnamese armed forces will will no longer have all the you know
the, the facilities and commodities that we have today and uh...the, the
fighting capacities of soldiers will diminish.
Interviewer:
Not
enough ice cream.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah,
I think it's really you know ah changed ah you know, the face of the
society and in in, in the worse, no not better.
Interviewer:
The,
the Communists could then say we’re the ones that are gonna preserve the
society.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Exactly.
Interviewer:
You
tell me that.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
that's the reason they use it for their propaganda you know they said
that ah we are puppet of American, we are working you know, for America,
receive money from America die for American, they are the true
liberators you know. They, the...they fought for a nationalist cause and
for the Vietnamese people...so wh—when you look just at the surface,
when you look at, at what happened you know to the society, a lot of
people listen to that propaganda and believed them.
That's why I remember one day I told Mr. Johnson, I said why don't you just...stay (saw
noises) you know stay behind the scenes like the Russian, like the Chinese and uh let us make the
show--do the show. Well, he just smiled and we never get you know a good
response from American government. They they want to do most of the time
they want to do it by themselves.
Well like a big executive officer of a big, you know, manufacturers.
That, uh, well...I invest money, (saw noises) soldiers, equipment, I
want to control, I want to direct, I want to take decisions.
Interviewer:
Tell
me when you came to the United States in 1970...
Encounters with protesters
Clapstick
Interviewer:
When
you came here in 1970...all the demonstrations
and the media comments, how did you feel about that, those?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well...I had demonstration in New
Zealand, in Philippines and uh of course during my visit to the United
States back in 1970...I tell you an example of
when I stayed in Williamsburg
before I c...went to the How...White House.
I
stayed one night at Williamsburg with my wife and it was very cold and
the next morning when I wake up there was a group of thirty of them
young so-called "hippy" you know long hair and uh dirty. They stood
outside shouting so we were, we were escort by twenty-one secret agents
at that time so I asked the chief secret agent ah to invite them you
know to come inside the hotel and I will come down and and talk with
them.
So
first he said oh no I can't let them come closer to you because they are
ah dangerous people, you know taking drug, and so on and so...I said no
just let them because it it cold outside you know. I invite them to come
inside warm, and I want to to, to meet and talk with them.
So
finally they arranged for not all of them but about fifteen of them to
come inside the lobby, so I come down and I stood there you know. They
all surround me. I asked them what are you against and they said I am
against the war, we are against the war.
Well I said, Me too I am against the war. The reason I am against the
war because in war I risk my life every minute and you can see that I
have a beautiful new wife and beautiful new family and I, I want to
live, not to die in wartime so a as you, as any other people in the
world, I am against war.
But uh, when the war is imposed on you and when you have to defend your
own country then you have to accept war. Ah. As I said we are against
corruption. I said, me too. I am against corruption. Do you think I as a
chief of government, I am corrupted? They said not you, but you know
your government.
Yes, I said it’s true there is corruption in Vietnam as there is
corruption in anywhere. Ah, can you tell me that in your own society,
you know there is no, the most advanced society in the world, that can
you tell me today that there is no corruption? and at that they said, oh
you are right ha, ha, ha.
So, ah, you know, I I talked with them and I explained to them
everything you know, with honesty with my heart. Then when I left for
the White House, they all stood there and clapped and the guy ah from
the State Department
you know who, who escort us, you know, he said to me well I think
President Nixon needs
you. Stay here as he advise for PR, public relations. So you know,
that’s, that's that kind of a meeting, ah I had many in my life.
Interviewer:
But
in general were you discouraged by the ah way you were received in other
demonstrations. That must have hurt your feelings.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No,
not at all because I know that whether they avenge me because their
ignorance or because they are they belong to the other side, the
Communists, and I know that I cannot change the Communists, I cannot
change their mind as I know that they cannot change my mind. Now for the
people who uh...
End roll.
Thieu in relation to the 1971 elections and the Paris Agreements
Clapstick
Interviewer:
I
want to go on to the elections in Saigon in 1971. Why did
you withdraw from the race?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, Because we knew for sure that would not have a clean election.
That Thieu will rig
the election. That’s all.
Interviewer:
That
he will rig the election?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh
yes.
Interviewer:
Why?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, the reason he won the election with 104% of the vote, ha,
ha.
Interviewer:
So...
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, why, why because power corrupt. Once you stay there for four
years you want four year mores and after that he want eight years more
and you know.
Interviewer:
Now
uh...so you didn't want to be part of this.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No,
not at all...The American Ambassador Bunker wants very much that ah people like me
or Big Minh, you know,
participate in the election but uh we, we refused to play the game and
even Bunker come to
my house and offer financial aid if I accept to run against Mr. Thieu...but I didn't
accept it.
Interviewer:
Why?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Because I am honest ha, ha, ha.
Interviewer:
Um...during '72 and '73 when peace
negotiations were going on, did you think that the south could survive
the terms of the proposed agreement, the cease fire in place, etc.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, I, uh...the south could survive with only one condition and that
condition I mentioned it to ah Mr. Nixon and later on to Henry Kissinger and that
only condition ah that we asked was the Communist North Vietnam will
accept withdrawal all the North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam but
at the end I don't think we got this agreement from ah the communist
North Vietnam.
Interviewer:
No
the cease fire in place and they stayed there.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeh.
Interviewer:
Did you
feel that Nixon and
Kissinger were
abandoning you?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well...I feel that particularly for Henry Kissinger, see he is, I had the feeling
that he made more concessions to the other side, to the Communist than
he really trying to defend us as a friend.
Interviewer:
You
sort of felt as if he was abandoning you.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah...Yeah, I think he made too much concession to the Communist. The
the facts that you know, irony was that ah after the treaty was signed
and both Kissinger and
Communist Le Duc Tho both
get the Nobel Prize for ha, ha, peace, so you can see that we, the
non-communist Vietnamese are the victims.
Interviewer:
These are some questions for Elizabeth Deane. After the agreement there
were immediate violations I guess on both sides. How did the Thieu government view
the violations on both sides?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
y...y...you know that in any military military truce, you know, uh
unless you have international force or the control, otherwise if you
just leave it to the, you know, the so...two parties involved, of course
uh, they they will violate it and the war, the fighting will continue.
That's what I suggest to them you know before you know the treaty. I
said you should have, once the treaty was signed, ah international
forces you know for the control and the implementation of the
agreement.
Interviewer:
But
Washington could have been more helpful at, at that time if there hadn't
been Watergate and Nixon's resignation, and
so on. Were you keeping a close eye on on Washington, what was American politics? Do you
think they affected the uh...
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah, yeah...I I didn't realize the, uh, that factors you know before
my visit ‘70, 1970 to
Washington but then
after that visit I came back to Saigon and I told Thieu that ah we should do something you know
concerning public opinion in America. Ah, but Thieu didn't listen to
me.
Watergate and public opinion regarding the war
VIETNAM
T 885
SR #2635
NGUYEN CAO KY
This is Sound Roll #2635. Vietnam T 885. Date is 5/7/81.
Talking minus ten. Continuing interview with NGUYEN CAO KY
T 885
SR #2635
NGUYEN CAO KY
This is Sound Roll #2635. Vietnam T 885. Date is 5/7/81.
Talking minus ten. Continuing interview with NGUYEN CAO KY
Interviewer:
What
were the thoughts in Saigon at that time about Nixon's resignation and Watergate and all
that?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, at first we thought that Watergate is, you know, the whole thing
was was a ridiculous. i—iii, you know, it came as a big surprise for all
of us that because Watergate, an American president had to resign
because ah we don't think Nixon did something different than other, you know, American
presidents and other American politicians.
Ah. The only thing wrong with him is, was yyy you know, his not coming
out the firs—the very first minute and admit that, yes, I did it, like
others did it before me. But, now if you people don't like it, okay. I,
I apologize. Okay. I will not do it again. And, that's it.
Finished.
Interviewer:
How
did you feel all this would effect...
Nguyen Cao Ky:
But,
then, after he resign, you know, and then we ah we, we saw the trouble
coming because and now the Congress and the press, you know, have the, the control of
everything, you know. The executive branch with the resignation of the
president ah was so weak, weak at that time, you know. Couldn't do
anything to help us.
Concerning the press a, an, and the Congress we knew before the resig—resignation their feeling.
You know, their reaction about the program of Vietnam. So, we, were, you
know, we know that we are in trouble, because no longer after Mr. Nixon resignation we had
the support of the Congress
or, or the public opinion, no more.
Fall of the South
Interviewer:
On
the 1st of January in 1975 when the
Communists attacked Phuoc Binh.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Ya.
Interviewer:
Did
you think you were in trouble then? Did you think this was the beginning
of a big final offensive or was this just one ordinary battle?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Personally, I, I, I, I, I knew that it was the beginning. But, as you
know, ah in the past ah we have ah such kind of offensive, you know.
Every three months, every four months, every five months. So, I believe
ah that ah we could, you know, resist offensive and stop them.
But, then when it happened with Ban Me Thuot and seeing the the II Corps commanders and his
staff, you know, retreat to the south and abandon ah Pleiku, I, I went to see General Cao Van Vien and asked him
to give me the troops, uh tanks and then I will lead that column to
reoccupy Ban Me Thuot.
And, Vien said it was,
you can do it, but he had to ask the Thieu permission and that permission never, you
know, reach us, so...so we lost the whole Two Corps area.
Interviewer:
The
highlands were always very, traditionally have been very important, and
they were very important to the French strategically why is that?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, because, when you see, ah, uh, uh, uh on the map, you know, ah,
the figure of of Vietnam, the one who can occupy the highland can cut
Vietnam in two easily. Second, because they have the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
their troops, their sentries in Cambodia, you know. If they can occupy permanently the
highland and then it's a link between you know, the highland and the
North and the Cambodia and
Laos. In the, in the long run
we lost anyway. They will cut S—Vietnam in two.
Interviewer:
Ahm.
In April, later on when, when the army was,
North Vietnamese Army was sweeping down the country, you were trying to
work out a, a, a coup against Thieu or to force him to resign?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yes.
Camera Roll 664 is up. Clap sticks.
Interviewer:
If
you had gained some political power then, how would you have coped with
this massive assault?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I
think the whole problem is the, a military leadership. When you look
back in every battle from the beginning; Ban Me Thuot and...
Phone rings
Nguyen Cao Ky:
...Pleiku, The II Corps and
then Nha Trang and then the I
Corps you can see that the, ah, what happened was the corps commander,
you know, choose to run first. So, I thought that if, the you know, the
commanding choo—you know, choose to stay and fight the soldiers will
stay and fight with them. And the whole problem for us at that time was
the troops stay and fight.
That's what I told Martin when he come to my home. Am—American ambassador. Ah. When
he discuss with me about, you know, having me taking over the government
and ah what will be our military, you know, position, strategy, and
political and so on. So, I told him that the first thing that we have to
do is stop the enemy advance, you know, by having our troops stay and
fight. And, I could do it, if I stood there and fight, they will, you
know, stay and fight with me.
Interviewer:
Did
he encourage you to take over?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeah. That's what he di—discussed with me when he come to my
home.
Interviewer:
Why
didn't you?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, beca...And then we wait, you know. Said something like, well give
give him some day, you know, he will make arrangement for Mr. Thieu to go and
something like that. But then what happened was well, the French ambassador you know, went
to them and offer a solution, ah acceptable to the Communists. Which is,
ah Mr. Thieu go, and
ah, Big Minh replace
him you know the, as the head of the government...So, they they accept
the solution and what happen you can see. Well, uh...
Interviewer:
When
you actually left the country, uh, when did you think it was
all...over...when did you have to leave, and how did you do it?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, you know, I...I'm a soldier. So even in the last second, I still
had some hopes that I could do something. So that morning of the 29, you know I I stay up on the air the
whole night, directing air power to destroy the last ah missile ah
position of the enemy.
So, the next morning, ah I went to the headquarters of the general
staff. From there I tried to call the Marines, the paratroopers, the air
force, you know, tried to call all the units, and ah maybe have the last
meeting trying to do something. But then, all they left, the morning of
29, so I was by myself in a, in a big
compound of the of headquarters.
So
at noon time when American helicopters, you know, start their emigration
flight, uh, my aide, he come he said to me, well General, I think it's
too late now. And of course the Communists you know are coming ah all
over, so he said to me, you couldn't do nothing it's too late now, it's
better you fly out. So I decide to left, to you know, to fly out with my
own helicopter to the Midway aircraft carrier.
Interviewer:
What
was it like when you landed on the Midway?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, with the helicopter, you know, it’s easy landing.
Interviewer:
You
flew it yourself?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Ya.
Interviewer:
Tell
us, then you actually flew it, some people wouldn't think that you flew
it there, thought you had a pilot.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Hmm,
ha ha ha. And I think all I know, ah all I can, in the only thing can do
well, is you know, flying the airplane. Ha, ha I'm not a good
politicians, I'm not a good diplomat because I'm too honest.
Interviewer:
Did
you feel that the Americans would somehow, hope that the Americans would
come in during this April period, that the
B-52s would come back, and were you waiting for us to do
something?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
A
lot of people, yeh, a lot of Vietnamese people, are you know, hoping,
expecting that American government will, you know, but...personally now
cause, ah, three days before the end, I'm had a meeting with that guy
named Abbot he's Assistant Secretary of
Defense of Material. He, he, he came South Vietnam to oversee, ah you
know the, the evacuation of the material, all the destruction of the
material.
So
I met with him at headquarters of the, the Vietnamese air force. So I
asked him ah if I decide ah to go ah south and re group the troops down
the Mekong River, the Delta, and
continue the fight, ah you think the American government will support
the idea? And he look at me and he say, no. And he said ah when I go you
better go with me.
The war in hindsight and contemporary Vietnam
Interviewer:
If
you look back at the whole history of the war, when did you feel it was
lost?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
As I
said, you know, I...I until the last second, I am still hoping, I know,
I can, I personally can do something. But as I said earlier that you
know, sinks...right after the Paris Treaty was signed uh, I felt firmly
that with Thieu in
power and nothing chance, we're going going to lose the war to the
Communists. I said it before it happened, and it happened as I said
it.
Interviewer:
D-do
you...was the problem Thieu or was the problem that the North Vietnamese were left in
place?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well
I think mainly the problem were Thieu the problem of military leadership for
the South Vietnamese government. Because if we are strong enough, you
know, we can deal with the 300 or 400 thousand North Vietnamese
troops.
Interviewer:
Did
you feel betrayed by the Americans in Paris?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
No.
Because ah...in the whole affair I still think that we, you know, have
to bear the responsibilities because it's our country. Because it's our
government, our people, our armed forces. And because we were not
capable to build a strong army, a strong regime. That's why we lost the
war.
Interviewer:
Will
you go back? Are you going back sometime?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
I'm
going back. There's no doubt.
Interviewer:
Start one more time.
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh
yeh, yeh, I'm going back, no doubt. Because you know when you look at
the situation in Vietnam today, you know, millions of people are
suffering, whether in the so called education camp, or living in, you
know in misery. There's...not only no freedom, but no food, no medicine,
nothing.
When you look at you know, thousands of so called boat people who are
trying to, risking, risking their lives risking everything trying to
escape South Vietnam every day now: wh—who they are? They, they're
they're not imperialists, they are not the enemy of the regime, they are
just a poor, you know, innocent peasant. Why those people, you
know...
Interviewer:
Why...?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
...still today have to risk everything to escape the communist regime.
And even today, they still use my name and look up at me as someone who
can save them. Liberate them. So it it’s my duty and my
responsibilities. I have to go back, there's no doubt.
Rational for an offensive in the North
Interviewer:
Twenty feet left.
Clapstick
Interviewer:
Why
did you want to go north in '64?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Well, I wanted to go north because that's the only way to stop them.
You know. Uh, also there are sentries in the south for them. So there is
no way, no reason why we don't have our own sentries at North Vietnam.
And not only we can use those sentries as a rallying point for the
anti-communist people in North Vietnam, but also tying down their troops
so that they will not have you know too much to send down south. It's
very clear and simple. That's reason.
Interviewer:
Sentries. You wanted to establish outposts?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Yeh.
Well, big sentries, big you know, ah, set zone for our military
camp...And particularly at the time with the support we have from the
air and sea, the American sea and air forces. You know. It's easy.
Interviewer:
And
that continued to be your feeling all the way along?
Nguyen Cao Ky:
Oh
yeah, all the time. And also I advocated a blockade of Hai Phong, mining Hai Phong. And that's what
that's Nixon did, but
they wait how many years to did it? They should you know do it right at
the beginning.
Interviewer:
I
think this is just right.
END T885 VIETNAM
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